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I. INTRODUCTION
A female attorney claimed that the male attorneys with whom she
worked regularly talked about their sex lives, told jokes about sex,
joked about masturbation in slang terms, and used the word "fuck.",
These conversations were not directed to the female attorney, but she
heard them and found them "acutely offensive to her as a woman."2 A
female manager of a city's computer department claimed that she reg-
ularly observed her supervisor viewing pictures of completely naked
women on Internet websites. 3 A female firefighter-the first woman
assigned to her engine company-saw stacks of pornographic
magazines in the company's common living areas, witnessed male
1. Fitzgerald v. Ford Marrin Esposito Witmeyer & Gleser, L.L.P., 153 F. Supp. 2d
219, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd, 2002 WL 313225 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2002).
2. Id.
3. Coniglio v. City of Berwyn, No. 99C4475, 2000 WL 967989, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June
15, 2000).
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firefighters watching pornographic movies in the company's common
sitting area, and heard frequent conversation about whether the male
firefighters had gotten "banged" over the weekend.
4
All three women are complaining about non-targeted sexual con-
duct in the workplace. Does such conduct violate Title VII's prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination in employment? Because the conduct did
not result in a tangible employment action, it will be actionable under
Title VII only if the plaintiff can prove that it constituted hostile work
environment sexual harassment. 5 The plaintiff must prove that the
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and to create an abusive work environment. 6 The plain-
tiff also must have some basis for establishing employer liability for
the conduct. 7 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,8 the Su-
preme Court emphasized an additional requirement in every sexual
harassment case: the plaintiff must prove that the conduct constituted
sex discrimination. This requirement may be difficult to satisfy when
the harassing conduct is not targeted on the basis of sex.
The majority of sexual harassment cases involve conduct that is
discriminatory under a disparate treatment theory. In other words,
most sexual harassment claims involve harassing conduct that is
caused by the sex of the plaintiff, where the harasser would not treat
someone of a different sex than the plaintiff in the manner in which he
or she is treating the plaintiff. The classic sexual harassment fact pat-
tern-in which a male supervisor tells a female subordinate "sleep
with me or I'll fire you"-is an example of disparate treatment; it
seems unlikely that the supervisor would have made such a demand of
a male subordinate.
Women who complain about non-targeted sexual conduct in the
workplace-conduct that was not caused by their sex-cannot estab-
lish that the conduct was discriminatory disparate treatment. How-
ever, they may be able to satisfy the discrimination requirement for
4. O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 718-19, 722 (1st Cir. 2001).
5. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998) (explaining
that sexually discriminatory conduct not involving a tangible employment action
is actionable only as hostile work environment sexual harassment); see also Re-
becca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1154
(1998) (noting that the Ellerth Court "distinguished discrimination resulting in
what it termed a 'tangible employment action' from harassment that is severe or
pervasive").
6. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The plaintiff must prove
both that a reasonable person would have perceived the environment to be abu-
sive and that the plaintiff had such a perception. Id. at 21-22; see also Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 754 (noting that hostile work environment harassment claims require
a showing of severe or pervasive conduct).
7. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65 (establishing a rule for employer liability for hos-
tile work environments created by a supervisor).
8. 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
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actionable sexual harassment through the disparate impact theory of
discrimination. Disparate impact discrimination occurs when a
facially neutral employment practice disproportionately harms mem-
bers of a protected class and is not job-related or consistent with busi-
ness necessity. 9 Should women in workplaces festooned with nude
pin-ups, in which vulgar language and discussions of sex are common-
place, be able to sue their employers for sexual harassment, claiming
that the work environment disproportionately harms them in viola-
tion of Title VII?1o
This Article explores whether non-targeted sexual conduct in the
workplace should be actionable under Title VII. Part II describes
courts' evolving understanding of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination, including their tendency to assume that any sexual
conduct in the workplace constituted sex discrimination and the Su-
preme Court's rejection of that approach in Oncale. Part III discusses
sexual harassment as a form of disparate treatment discrimination
and explains why non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace can-
not be actionable under a disparate treatment theory. Part IV ana-
lyzes whether non-targeted workplace sexual conduct can be
actionable under the disparate impact theory of discrimination, which
requires a plaintiff to prove that a facially neutral employment prac-
tice has a disparate impact on persons of one sex. Part V explores
potential problems with finding non-targeted workplace sexual con-
duct actionable. In Part VI, the Article concludes that non-targeted
sexual conduct in the workplace should be actionable only if the con-
duct's disproportionate impact on women is great.
II. THE EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AS A
FORM OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
Courts have struggled to determine whether and under what cir-
cumstances sexual conduct in the workplace violates Title VII's prohi-
bition of sex discrimination in employment."1 Courts initially viewed
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000).
10. This Article generally refers to female plaintiffs because the vast majority of
plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases are women. See Ann Juliano & Stewart J.
Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 560
(2001) (noting that, out of nearly 650 federal court cases involving sexual harass-
ment claims, only 5.4% of the cases involved male plaintiffs). In addition, re-
search suggests that non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace-the
harassing conduct focused upon in this Article-is disproportionately harmful to
women. See infra notes 260-76 and accompanying text. It is possible, however,
that under some circumstances a male plaintiff could prove that non-targeted
sexual conduct in the workplace had a disparate impact on men. See infra note
271.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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workplace sexual conduct, even when a supervisor based employment
decisions on a subordinate's willingness to engage in such conduct, as
outside the scope of Title VII. After courts recognized that workplace
sexual conduct could constitute sexual harassment in violation of Title
VII, however, they began ignoring the statutory requirement that
such conduct be sexually discriminatory. Instead, courts just looked
at whether the challenged conduct was sexual in nature, reasoning
that, if it was, it could be the basis of a sexual harassment claim.
Under this view, any workplace sexual conduct, even if it was non-
targeted, could be the basis of a Title VII claim. In its 1998 decision in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,12 the Supreme Court re-
jected this view, holding that it was not sufficient for harassing con-
duct to be sexual in nature. Rather, to be actionable under Title VII,
harassing conduct must constitute discrimination because of sex.13
A. Recognition of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment as
Actionable Under Title VII: The Relevance of Desire
Courts first recognized that sexual conduct in the workplace could
violate Title VII in the late 1970s. The first cases involved allegations
of what was termed quid pro quo sexual harassment, where supervi-
sors conditioned employment benefits on sexual favors. 14 In the typi-
cal case, the female plaintiff alleged that her employment was
terminated because she rejected her male supervisor's sexual ad-
vances. At first many courts did not view this conduct as violative of
Title VII. According to some courts, such conduct reflected the per-
sonal and private preferences of the plaintiffs supervisors, not action-
able sex discrimination in the workplace.1 5
12. 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
13. Id.
14. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOY-
MENT LAW 8 (1992) (describing the essence of a quid pro quo claim as "that the
individual has been forced to choose between suffering an economic detriment
and submitting to sexual demands," a "'put out or get out' bargain").
15. For example, in Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., the court rejected the plaintiffs'
Title VII claim based on their supervisor's repeated sexual conduct on the
grounds that the supervisor's conduct "appears to be nothing more than a per-
sonal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism. By his alleged sexual advances, [the
supervisor] was satisfying a personal urge." 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz.
1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (stating that Title VII "is not in-
tended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical attack moti-
vated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened to occur in
a corporate corridor rather than a back alley"), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977).
Courts suggested that if such conduct was deemed to create a cause of action,
the federal courts would be overrun with frivolous cases. The district court in
Tomkins stated:
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Other courts held that plaintiffs were discriminated against be-
cause they refused to provide sexual favors, not because of their gen-
der. In Barnes v. Train, for example, the plaintiff alleged that her
position was eliminated because she refused her male supervisor's
sexual advances. The court rejected the plaintiffs Title VII claim, rea-
soning that "[t]he substance of plaintiffs complaint is that she was
discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but because she
refused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor."16 Courts
refused to equate acts motivated by sexual desire with sex
discrimination. 17
In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed Barnes and became the first federal appellate court to hold
that quid pro quo sexual harassment could constitute sex discrimina-
tion.1S The court focused on sexual desire, assuming that the plain-
tiffs supervisor was heterosexual and that his conduct was motivated
If the plaintiffs view were to prevail, no superior could, prudently, at-
tempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of either sex. An
invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a
once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time. And if an
inebriated approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christ-
mas party could form the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination
if a promotion or a raise is later denied to the subordinate, we would
need 4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400.
422 F. Supp. at 557. Similarly, the district court in Corne asserted: "[A]n out-
growth of holding such activity [sexual advances by a supervisor to a
subordinate] to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit
every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward
another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to
have employees who were asexual." 390 F. Supp. at 163-64.
16. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212 (D.D.C. 1974),
rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The defendants in
Williams v. Saxbe also made this argument:
[S]ince the primary variable in the claimed class is willingness vel non to
furnish sexual consideration, rather than gender, the sex description
proscriptions of the Act are not invoked. Plaintiff was allegedly denied
employment enhancement not because she was a woman, but rather be-
cause she decided not to furnish the sexual consideration claimed to
have been demanded. Therefore, plaintiff is in no different class from
other employees, regardless of their gender or sexual orientation, who
are made subject to such carnal demands.
413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976). However, the Williams court rejected the
argument. Id. at 657-58.
17. For example, in Tomkins, the plaintiff, a former employee of a utility company,
alleged that her male supervisor made sexual advances to her and that she was
discharged as a result of her complaints about the advances. The district court
rejected the plaintiffs claim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, reason-
ing that "[w]hile sexual desire animated the parties, or at least one of them, the
gender of each is incidental to the claim of abuse." 422 F. Supp. at 556. Accord-
ing to the court, although the supervisor was male and the plaintiff was female,
"[lt]he gender lines might as easily have been reversed, or even not crossed at all."
Id.
18. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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by sexual attraction to the plaintiff.19 In light of that assumption, the
court reasoned that male employees would not have been subjected to
the conduct that the plaintiff had experienced: "retention of her job
was conditioned upon submission to sexual relations-an exaction
which the supervisor would not have sought from any male."2 0 Re-
jecting the district court's distinction between discrimination against
the plaintiff because of her sex and discrimination against the plain-
tiff because she rejected her supervisor's advances, the court noted
that "[b]ut for her womanhood, . . . her participation in sexual activity
would never have been solicited."2 1 Under the reasoning of the court
of appeals in Barnes, sexual harassment in the form of sexual ad-
vances-unless there was evidence that the harasser would direct his
or her advances to members of both sexes 2 2-was sex discrimination,
and thus was actionable under Title VII.23 Other courts soon followed
this approach.24
As discussed above, Barnes and the other early sexual harassment
cases involved allegations of quid pro quo sexual harassment, in which
employment benefits were conditioned on sexual favors. The next
question the courts had to resolve was whether workplace sexual con-
duct violated Title VII when job benefits were not conditioned upon
19. Id. at 989 n.49 (noting that "there is no suggestion that appellant's allegedly amo-
rous supervisor is other than heterosexual").
20. Id. at 989.
21. Id. at 990.
22. The court based its finding of sex discrimination on the assumption that the har-
asser would not have made sexual advances to an individual not of the plaintiffs
sex; accordingly, the sexual orientation of the harasser is highly relevant to the
court's reasoning. The court explained:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition could be imposed on a
male subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon a
subordinate of either gender by a homosexual superior of the same gen-
der. In each instance, the legal problem would be identical to that con-
fronting us now[,] the exaction of a condition which, but for his or her
sex, the employee would not have faced. These situations, like that at
bar, are to be distinguished from a bisexual superior who conditions the
employment opportunities of a subordinate of either gender upon partici-
pation in a sexual affair. In the case of the bisexual superior, the insis-
tence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination
because it would apply to male and female employees alike.
Id. at 990 n.55.
23. Id. at 995. The District of Columbia District Court had reached the same conclu-
sion the previous year. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.D.C.
1976) (holding that an employer violates Title VII when a supervisor dismisses
an employee because she rejected his sexual advances: "the conduct of the plain-
tiffs supervisor created an artificial barrier to employment which was placed
before one gender and not the other"), rev'd in part, vacated in part, on separate
grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
24. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir.
1977).
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the provision of sexual favors.25 What if the plaintiff was not com-
plaining that a negative employment action was taken after she re-
fused her supervisor's advances, but rather was complaining about the
advances occurring at all? Such complaints gave rise to a second type
of sexual harassment claim, hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment, which occurs when conduct based on sex creates a hostile envi-
ronment but does not result in a tangible employment action.26 The
majority of sexual harassment cases in the federal courts involve alle-
gations of hostile work environment sexual harassment.2 7
B. Recognition of Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment as a Form of Sex Discrimination: Sexual
Desire, Sexual Conduct, and Conduct Based
upon Sex
Courts were initially reluctant to recognize hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII, but their reluc-
tance was not due to an inability to understand such harassment as
constituting discrimination based on sex. Rather, courts held that
sexual harassment alone-not connected with the denial of any tangi-
ble job benefit-was not discrimination with respect to the "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" within the meaning of Title
VII.28
In Bundy v. Jackson,29 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit became the first appellate court to hold that hostile
work environment sexual harassment violated Title VII. The court re-
lied upon the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Rogers v. EEOC,3o which held
that an employer's practice of providing discriminatory service to its
Hispanic clients created a hostile work environment for its Hispanic
25. The Tomkins court expressly left that question open. See 568 F.2d at 1046 n.1.
26. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998) (explaining
that sexually discriminatory conduct not involving a tangible employment action
is actionable only as hostile work environment sexual harassment); Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (holding that "a plaintiff may establish a
violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a
hostile or abusive work environment").
27. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 565 (noting that, out of nearly 650 fed-
eral court cases involving sexual harassment claims, almost 70% of the cases in-
cluded only a hostile environment claim, and an additional 22.5% included both a
hostile environment and a quid pro quo claim).
28. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 900-01 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing
district court's conclusion that there was no violation of Title VII unless the
plaintiffs supervisor's conduct inflicted upon her "some tangible job detriment");
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing the district
court's rationale for refusing to grant the plaintiff any declaratory or injunctive
relief).
29. 641 F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
30. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
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employees, in violation of Title VII.31 In his opinion in Rogers, Judge
Goldberg stated that "the phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps
within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environ-
ment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination," protecting
employees' psychological as well as economic fringe benefits from dis-
criminatory abuse by employers. 32 The Bundy court found Judge
Goldberg's reasoning persuasive and noted, moreover, that unless it
held that hostile work environment sexual harassment was actiona-
ble, "an employer could sexually harass a female employee with impu-
nity by carefully stopping short of firing the employee or taking any
other tangible actions against her in response to her resistance."3 3
In contrast to its detailed analysis of how a hostile work environ-
ment could constitute "a term, condition, or privilege of employment,"
the Bundy court dealt very briefly with the issue of whether the con-
duct at issue in the case was sexually discriminatory. The court
stated that it "ha[d] no difficulty inferring that Bundy suffered dis-
crimination on the basis of sex."34 The conduct at issue in that case,
as in the quid pro quo cases, was sexual advances; as in those cases,
the plaintiffs supervisors made sexual demands of her that they
would not have made of male employees. 3 5
In the next appellate case to discuss hostile work environment sex-
ual harassment, Henson v. City of Dundee,36 the court expressly laid
out what it considered the elements of a hostile environment cause of
action, including the requirement that "[t]he harassment complained
of was based upon sex."37 The court explained that to satisfy this
"based upon sex" requirement, "the plaintiff must show that but for
the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of harass-
ment."38 According to the court, the plaintiff can easily make such a
showing "[i]n the typical case in which a male supervisor makes sex-
ual overtures to a female worker."3 9 The plaintiff will have difficulty
proving sex discrimination only in "cases in which a supervisor makes
31. Id. at 944 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)).
32. 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
33. 641 F.2d at 945.
34. Id. at 943.
35. See id. at 942; see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Trans-
formation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1199 (1989) (noting that
demands for sexual contact "were among the first offenses that women targeted
in hostile environment actions").
36. 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
37. The other elements were as follows: the employee belongs to a protected class; the
employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; the harassment af-
fected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and respondeat superior. Id.
at 903-05.
38. Id. at 904.
39. Id.
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sexual overtures to workers of both sexes or where the conduct com-
plained of is equally offensive to male and female workers."40
The Henson court concluded-with no analysis of the plaintiffs al-
legations-that the harassing conduct alleged by the plaintiff occurred
because of the plaintiffs sex. 4 1 To some extent, this lack of analysis is
not surprising. The harassment alleged by the female police dis-
patcher consisted in part of the male chief of police's repeated requests
that the plaintiff have sexual relations with him.42 As in the quid pro
quo cases of Barnes and Bundy, the court likely concluded that the
police chief made these requests out of sexual desire for the plaintiff
and that he would not have made such requests to male employees.
The Henson plaintiff complained about more than requests for sexual
relations, however. She also alleged that the police chief subjected her
and the only other female employee "to numerous harangues of
demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities."43
Why did the Henson court feel no need to examine or even discuss
whether the police chiefs "sexual inquiries and vulgarities" occurred
because of the plaintiffs sex? The court stated in a footnote that, un-
like in disparate treatment sex discrimination cases, "the case of sex-
ual harassment that creates an offensive environment does not
present a factual question of intentional discrimination which is at all
elusive. Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervi-
sor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based
upon sex."44 The court's reference to a "bisexual supervisor" indicates
the court's belief that whether harassment is because of sex depends
upon whether it arises out of the harasser's sexual desire for the tar-
get of the harassment. The court apparently assumed that because
the police chiefs "inquiries and vulgarities" were sexual in nature,
they were motivated by his desire for the plaintiff, and the police chief
would not have directed such "inquiries and vulgarities" to male
employees.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's)
Guidelines on sexual harassment may have helped the Henson court
equate sexual conduct with the requirement that harassing conduct
occurs because of the plaintiffs sex. In 1980, the EEOC issued Guide-
lines providing that "[hlarassment on the basis of sex" violates Title
40. Id.
41. After describing the five elements for a hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment claim, the court stated simply: "In this case, Henson has made a prima facie
showing of all elements necessary to establish a violation of Title VII." Id. at 905.
42. Id. at 899.
43. Id. The court later referred to the police chiefs subjecting the plaintiff and her
female coworker to "crude and vulgar language, almost daily inquiring of these
two women employees as to their sexual habits and proclivities." Id. at 900-01.
44. Id. at 905 n.11.
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VII.45 The Guidelines then state that "[ulnwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature constitute sexual harassment... ."46 The Henson court
cited this provision of the Guidelines as "helpfully defin[ing] the type
of conduct that may constitute sexual harassment."47 The Henson
court may have interpreted the Guidelines as indicating that unwel-
come sexual conduct in the workplace is always harassment on the
basis of sex, rather than as providing one example of the kind of con-
duct that may constitute sexual harassment if it occurs because of the
plaintiffs sex. In other words, if the alleged harassing conduct is sex-
ual in nature, there is sex discrimination, except in the rare case of the
bisexual harasser.4S
In the vast majority of hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment cases after Henson, courts held with little analysis that if the
alleged harassing conduct was sexual in nature, it was based upon the
plaintiffs sex. The Ninth Circuit did not even include conduct based
upon sex as an element of a cause of action for sexual harassment,
requiring only that the harassing conduct be "of a sexual nature."49
Other courts listed "conduct based upon sex" as one of the elements of
a hostile environment cause of action but never discussed whether the
plaintiff satisfied this element.50 In fact, in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,51 its decision holding that hostile work environment sexual
harassment violated Title VII, the Supreme Court addressed the re-
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2001).
46. Id.
47. 682 F.2d at 903.
48. In her article What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment, Katherine Franke criticizes
courts' misreading of the EEOC Guidelines to equate sexual conduct with dis-
crimination because of sex: "The EEOC Guidelines on sexual harassment seek to
define only part of the Title VII prima facie case. They do not address the en-
tirety of the plaintiffs case." 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 719 (1997); see also Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 n.6 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that
the district court's holding that sexual advances, innuendo, or contact were nec-
essary to establish a hostile work environment may have resulted from that
court's misreading of the EEOC Guidelines on sexual harassment).
49. See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). One Ninth
Circuit judge expressly rejected including conduct based upon sex as an element
of a sexual harassment cause of action, stating that "sexual harassment is ordi-
narily based on sex. What else could it be based on?" Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d
503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., not joined by other two judges as to this
part). While the judge was addressing a claim of quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment, his reasoning on this point does not appear limited to that type of
harassment.
50. See Steven L. Willborn, Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the Fate of
Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 677, 684-
85 (1999) (stating that, when harassing conduct is sexual in nature and directed
at a member of the opposite sex, "courts find that the 'based on sex' element is
met without any proof of actual discrimination").
51. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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quirement of sex discrimination with the following brief statement:
"Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on
the basis of sex."52
In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,53 the court explained its under-
standing of the connection between conduct that is sexual in nature
and conduct that occurs because of the plaintiffs sex or gender. The
Andrews court acknowledged that an element of a hostile environment
cause of action is intentional discrimination because of sex.54 The
court concluded, however, that some of the harassing conduct alleged
by the plaintiffs in that case easily could be deemed intentionally dis-
criminatory: "The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases
involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or
sexual ly] derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recog-
nized as a matter of course. A more fact intensive analysis will be
necessary where the actions are not sexual by their very nature."s5
The Andrews court's conclusion that sexual propositions can be
presumed to be sexually discriminatory is not surprising. It flows nat-
urally from the presumption, recognized in early quid pro quo and
hostile environment cases, that when a man makes sexual advances
toward a woman, he does so because of his heterosexual desire for the
woman. What is more interesting is the court's declaration that sex-
ual innuendo, pornographic materials, and sexually derogatory lan-
guage should be recognized as sexually discriminatory as a matter of
course. It is not obvious that a male supervisor would use sexual in-
nuendo or sexually derogatory language or display pornographic
materials 56 only or primarily because of his heterosexual desire for a
52. In fairness, the facts of Meritor strongly suggested that the plaintiffs supervisor
would not have subjected a male employee to the kind of treatment to which he
subjected the plaintiff: forcing her to have sexual intercourse with him, fondling
her, and exposing himself to her. See id. at 60. The succinct discussion of the
requirement of sex discrimination may thus have been appropriate in that case.
It is worth noting, however, that at least one lower court read the Meritor opinion
as indicating that it was not necessary to determine whether harassing conduct
was discriminatory. In Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., the court responded to
the defendant's claim that the alleged harassment was not based on sex as fol-
lows: "Arguably, the Meritor Court moved away from a disparate treatment or
'but for' analysis of gender harassment, and moved toward the view that gender
harassment occurs when unwelcome physical or verbal conduct creates a hostile
work environment." 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (D. Wy. 1993).
53. 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1482 n.3.
56. As discussed infra at section III.D, "pornographic materials" in some cases may
raise an inference of disparate treatment sex discrimination, for example, in
cases where male coworkers place pornographic materials in the desk drawers of
their female coworkers, apparently in order to make their female coworkers un-
comfortable. Some of the pornography complained about in Andrews was of this
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particular female employee. Accordingly, it appears that the court's
reasoning cannot be based solely on the idea that this kind of conduct
evinces sexual desire and thus constitutes discrimination on the basis
of sex. Instead, the court seems to be assuming that any conduct that
is "sexual by [its] very nature" is sexually discriminatory. Many other
courts have taken the same approach as the Andrews court, equating
conduct that is sexual in nature with the statutory requirement of sex
discrimination. 57
In short, courts came full circle from the days in which they held
that sexual conduct occurring in the workplace was based on sexual
desire and accordingly was not sex discrimination. S They assumed
that any sexual conduct in the workplace was discrimination because
of sex. Under this view, the sex discrimination requirement would
nature. See 895 F.2d at 1475. Some of the pornography, however, was just dis-
played in the locker room, with no indication that the display was intended to
make women feel unwelcome in the workplace. See id. at 1472. In any event,
there was no indication that any of the pornography was displayed due to the
male police officers' sexual desire for the plaintiffs.
57. For example, in Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., the court held that
"sexual behavior directed at a woman raises the inference that the harassment is
based on her sex." 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("sexual behav-
ior directed at women will raise the inference that the harassment is based on
their sex"); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904-05 (11th
Cir. 1988) (finding that comments made to the female plaintiff by her male co-
workers "carried sexual connotations" and thus were based on the plaintiffs sex).
As in Andrews, some of the conduct at issue in Burns was sexual advances, but
the plaintiff also complained about sexual comments and vulgar name-calling.
Because the conduct was sexual, the court concluded that it constituted sex dis-
crimination. The court noted that "the harassment, because of its sexual nature,
was based on Bums' sex." 955 F.2d at 564. Interestingly, many of the sexual
comments-such as asking the plaintiff after she left the restroom if she had
been "playing with [her]self in there"-were made by a female manager-trainee.
Id. at 560. Nonetheless, the court concluded that they were made because of the
plaintiffs sex. As discussed infra at notes 66-67 and accompanying text, most
courts have rejected the presumption that sexual conduct is sexually discrimina-
tory in same-sex harassment cases.
Similarly, in Cline v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., the court stated
that if the harassment is related to sexual activity, discriminatory intent is pre-
sent: "[T]he discriminatory nature of the charged conduct speaks for itself." 748
F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see also Smolsky v. Consol. Rail Corp., 780
F. Supp. 283, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that sexual comments created the in-
ference that the harassment was based on the plaintiffs gender). The Seventh
Circuit has noted that "it is generally taken as a given that when a female em-
ployee is harassed in explicitly sexual ways by a male worker or workers, she has
been discriminated against 'because of her sex." Doe v. City of Belleville, 119
F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 523 U.S.
1001 (1998).
58. L. Camille Hebert made a similar observation in a recent article, Sexual Harass-
ment as Discrimination "Because of... Sex": Have We Come Full Circle?, 27 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 439 (2001).
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pose no obstacle to women bringing harassment actions based on nude
pin-ups or discussions of sex in the workplace. Because the conduct
was sexual in nature, courts would find the discrimination element
satisfied.
C. A Renewed Focus on the Requirement of Sex
Discrimination: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.
Using sexual conduct as a proxy for conduct occurring because of
the plaintiffs sex may have seemed like a simple solution to many
courts, allowing them to bypass the issue of discrimination to get to
the issue of whether the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create a hostile work environment. 5 9 The problem with using sex-
ual conduct as such a proxy, however, is that it is both under- and
over-inclusive. 60
All sex-based conduct-all conduct that is sexually discrimina-
tory-is not sexual in nature. The tendency of courts to equate con-
duct that is sexual in nature with conduct that is sexually
discriminatory, however, led them to separate the instances'of harass-
ing conduct alleged by the plaintiff into two groups: sexual conduct
and non-sexual conduct. 6 1 Courts would consider only the conduct
that was obviously sexual in nature when determining whether the
plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment that created
an abusive work environment. 6 2 Courts would view the non-sexual
conduct-even if it was directed only at women or was motivated by
animus against women-as irrelevant to a plaintiffs sexual harass-
59. See, e.g., Cline v. Gen. Elec. Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 650, 654 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (stating that "[tihe main issue in sexual harassment cases is not
whether the employer harassed the employee on the basis of her gender, but
whether the claimed harassment affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of
the plaintiffs employment").
60. See Willborn, supra note 50, at 683, 693 (explaining that sexual conduct "is an
imperfect proxy for discrimination" because "'sexual conduct' can occur when no
'discrimination' is present, and 'discrimination' can occur when no 'sexual con-
duct' is present").
61. In her article Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Vicki Schultz discusses at
length the disaggregation approach engaged in by courts in sexual harassment
cases. 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1706-38 (1998). Schultz contends that disaggregation
is "the most prominent feature of hostile work environment jurisprudence," in
which courts disaggregate "sexual advances and other conduct that courts con-
sider 'sexual' in nature from other gender-based mistreatment that judges con-
sider nonsexual." Id. at 1713.
62. See id. at 1714 (explaining that courts engaging in disaggregation "decide, explic-
itly or implicitly, that only overtly sexual conduct counts toward establishing hos-
tile work environment harassment and that nonsexual conduct must be
considered-if at all-as a separate form of disparate treatment").
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ment claim.6 3 The problem with this disaggregation approach was
that it left courts with a much too narrow view of the plaintiffs work
environment. If a court only considers, for example, two sexual pro-
positions in determining whether the plaintiff experienced severe or
pervasive harassment, the court is unlikely to find that requirement
satisfied. If, on the other hand, the court considers all of the harass-
ing conduct that was caused by the plaintiffs sex-two sexual proposi-
tions and evidence that the plaintiffs coworkers frequently belittled
her and sabotaged her work because of her sex, for example-the
court is much more likely to find that she experienced an objectively
hostile work environment. Courts' focus on sexual harassment doc-
trine as involving only sexual conduct in the workplace hurt the abil-
ity of plaintiffs to challenge the many other ways in which they are
discriminated against in the workplace because of their sex.64
63. Schultz describes several cases in which courts engaged in disaggregation. Id. at
1706-10, 1716-20. For example, in Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp.
1438, 1442 (S.D.W. Va. 1985), the plaintiff alleged that her foreman treated her
differently from the male employees and picked on her all the time. The court
rejected the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim, reasoning that she "was not sub-
jected to harassment of a sexual nature" because the foreman "did not demand
sexual relations .... touch her or make sexual jokes." Id. Schultz notes that
other courts have been more subtle than the Turley court, simply proceeding,
"without analysis, to examine only the sexually explicit conduct for the hostile
work environment claim and to consider the nonsexual conduct, if at all, under a
separate disparate treatment analysis-each in isolation from the other." See
Schultz, supra note 61, at 1720, n.178 (citing cases); see also Williams v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564-65 (6th Cir. 1999) (criticizing the district court's
consideration only of instances of harassment that were sexual in nature, be-
cause "harassing behavior that is not sexually explicit but is directed at women
and motivated by discriminatory animus against women satisfies the 'based on
sex' requirement").
64. Schultz contends that much of the workplace harassment experienced by women
is not sexual in nature but is nonetheless based on sex:
[M]any of the most prevalent forms of harassment are actions that are
designed to maintain work-particularly the more highly rewarded lines
of work-as bastions of masculine competence and authority. Every
day, in workplaces all over the country, men uphold the image that theirjobs demand masculine mastery by acting to undermine their female col-
leagues' perceived (or sometimes even actual) competence to do the
work. The forms of such harassment are wide-ranging. They include
characterizing the work as appropriate for men only; denigrating wo-
men's performance or ability to master the job; providing patronizing
forms of help in performing the job; withholding the training, informa-
tion, or opportunity to learn to do the job well; engaging in deliberate
work sabotage; providing sexist evaluations of women's performance or
denying them deserved promotions; isolating women from the social net-
works that confer a sense of belonging; denying women the perks or priv-
ileges that are required for success; assigning women sex-stereotyped
service tasks that lie outside their job descriptions (such as cleaning or
serving coffee); engaging in taunting, pranks, and other forms of hazing
designed to remind women that they are different and out of place; and
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Moreover, all conduct that is sexual in nature is not sexually dis-
criminatory. A court deciding an early quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment case recognized that the bisexual harasser posed a problem for
courts' willingness to equate sexual conduct with conduct that is sexu-
ally discriminatory, reasoning that in such a case "the insistence upon
sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it
would apply to male and female employees alike."65 In the 1990s,
courts were particularly troubled by the potential over-inclusiveness
of the sexual conduct approach in cases involving same-sex sexual
harassment. Many courts were unwilling to assume that conduct that
was sexual in nature-and that was directed at a person of the same
sex as the harasser-was harassment "based on sex" and actionable
under Title VII. Courts adopted what the Supreme Court character-
ized as "a bewildering variety of stances" 66 on the issue of when, if
ever, same-sex sexual harassment was actionable. 67
Responding to the lower courts' confusion, in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.,68 the Supreme Court answered the narrow
question whether conduct among members of the same sex could ever
be deemed sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. In so doing, the
Court also answered the broader question about the connection be-
tween sexual harassment and sex discrimination, dealing with both
the under- and over-inclusiveness of the "sexual conduct" approach.
The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that sexual
harassment could be actionable under Title VII when the harasser
and the harassed employee were of the same sex.69 The Court empha-
physically assaulting or threatening to assault the women who dare to
fight back.
Schultz, supra note 61, at 1687.
65. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
66. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
67. See, e.g., Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 579 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that all
workplace harassment that is sexual in nature is actionable because such harass-
ment conditions the plaintiffs employment "upon her willingness to endure har-
assment that is inseparable from her gender"), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); McWilliams
v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that
the harasser is homosexual); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52
(5th Cir. 1994) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is never actionable
under Title VII).
68. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). The plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, worked on one of Sundowner's
offshore oil rigs. He alleged that his supervisor and two of his coworkers sexually
harassed him by, among other things, threatening to rape him and forcing a bar
of soap in his anus while he was showering. 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
69. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The Court noted that in its racial discrimination cases it
had rejected any conclusive presumption that persons will not discriminate
against members of their own race. Id. at 78 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 499 (1977)). Similarly, Title VII does not bar a claim of sex discrimina-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1152
sized, however, that to be actionable under Title VII, sexual harass-
ment must constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of the
statute. 70 The Court rejected the idea that "sexual conduct" is a proxy
for the statutory requirement of sex discrimination. First, the Court
noted the over-inclusiveness of the "sexual conduct" approach, noting
that not all sexual conduct in the workplace is sex discrimination: "We
have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment be-
tween men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex
merely because the words used have sexual content or connota-
tions."71 The Court also noted that harassing conduct could constitute
discrimination because of sex even if it is not motivated by sexual de-
sire, implicitly rejecting the under-inclusiveness of the "sexual con-
duct" approach. 72
According to the Court, "the critical issue" in determining whether
harassing conduct violates Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation "is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvanta-
geous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed."73 The Court gave several examples of
ways in which a jury could infer that harassing conduct was sexually
discriminatory. Where the conduct consists of proposals of sexual ac-
tivity, a jury could infer discrimination if the harasser and target are
tion merely because the plaintiff and the defendant are of the same sex. Id. at 79.
Nothing in the language of Title VII or in the Court's precedents indicated that
hostile environment sexual harassment claims should be treated differently. See
id. ("We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a
categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title
VII.")
70. See, e.g., id. at 76 ("This case presents the question whether workplace harass-
ment can violate Title VII's prohibition against 'discriminat[ion] . . . because of
... sex,' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), when the harasser and the harassed employee
are of the same sex."); id. at 82 ("[W]e conclude that sex discrimination consisting
of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII .... "). Justice
Thomas' concurring opinion consisted of one sentence, focusing on the require-
ment of sex discrimination: "I concur because the Court stresses that in every
sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's
statutory requirement that there be discrimination 'because of ... sex."' Id.
71. Id. at 80.
72. Id. The Court did not state expressly that conduct that is not sexual in nature
can be considered in determining the existence of a hostile work environment.
This is not surprising, however, given that the conduct alleged in Oncale was
sexual in nature. See supra note 68. Moreover, the emphasis in the Court's opin-
ion on whether the harasser treated members of one sex differently from mem-
bers of the other sex suggests that it is not necessary for the harasser's conduct to
be sexual in nature. See Charles R. Calleros, Same-Sex Harassment, Textualism,
Free Speech, and Oncale: Laying the Groundwork for a Coherent and Constitu-
tional Theory of Sexual Harassment, 7 GEo. MASON L. REV. 1, 28 n.167 (1998)
(arguing that Oncale appears to "rebut the suggestion that sexual content, rather
than the selective targeting of victims, is the critical inquiry").
73. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
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of different sexes-or, where they are of the same sex, if there is evi-
dence that the harasser was homosexual.74 "[I]f a female victim is
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman
as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility
to the presence of women in the workplace," a jury could infer sex dis-
crimination. 75 Finally, the plaintiff could present "direct comparative
evidence," contrasting how the alleged harasser treated members of
each sex in the workplace.7 6
After Oncale, it is clear that sexual conduct is neither necessary
nor sufficient for a sexual harassment claim.77 Rather, to be actiona-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 80-81.
77. It may be more accurate to say that after Oncale it should be clear that sexual
conduct is not sufficient for a sexual harassment claim. The clarity of this princi-
ple, however, appears to have eluded the majority of the judges on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In an opinion issued after this
Article was accepted for publication, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
an employee who alleged that he experienced severe, pervasive, and unwelcome
"physical conduct of a sexual nature" stated a viable claim of sexual harassment
in violation of Title VII. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64
(9th Cir. 2002).
The plaintiff in Rene, an openly gay man, alleged that his supervisor and co-
workers, all men, repeatedly grabbed him in the crotch and poked their fingers in
his anus through his clothing. Id. at 1064. He explained that he believed the
behavior occurred because he was gay. Id. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the employer, reasoning that Title VII does not prohibit dis-
crimination based on sexual preference. Id. The en banc Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded the case for trial.
The reasoning in Rene conflicts with the basic premise of Oncale, that harass-
ing conduct must be sexually discriminatory in order to be actionable under Title
VII. The Rene majority stated:
The Oncale Court's holding that offensive sexual touching in a same-sex
workforce is actionable discrimination under Title VII necessarily means
that discrimination can take place between members of the same sex,
not merely between members of the opposite sex. Thus, Oncale did not
need to show that he was treated worse than members of the opposite
sex. It was enough to show that he suffered discrimination in compari-
son to other men.
Id. There are several problems with this reasoning. First, the Oncale Court did
not find that the harassing conduct alleged by Oncale was actionable discrimina-
tion under Title VII; it merely rejected the lower court's holding that same-sex
sexual harassment could never violate Title VII. See id. at 1073 (Hug, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that "[t]here was no implication in the Supreme Court's opinion that
the alleged sexual harassment was 'because of sex'"). Accordingly, Oncale does
not stand for the proposition that offensive sexual touching is always actionable
discrimination under Title VII. Second, while the Rene majority is correct that
persons of the same sex can sexually harass each other, the Oncale Court empha-
sized that sexual harassment violates Title VII only if it constitutes discrimina-
tion because of sex. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80 (stating that Title VII prohibits
sexual harassment "that meets the statutory requirements"). To succeed in prov-
ing the sex discrimination requirement of actionable sexual harassment, On-
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ble under Title VII, harassing conduct must constitute discrimination
because of sex. As discussed in the next Part, most sexual harassment
cases involve one model of discrimination: disparate treatment.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS A FORM OF
DISPARATE TREATMENT
A. Introduction to Disparate Treatment and Disparate
Impact
There are two models of actionable discrimination under Title VII:
disparate treatment and disparate impact. 78 Disparate treatment,
"the most easily understood type of discrimination,"7 9 is intentional
discrimination.8 0 To establish disparate treatment, a plaintiff need
not prove that the defendant employer held ill will or animus toward
cale-or the plaintiff in Rene-needed to prove that he suffered discrimination
because of his sex; it would not suffice for the plaintiff to show that he was treated
differently than other employees for a reason unconnected to his gender.
The Oncale Court stated, "We have never held that workplace harassment...
is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used
have sexual content or connotations." 523 U.S. at 80. By implication, the Court
also rejected the proposition that workplace harassment consisting of physical
touching, rather than words, is automatically discrimination because of sex
merely because the touching has sexual connotations. As noted in the dissenting
opinion in Rene, the majority opinion ignores this language from Oncale, incor-
rectly interpreting that case "to mean that if the defendant's conduct was 'sexual
in nature' the statutory requirements of Title VII are met." 305 F.3d at 1074
(Hug, J., dissenting). The Rene dissent pointed out, moreover, that following On-
cale, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case of Doe v. City of Belle-
ville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998), in which the
appellate court had held that workplace harassment that was sexual in nature
was always actionable. See id. at 1074 n.2. This action by the Supreme Court
reinforces that "workplace harassment, which is simply 'sexual in content,' is not
always actionable." Id.
A discussion of the methods by which a same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff
can prove that the harassing conduct was sexually discriminatory is outside the
scope of this Article. But see infra note 94. However, the approach taken by the
Ninth Circuit-assuming that all workplace sexual conduct is actionable under
Title VI-is foreclosed by Oncale.
78. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713
n.1 (1983) ("We have consistently distinguished disparate-treatment cases from
cases involving facially neutral employment standards that have disparate im-
pact on minority applicants.").
79. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
80. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (stating that in
disparate treatment cases "the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant
had a discriminatory intent or motive"); Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (stating that, in a disparate treatment case, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant employer intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff).
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members of a particular group.8 1 Rather, disparate treatment occurs
whenever an employer "treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."8 2 In a
disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must prove that a factor pro-
hibited by Title VII "actually motivated the employer's decision,"83 or,
in other words, that a prohibited factor caused the decision to be
made. 8 4 Proof that a prohibited factor caused an employment decision
can be made by direct or circumstantial evidence. If an employer
treats female employees differently than similarly situated male em-
ployees, without a plausible nondiscriminatory reason for doing so,
this may be enough for a reasonable jury to infer that the employer
took the action because of the female employees' sex.8 5
Disparate impact discrimination, in contrast, does not require
proof of a discriminatory motive on the part of the employer.S6 Dispa-
rate impact claims are not based on allegations that an employer
treated an employee differently from other employees because of her
membership in a protected class. Instead, the disparate impact plain-
81. See, e.g., Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (noting
that the "absence of a malevolent motive" does not render a plaintiff unable to
prove disparate treatment).
82. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
83. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (2000) (quoting
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)) (both discussing the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
84. In a recent article, Rebecca Hanner White and Linda Hamilton Krieger explain
that the disparate treatment inquiry is not a search for conscious discriminatory
intent, but rather a search for a causal connection between the protected charac-
teristic and the challenged employment action. Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimi-
nation in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 499
(2001); see also Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The
Supreme Court's Rhetoric and Its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimi-
nation Law, 60 U. Prr. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (stating that "the standard of causa-
tion defines the very act of intentional discrimination"); Michael Selmi, Proving
Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEo. L.J.
279, 289 (1997) (contending that, to the Supreme Court, the "key question" in
finding intentional discrimination on the basis of race "is whether race made a
difference in the decisionmaking process, a question that targets causation,
rather than subjective mental states").
85. See, e.g., Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (1977) ("Proof of discriminatory motive
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment."); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973) (establishing a procedure for analyzing discrimination claims based on cir-
cumstantial evidence). Pamela L. Perry explained the use of circumstantial evi-
dence to prove an employer's discriminatory motive as follows: "employees must
demonstrate that similarly situated female employees are treated differently
from similarly situated male employees, thereby raising the inference that their
different treatment was motivated by their different sexes in violation of Title
VII." Let Them Become Professionals: An Analysis of the Failure to Enforce Title
VII's Pay Equity Mandate, 14 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 127, 134 (1991).
86. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
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tiff is arguing that her employer's seemingly neutral practice-one
that, on its face, applies equally to all employees-is disproportion-
ately harmful to members of a protected class, while lacking a busi-
ness justification.8 7 Claims of disparate impact discrimination
"involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treat-
ment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity."88
B. Oncale: Discrimination as Only Disparate Treatment
Although there are two theories of discrimination under Title VII,
the Supreme Court's language in Oncale references only one of those
theories: disparate treatment. The Court explained that to satisfy the
discrimination requirement for actionable sexual harassment, a plain-
tiff must prove that the harassing conduct was caused by the plain-
tiffs sex, mentioning several ways in which the plaintiff could provide
such proof.8 9 The Court explained the discrimination requirement
further by stating that "the critical issue .. .is whether members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employ-
ment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."90 This lan-
guage evinces the Court's use of the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination, which requires a showing that the challenged conduct
was caused by the plaintiffs sex, or other characteristics prohibited
under Title VII, and is often proved by showing different treatment of
similarly situated persons.9 1 Absent from the Court's opinion is any
reference to the disparate impact theory of discrimination. Moreover,
early in the opinion, the Court noted that, in its harassment cases, it
has interpreted Title VII's prohibition against discrimination as
"evinc[ing] a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of
87. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) ("[T]o establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral stan-
dards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pat-
tern. Once it is thus shown that the employment standards are discriminatory in
effect, the employer must meet 'the burden of showing that any given require-
ment [has] ... a manifest relationship to the employment in question.") (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
88. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
89. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998). The Court
stated, for example, that the plaintiff could prove that his sex caused the harass-
ing conduct by showing that the harasser was motivated by sexual desire or by
general hostility to the presence of members of his sex in the workplace. Id. at
80.
90. Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring)). The Court stated that one way to prove discrimination in a har-
assment case was by "offer[ing] direct comparative evidence about how the al-
leged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace." Id. at
80-81.
91. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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disparate treatment of men and women in employment."92 Commen-
tators analyzing Oncale and lower courts applying the opinion have
agreed that the Oncale Court utilized only the disparate treatment
theory of discrimination.93
92. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986)).
93. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, The Unenvisaged Case, Interpretive Progression, and the
Justiciability of Title VII Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims, 7 DuKE J. GEN-
DER L. & POL'Y 57, 78 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court treated Oncale's
hostile environment claims "as a disparate treatment case"); Rebecca Hanner
White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court Mainstreams Sex-
ual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 734-35 (1999) (stating that after
Oncale "[t]he question, as in other sex-based disparate treatment claims, is
whether the plaintiff experienced the conduct because of her sex"); Ramona L.
Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, Revisited: The Aftermath of Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 251, 262-63(1999) (referring to the Oncale Court's "attempt[ ] to fit hostile environment sex-
ual harassment claims within a well-known model of discrimination law, the dis-
parate treatment model").
Since Oncale, some lower courts have expressly stated that sexual harass-
ment is actionable only as a form of disparate treatment discrimination. See, e.g.,
Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that "[u]nder Title
VII, a hostile work environment is one form of disparate treatment on the basis of
'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"'); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399,
404 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "it would be anomalous not to require proof of
disparate treatment for claims of sex discrimination (of which sexual harassment
is a subset)"); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1254 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999)(Edmondson, J., concurring) (stating that "[a] claim of sexual harassment is a
claim of disparate treatment"). Other courts have also applied the disparate
treatment theory, holding that plaintiffs must prove that, but for their sex, they
would not have been subjected to the harassing conduct. See, e.g., Gregory v.
Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 694 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiff alleged facts that
could "establish[ I that her sex, in one way or another, played a substantial role in[her harasser's] behavior"); Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242(4th Cir. 2000) ("An employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against 'be-
cause of his or her gender if, 'but for' the employee's gender, he or she would not
have been the victim of the discrimination"); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d
1238, 1248 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that the plaintiff "must show that but for
the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of the harassment") (quot-
ing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (lth Cir. 1982)); Williams v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Any unequal treatment of
an employee that would not occur but for the employee's gender may, if suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive under the Harris standard, constitute a hostile envi-
ronment in violation of Title VII"). In other words, a female plaintiff must prove
that her harasser would not have treated a man the way that he treated the
plaintiff. See Frazier v. Delco Elecs. Corp., 263 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2001).
Michael Selmi has characterized the type of question asked by the Frazier
court-whether the plaintiff would have been treated the same way if she were a
man-as the "reversing the groups" test. Selmi, supra note 84, at 291 (citing
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935 (1989), as the first to articulate this test). According to Selmi, this test,
which asks whether the complaining party would have been treated the same if
the category proscribed by Title VII were removed, is the best test available for
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C. Proving Disparate Treatment in a Sexual Harassment
Case
Following the guidance given by the Supreme Court in Oncale, the
lower courts have recognized several ways in which sexual harass-
ment plaintiffs can prove disparate treatment.9 4 Perhaps the easiest
way is to demonstrate that the conduct was motivated by sexual de-
sire-whether heterosexual or homosexual-such that a jury could in-
fer that if the plaintiff had been of a different sex, the harassment
identifying intentional discrimination. Selmi, supra note 84, at 291; see also
White & Krieger, supra note 84, at 510 (endorsing the "reversing the groups" test
as a useful way to understand disparate treatment as an inquiry into causation).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. One method of proving disparate
treatment, based on the case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
holds particular promise for plaintiffs alleging same-sex sexual harassment. The
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was denied partnership in an accounting firm, at
least in part because various partners viewed her as "macho," "overcompen-
sat[ing] for being a woman," and needing "a course in charm school." Id. at 235.
She was advised that, to improve her chances for partnership, she should "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id. The Supreme Court held that an
employer violates Title VII when it takes an adverse employment action against
an individual because that person failed to conform to the stereotypes associated
with her sex. Id. at 250-51.
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse, courts have rea-
soned that if plaintiffs are harassed because they failed to conform to the stereo-
types associated with their sex, their harassment constitutes sex discrimination.
See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002) (noting that "a plaintiff may be able to
prove that same-sex harassment was discrimination because of sex by presenting
evidence that the harasser's conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did
not conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender"); Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that "just as a
woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her be-
cause she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, . . . a man can
ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he
did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity"). In Nichols v. Azteca Res-
taurant Enterprises, Inc., the male plaintiff alleged that male co-workers and a
male supervisor repeatedly referred to him as "she" and "her," mocked him for
walking "like a woman," and called him a "faggot" and a "fucking female whore."
256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff argued that he was abused be-
cause the other employees viewed him as effeminate and, accordingly, as not con-
forming to the stereotype that men are masculine. Id. at 874. The court agreed,
holding that harassment based on sex stereotypes violates Title VII. Id. at 874-
75. Courts have also found that women who are harassed because they are
viewed as insufficiently feminine satisfy the sex discrimination requirement of
Title VII. See, e.g., Samborski v. W. Valley Nuclear Serv., Inc., No. 99-CV-
0213E(m), 1999 WL 1293351, at *3-*4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1999) (finding that the
plaintiff, who alleged she was told she had a "nice penis" and was called a lesbian,
and who argued that she was harassed because she "did not exhibit her feminin-
ity in a stereotypical manner," sufficiently alleged that she was harassed because
of her sex).
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would not have occurred. 9 5 Another method of proving that harassing
conduct was caused by the plaintiffs sex is to show that the conduct
95. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1248 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (stating that the plaintiff "sought to establish discrimination 'based on sex'
circumstantially by claiming [that the harassing] conduct amounted to sexual ad-
vances towards her"); Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1074,
1079 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (finding "because of sex" satisfied in a same-sex harass-
ment case because "[t]he persistent sexual propositions, epithets, and offensive
touchings engaged in by Fry's co-workers suggest that one or all of them may be
oriented toward members of the same sex"). Harassment motivated by bisexual
desire, however, would not be sexually discriminatory under a disparate treat-
ment approach. See supra text accompanying note 65.
In one case in which the harassing conduct, which included the plaintiffs su-
pervisor telling her that he dreamed about her and that she reminded him of "his
one true love, the person he should have married," seemed clearly motivated by
sexual desire, the court found that the employer's argument that the harassing
conduct was not based on the plaintiffs sex "verge[d] on the frivolous." Bales v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1107-09 (8th Cir. 1998). The court noted
that no one, not even the employer, suggested that the supervisor would have
behaved toward a male employee as he did towards the plaintiff. Id. at 1109.
In short, the reasoning of the first appellate court to hold that sexual harass-
ment could violate Title VII-that sexual advances were probably motivated by
sexual desire, and probably would not have been made if the plaintiff had been of
a different sex-is still sound. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (discussed supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text). Unlike the
sloppy analysis engaged in by many of the lower courts prior to Oncale, however,
most courts after Oncale do not assume that just because conduct is sexual in
nature, it is motivated by sexual desire and thus is discriminatory. See, e.g.,
Ward v. West, No. 99-4164, 2000 WL 868587 (7th Cir. June 6, 2000) (holding that
male plaintiff, who contended that a female coworker sexually harassed him by
telling other coworkers confidential details about his sex life, failed to establish
that the harassment was because of his sex: "Ward seems to think that the sexual
content of some disclosures, and the fact that Toles is a woman, show that she
acted 'because of his sex, but this is a non-sequitur"); Black v. Columbus Pub.
Sch., 124 F. Supp. 2d 550, 564 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that sexual harassment
claim of assistant principal, based on her supervisor's affair with a parent volun-
teer, could not survive summary judgment: 'The fact that some type of sexual
activity may have been occurring does not mean that the Plaintiff was subjected
to harassment based on her sex").
Some courts, however, still pay little attention to the "because of sex" element
in cases in which the harassing conduct is sexual in nature. For example, in
Abeita v. Transamerica Mailings, Inc., the plaintiffs supervisor frequently made
sexual comments to the plaintiff, a woman, about models and other female em-
ployees (such as "I'd really like to lay her"). 159 F.3d 246, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1998).
In considering whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to
the employer on the plaintiffs sexual harassment claim, the court did not engage
in an analysis of whether the supervisor made the comments because of the
plaintiffs sex. Unlike in Bales, it was not apparent that the comments in Abeita
reflected the supervisor's sexual desire for the plaintiff. Perhaps a reasonable
jury could have concluded that the supervisor probably would not have made the
statements to a male employee, but the court did not even consider this question,
simply assuming that the conduct was motivated by the plaintiffs sex.
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reflected an animus toward persons of the plaintiffs sex.9 6 Conduct
need not be motivated by anti-female or anti-male animus in order to
be discriminatory; intentional discrimination-not ill will-is all that
is required.97 If, however, a female plaintiff can demonstrate that her
harasser had an anti-female animus, a jury could reasonably infer
that her harasser's poor treatment of her arose out of that animus
and, accordingly, was due to the plaintiffs sex.98
96. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (stating that la] trier of fact might reasonably find
such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-spe-
cific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the har-
asser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace"); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 1999)
(stating that "harassing behavior that is not sexually explicit but is directed at
women and motivated by discriminatory animus against women satisfies the
'based on sex' requirement").
97. Some commentators, who argue that harassment should not be viewed as a type
of discrimination and should not be handled under the rubric of anti-discrimina-
tion law, overlook this fact. They contend that harassment should not be viewed
as a form of discrimination because, while discrimination involves an animus
against a certain group, harassment involves favoring a certain group, to whom
the harasser is sexually attracted. See, e.g., Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harass-
ment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed,
30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 379 (1998); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 352 (1990).
This argument is flawed on two points. First, much harassment does not arise
out of sexual desire and is based on animus toward members of the group that
the harasser is targeting. See, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir.
1999) (noting, in case in which a male coworker verbally and physically assaulted
the female plaintiff, that "[ilt makes no difference that the assaults and the epi-
thets sounded more like expressions of sex-based animus rather than misdirected
sexual desire"); Schultz, supra note 61, at 1686-87 (contending that "much of the
gender-based hostility and abuse that women (and some men) endure at work is
neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content").
Second, mainstream disparate treatment analysis, outside the harassment con-
text, does not require a showing of animus. See, e.g., Int'l Union v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (stating that "the absence of a malevolent
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy");
L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (finding a
policy sexually discriminatory because it "does not pass the simple test of
whether the evidence shows 'treatment of a person in a manner which but for
that person's sex would be different'"). Courts have held, for example, that job
assignments based on race-regardless of the employer's reason for making such
assignments-constitute disparate treatment and are actionable. See Ferrill v.
Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a defendant
who has no racial animus but makes job assignments on the basis of race is liable
for intentional discrimination).
98. In Jessen v. Babbitt, for example, the court found that the plaintiff proved her
supervisor's animus toward women by testifying that the supervisor referred to
two of plaintiffs female coworkers as "stupid bitch" and "stupid fucking cunt."
No. 98-8069, 1999 WL 1246915, at **3 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1999). The evidence of
this animus, according to the court, could lead a reasonable jury to infer that
other harassing conduct by the supervisor-such as physically intimidating the
plaintiff by blocking her path-occurred because of the plaintiffs sex. Id. Simi-
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Plaintiffs can also prove that harassment was caused by their sex
by demonstrating that their harassers directed their harassing con-
duct only at persons of the plaintiffs' sex.99 Where male and female
workers were exposed to the same allegedly harassing conduct, how-
ever, courts generally have found plaintiffs unable to establish that
the harassment was discriminatory. One such situation involves the
bisexual or "equal opportunity" harasser, who makes sexual advances
at both male and female employees.100 The plaintiffs in Holman v.
Indiana,10 1 husband and wife, sued their male supervisor at the Indi-
ana Department of Transportation, alleging that he had solicited sex
from each of them on separate occasions. The court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claims, reasoning that "Title VII does not cover the 'equal oppor-
larly, in Smith v. First Union National Bank, the defendant employer argued
that a male supervisor did not harass the female plaintiff because of her gender,
in light of the fact that both male and female employees complained about the
supervisor's management style. 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 2000). The court
found, however, that the derogatory references to women present in almost all of
the supervisor's harassing remarks demonstrated that the supervisor singled the
plaintiff out for harassment because of her sex. Id. Obviously, the same reason-
ing would apply if the plaintiff were male: if a male plaintiff could demonstrate
that his harasser had an anti-male animus, a jury could reasonably infer that his
harasser's abuse of him arose out of that animus and thus was due to the plain-
tiffs sex.
99. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (stating that a plaintiff can prove that harassment
was caused by sex by "offer[ing] direct comparative evidence about how the al-
leged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace"); Smith
v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[o]ne method of dem-
onstrating that harassment is based on sex is to provide evidence of discrepancies
in how the alleged harasser treats members of each sex in a mixed-sex work-
place"); see also Selmi, supra note 84, at 294 (stating that "[in defining inten-
tional discrimination, the question is not what the particular decisionmaker
subjectively intended, but whether the record allows for an inference that an im-
permissible factor such as race served as the impetus for the challenged action.
In short, proving the fact of differential treatment suffices to demonstrate inten-
tional discrimination.").
In Smith v. Sheahan, for example, the court found that evidence that a male
prison guard, who had violently assaulted the female plaintiff, engaged in recur-
rent hostile behavior toward only his female coworkers would permit a jury to
infer that he assaulted the plaintiff because of her sex. 189 F.3d 529, 533 (7th
Cir. 1999). Similarly, in Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court found that
evidence that the plaintiffs alleged harassers "directed harsh treatment, abusive
language, and profanity at women, but not at men" allowed a reasonable jury to
conclude that the harasser's conduct was caused by the plaintiffs sex. 107 F.3d
568, 574 (8th Cir. 1997).
100. Steven Willborn refers to the bisexual supervisor as the "Loch Ness Monster of
sexual harassment law because, even though the issue is discussed often in the
literature and occasionally in the case law, a real-life bisexual harasser has yet to
be sighted." Willborn, supra note 50, at 683 n.22. As discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 101-02, however, the Seventh Circuit decided such a case
after the publication of the Willborn article.
101. 211 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2000).
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tunity' or 'bisexual' harasser . . . because such a person is not
discriminating on the basis of sex. He is not treating one sex better
(or worse) than the other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit
badly)."102
More frequently, plaintiffs allege that conduct not consisting of
sexual advances and not rooted in sexual desire-such as foul lan-
guage-constituted harassment, and courts have rejected such claims
where both male and female employees were subjected to the same
conduct.103 In Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co.,104 for example, the
court noted that the plaintiffs supervisor used offensive language to
describe both men and women and in front of both men and women,
and that he played an audiotape of the "Jerky Boys"-containing "ob-
scene, vulgar, and sexually explicit 'prank' phone calls to businesses
on topics such as genital warts"-at a staff meeting that both men and
women attended. The court found that the harassing conduct was not
based on sex, reasoning that the use of foul language in front of both
male and female employees is not sex discrimination.105 Another
court rejected a male plaintiffs claim that his work environment-"in
which sexual jokes, pornography, office affairs and flirtations, and the
display of 'sex toys' were commonplace"-violated Title VII, because
both male and female employees were subjected to the same
environment.10 6
102. Id. at 403.
103. See, e.g., Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding
that the plaintiff could not prove that harassing conduct was based on her sex
when she admitted that her alleged harasser used profanity when talking to both
male and female employees); Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517
(7th Cir. 1996) (stating that where males and females in the workplace receive
the same treatment, such treatment cannot be harassment based on sex).
104. 223 F.3d 721, 724, 737 (8th Cir. 2000) (Beam, J., with Gibson, J., concurring only
in the result).
105. Id. at 737.
106. Ellett v. Big Red Keno, Inc., No. 98-3046, 98-3694, 2000 WL 1006743, at **1 (8th
Cir. July 21, 2000). The court reasoned that "[a] dually offensive sexual atmos-
phere in the workplace, no matter how offensive, is not unlawful discrimination
unless one gender is treated differently than the other." Id.
Similarly, in Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., the court rejected a plaintiffs
sexual harassment claims based on the allegation that her supervisor yelled at
her, where there was evidence that the supervisor yelled at other workers. 138
F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1998). According to the court, the plaintiff needed to
prove that her employer "created or condoned discriminatory conditions. Title
VII does not require improvements in conditions that all workers experience."
Id.; see also Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1253 (11th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (Edmondson, J., concurring) (stating that "the essence of a Title VII case,
including one based on a claim of sexual harassment, is plaintiffs proof of actual
discrimination. And in this case, plaintiff never presented evidence that other
employees-particularly men-at her workplace were treated considerably dif-
ferently and better than she was.").
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D. Pornography and Discussions About Sex as Disparate
Treatment
The cases described at the beginning of this Article involved com-
plaints about pornography and discussions of sex in the workplace. In
Fitzgerald v. Ford Marrin Esposito Witmeyer & Gleser, L.L.P.,107 a fe-
male attorney claimed that the male attorneys with whom she worked
regularly talked about their sex lives, told jokes about sex, joked about
masturbation in slang terms, and used the word "fuck." These conver-
sations were not directed to the female attorney, but she heard them
and found them "acutely offensive to her as a woman."' 0 8 In Coniglio
v. City of Berwyn, 10 9 a female manager of a city's computer depart-
ment claimed that she regularly observed her supervisor, while he
was in his office, viewing pictures of completely naked women on In-
ternet websites. And in O'Rourke v. City of Providence,110 a female
firefighter-the first woman assigned to her engine company-saw
stacks of pornographic magazines in the company's living areas, wit-
nessed male firefighters watching pornographic movies in the com-
pany's common sitting area, and heard frequent conversation about
whether the male firefighters had gotten "banged" over the weekend.
Could the plaintiffs in these cases prove disparate treatment, that
the conduct about which they are complaining was caused by their
sex?"' If not, that conduct will be actionable under Title VII only if
107. 153 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd, 2002 WL 313225 (2d Cir. Feb. 27,
2002).
108. Id.
109. No. 99C4475, 2000 WL 967989, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2000).
110. 235 F.3d 713, 718-19, 722 (1st Cir. 2001).
111. Prior to Oncale, many courts likely would have assumed that the "because of sex"
element was met, due to the fact that the conduct was sexual in nature. See
supra section II.B. Some courts still tend to assume that conduct that is sexual in
nature is discriminatory; in fact, the courts in the Fitzgerald, Coniglio, and
O'Rourke cases-all post-Oncale-failed to analyze whether the plaintiffs were
harassed because of their sex. In Fitzgerald, the court entered judgment as a
matter of law for the defendant law firm, setting aside the jury verdict on the
plaintiffs sexual harassment claim. Fitzgerald, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 240. The
court found that the plaintiff failed to prove that she experienced severe or perva-
sive harassment, id. at 238, but the court of appeals reversed, reinstating that
jury verdict. Fitzgerald, 2002 WL 313225. In Coniglio, the court denied the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs sexual harassment
claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the challenged conduct
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. Conig-
lio, 2000 WL 967989, at *8. In O'Rourke, the plaintiff experienced other harass-
ing conduct that appeared clearly directed at her because she was a woman. See
Coniglio, 235 F.3d at 718-24. In affirming the jury verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff, the court simply stated the following regarding the sex discrimination re-
quirement: "The evidence is compelling that she suffered harassment based upon
sex." Id. at 728. Oncale made clear, however, that harassing conduct is not sexu-
ally discriminatory just because it was sexual in nature. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
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the disparate impact theory of discrimination can be used in the har-
assment setting.
Pornography,112 discussions of sex, and other sexual conduct such
as sex-related jokes or teasing can certainly constitute disparate treat-
ment of women under some circumstances. One such circumstance is
where the conduct is motivated by sexual desire for the plaintiff. In
Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,113 for example, the plaintiffs supervi-
sor-who had told the plaintiff that he dreamed about her and that he
wanted to leave his wife-said to the plaintiff that a marker she was
using "looked like a big red penis." In light of the other evidence indi-
cating the supervisor's sexual interest in the plaintiff, a jury could rea-
sonably find that he made the penis comment because of the plaintiffs
sex. None of the challenged conduct in the Fitzgerald, Coniglio, or
O'Rourke cases, however, appears to have been motivated by sexual
desire for the plaintiffs. In those cases, the conduct was not directed
at the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs did not contend that their harass-
ers were motivated by sexual desire for them.
Even absent any evidence of sexual desire for the plaintiff, where
pornography, discussions of sex, and other sexual conduct are directed
only at women, a reasonable jury can conclude that the conduct is
caused by the plaintiffs sex. For example, many cases have involved
male coworkers intentionally placing pornographic material where
they knew a female coworker would find it or writing a female co-
worker's name on pornographic material.114 Other cases have in-
volved sexual comments or jokes made only to the female plaintiff,
112. Definitions of pornography vary greatly. See Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Cri-
tique of "the" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1103-04
(1993). Some definitions include a requirement of degrading or abusive sexual
behavior. See, e.g., Morrison Torrey, We Get the Message-Pornography in the
Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 53, 82 n.178 (1992) (defining pornography as "sexu-
ally explicit material that represents or describes degrading or abusive sexual
behavior so as to endorse and/or recommend the behavior as described"). This
Article uses a simple dictionary definition: "a portrayal of erotic behavior de-
signed to cause sexual excitement." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1767 (1993). The term "pornography" as used in this Article thus
includes posters of naked women and copies of Playboy magazine, even if such
material does not represent degrading or abusive sexual behavior.
113. 143 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (8th Cir. 1998).
114. In Carter v. Chrysler Corp., for example, the female plaintiffs male coworkers
placed a photograph of a naked man in her work station. 173 F.3d 693, 697 (8th
Cir. 1999); see also Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1475 (3d Cir. 1990)
(discussing female plaintiffs allegations that male coworkers placed sexual de-
vices and pornographic magazines in her desk drawer and gathered around to
laugh at her reaction); Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir.
1989) (female plaintiffs male coworkers placed over thirty pornographic notes in
her locker and wrote sexual graffiti about the plaintiff on the walls).
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where a jury could reasonably infer that the harasser would not have
made such comments to a man. 11 5
It is possible, moreover, that even where sexual conduct is not obvi-
ously directed toward the plaintiff, there could still be disparate treat-
ment if women were nonetheless intended to be intimidated or
otherwise affected by the behavior.116 Men in some workplaces may
use pornography and discussions about sex to send the message that
women are not welcome in that environment, marking the workplace
as a bastion of masculinity.117 Under such circumstances, a reasona-
ble jury could find disparate treatment, that but for the presence of
women in the workplace, this conduct would not have occurred. If pic-
tures of naked women were suddenly displayed around the firehouse
the day before the first female firefighter arrived, such conduct would
be evidence of intentional discrimination.11s If male attorneys at a
law firm started talking about sex much more frequently after a new
115. For example, in Abeita v. Transamerica Mailings, Inc., the female plaintiffs male
supervisor commented to the plaintiff, "oh, yellow dress and yellow shoes, yellow
underwear too?," and regularly told the plaintiff about his sexual interest in mod-
els and other female employees. 159 F.3d 246, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1998). Although
the court did not analyze whether the harassment was sexually discriminatory, it
is possible that a reasonable jury could conclude that the supervisor would not
have made such comments to another man. In contrast, in Richmond-Hopes v.
Cleveland, the court found that a male supervisor's "stroke me" comment and
simulated masturbation when he was angry with the female plaintiff was not
harassment because of sex, because the supervisor had made the same gesture to
male employees. No. 97-3595, 1998 WL 808222 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 1998).
116. See Willborn, supra note 50, at 721-22 n.186 (asserting that obnoxious speech
need not be directed at a particular woman because she is a woman in order to
constitute disparate treatment: "[O]bnoxious speech directed at a large number of
female employees because they are women also would be discriminatory and sub-
ject to restriction").
117. Kathryn Abrams makes this point in The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harass-
ment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1210-11 (1998) [hereinafter New Jurisprudence].
She explains that when women enter traditionally male workplaces, male work-
ers may engage or engage more intensely in sexual talk and may post sexually
explicit pictures, in order to "mark the workplace as an arena in which masculin-
ity is appropriate or even constitutive." Id. at 1211; see also Schultz, supra note
61, at 1755 (contending that most forms of sexual harassment on the job are moti-
vated by the desire to "maintain the most highly rewarded forms of work as do-
mains of masculine competence" and that the purpose of most harassment is to
"denigrat[e] women's competence for the purpose of keeping them away from
male-dominated jobs"); Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signal-
ing and the Law, with Particular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 1069, 1085 (1999) (stating that "[w]hen men want to drive women out of the
workplace, they sometimes do so by flaunting symbols of male sexuality, as by
using obscene language, exhibiting their genitalia, and posting pornographic
photographs").
118. See Willborn, supra note 50, at 721 ("if the pinups only began to appear when
women entered the workplace... the speech may be evidence of discrimination").
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female attorney arrived, such conduct would be evidence of intentional
discrimination.
In the Fitzgerald, Coniglio, and O'Rourke cases, however, there is
no evidence that the challenged conduct either was directed at the
plaintiffs or was intended to send a message of exclusion to women in
the workplace. In Fitzgerald, although occasionally the male attor-
neys appeared to realize that their talk about sex embarrassed the
plaintiff, they did not engage in the conversations for that purpose:
"Basically Fitzgerald's evidence about the male associates' [sic] is that
they intended to have fun among themselves by talking and joking
about sex."119 There was no evidence that the supervisor in Coniglio
intended anyone else to see the pictures of naked women that he was
viewing on the Internet.120 In O'Rourke, there was no evidence that
the amount of pornography increased after O'Rourke was assigned to
the engine company.
As discussed in the previous section, courts have found that
harassing conduct was caused by the plaintiffs sex where the conduct
reflected an animus toward persons of the plaintiffs sex. Courts have
not been clear, however, in explaining this "gender animus" basis for
finding conduct discriminatory. When the Oncale Court described evi-
dence of gender animus as a means of proving that harassing conduct
was discriminatory, it seemed to refer to conduct that was directed at
a person because of that person's sex. 12 1 In other words, gender ani-
mus did not appear to be a separate means of proving disparate treat-
ment as much as an explanation for why some conduct might be
directed at a person because of that person's sex. Because none of the
conduct in our sample cases was directed at the plaintiffs, if this is all
that gender animus means, it would not provide an argument for this
conduct to be considered disparate treatment. Some lower courts have
taken this view of gender animus. Such courts have used the idea of
gender animus primarily to reason that, where a harasser has demon-
strated gender animus, like through the use of an offensive word to
refer to women, it is likely that his other conduct directed at the plain-
119. Fitzgerald, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 222.
120. Coniglio, 2000 WL 967989, at *2; see also Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and the
First Amendment: Content-Neutral Regulation, Disparate Impact, and the "Rea-
sonable Person," 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1243 (1997) [hereinafter Title VII and the
First Amendment] (asserting that "a male employee might display a nude female
pin-up simply because he enjoys viewing it during the course of his work and not
because he wishes to direct its message at anyone else").
121. The Court stated that a trier of fact might reasonably find harassing conduct
discriminatory "if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory
terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by
general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace." Oncale, 523 U.S. at
80.
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tiff-which might not otherwise obviously be based on her gender-
was in fact caused by the plaintiffs gender.122
Other lower courts, however, have found that conduct that was not
directed at the plaintiff or at any other women in the workplace is
sexually discriminatory if it reflects gender animus. For example, in
O'Shea v. Yellow Technology Services, Inc.,123 the female plaintiffs
male coworker described to other coworkers a dream that he had
about a naked woman jumping on a trampoline and told them that
"Playboy is superior to a wife because at least with Playboy you get
variety." The coworker did not make these statements to the plaintiff,
and there was no evidence that he targeted the statements at any wo-
man in the workplace. The district court found that the coworker did
not make the comments because of the plaintiffs sex,12 4 but the appel-
late court rejected that view, stating that "[blecause of the overtly sex-
ual nature of these incidents, we think that a jury readily could find
that they were based on gender or sexual animus."125 The coworker's
comments clearly involved gender, but were they sexually discrimina-
tory under a disparate treatment approach?
If there is no evidence that such comments were caused by the sex
of any of the women in the workplace, the comments might not consti-
tute disparate treatment because that theory of discrimination re-
quires the plaintiff to prove causation. On the other hand, one could
argue that disparate treatment clearly exists where someone makes
comments that are only derogatory toward or lascivious about women,
and does not make such statements about men, because men and wo-
men are being treated differently.126 Female employees hear deroga-
tory or lascivious statements made about their gender; male
employees do not. It seems likely that most courts would take the lat-
122. See, e.g., Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 618-20 (2d Cir. 2001); Jessen v. Bab-
bitt, No. 98-8069, 1999 WL 1246915, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1999); Williams v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[t]he myr-
iad instances in which Williams was ostracized, when others were not, combined
with the gender-specific epithets used, such as 'slut' and 'fucking women,' create
an inference, sufficient to survive summary judgment, that her gender was the
motivating impulse for her coworkers' behavior").
123. 185 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 1999)
124. O'Shea v. Yellow Tech. Serv., 979 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 (D. Kan. 1997).
125. O'Shea, 185 F.3d at 1099.
126. See Brennan v. Metro. Opera Assoc., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5562, at *41-
*42, 78 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1291, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting female
plaintiffs argument that she suffered harassment because of sex when a homo-
sexual male coworker displayed postcards of undressed and partially undressed
men, because "it is most reasonable to conclude that the sexual objectification of
one sex-in this case, males-would be most offensive to members of that sex"),
affd on other grounds, 192 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1999); Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co.,
875 F.2d 468, 486 (5th Cir. 1989) (Jones, J., dissenting) (contending that sexually
explicit graffiti drawn on the walls of plaintiffs workplace "was arguably non-
discriminatory because it included male and female references").
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ter view. If presented with a case involving a male employee who al-
ways uses the word "cunt" to refer to women, who says that he is not
directing that word at any of the women with whom he works, it
seems likely that courts would find that such conduct constituted dis-
parate treatment. 12 7
This view of gender animus and disparate treatment seems to sug-
gest that if the pornography posted in a workplace depicts only wo-
men, if the sexual jokes make fun only of women, if the sexual
discussions focus only on demeaning women, such conduct-even if
not targeted at any women in the workplace-is sexually discrimina-
tory under a disparate treatment approach. 128 Women are forced to
see pictures and hear language in the workplace that demeans their
gender, and men are not. This reasoning may suggest an odd conclu-
sion, however: that as long as some of the pictures have naked men as
well as naked women, as long as some of the jokes make fun of men as
well as women, the conduct is not discriminatory and thus is not rele-
vant to the plaintiffs sexual harassment claim.
In her dissenting opinion in Waltman v. International Paper
Co.,129 Judge Edith H. Jones made this argument, noting that sexu-
127. The racial harassment case of Collier v. RAM Partners, Inc., however, may sug-
gest otherwise. 158 F. Supp. 2d 889 (D. Md. 2001). The plaintiff, who was Afri-
can-American, worked with Moody, an employee who made racist comments
about many racial minority groups, including African-Americans. Id. at 894-95.
The employer contended that the comments were not caused by the plaintiffs
race. Id. at 898. The court rejected this argument:
RAM's contention that Collier has failed to demonstrate that Moody's
comments were on account of Collier's race borders on the absurd. Ap-
parently, the predicate for this argument is the unarticulated premise
that Moody was simply an "unreconstructed bigot," who harbored an an-
tipathy and animus toward members of all racial and ethnic groups
outside his own, and that therefore, the fortuity that Collier, the sole
African-American employee in the workplace, found his constant use of
racial epithets offensive, should not give rise to liability as to RAM. I
reject this notion out of hand. When Moody chose to vilify African-Amer-
icans, he intentionally injected Collier's race into his comments and
thereby made humiliation and debasement on the basis of her race and
ethnicity a part of her experience in the everyday workplace environ-
ment. A reasonable juror could readily conclude that Moody's comments,
steeped in hateful racial overtones, were motivated, at least in part, be-
cause of Collier's race.
Id. at 899 (internal citation omitted). It is interesting that, rather than reasoning
simply that Moody's use of derogatory terms to refer to racial minorities but not
to whites is disparate treatment on its face and thus constitutes harassment be-
cause of race, the court contends that Moody's use of the derogatory terms must
have been caused by the plaintiffs race.
128. Similarly, if the pornography and sexual jokes involved only men, they would be
sexually discriminatory under a disparate treatment approach. But see B. Glenn
George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV.
1, 31-32 (1993) (asserting that sexual cartoons generally depict women, but not
men, in a demeaning manner).
129. 875 F.2d 468, 486 (5th Cir. 1989).
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ally explicit graffiti drawn on the walls of the plaintiffs workplace
"was arguably non-discriminatory because it included male and fe-
male references."13 0 But should whether pornography is discrimina-
tory and thus relevant as part of a hostile work environment turn on
to what extent both sexes are depicted? The Waltman majority con-
cluded that it should not. 131 The majority explained that it had held
in a previous case, involving sexually oriented cartoons depicting both
men and women, that "any reasonable person would have to regard
these cartoons as highly offensive to a woman who seeks to deal with
her fellow employees and clients with professional dignity and without
the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse."13 2 The majority's rea-
soning, however, does not appear responsive to the question of
whether the graffiti or cartoons were discriminatory against women
under a disparate treatment theory. Rather, by focusing on the effect
of the graffiti or cartoons on women, the court seems to be using a
disparate impact theory to find discrimination.
Some radical feminists may argue that all pornography, discus-
sions of sex, and other sexual conduct in the workplace constitute the
disparate treatment of women because, in our patriarchal society, eve-
rything related to sexual intercourse contributes to the subordination
of women to men. 13 3 In other words, even if a particular item of por-
nography depicts both women and men, it nonetheless constitutes the
disparate treatment of women because everything sexual in nature
communicates a message of women as sexual objects and men as sex-
ual subjects. Like the argument made by the Waltman majority, how-
ever, this argument seems to focus not on different treatment of men
and women but rather on the different effect that sexual conduct has
on women. This argument supports the disparate impact theory of
discrimination rather than disparate treatment.13 4
130. Some of the graffiti was directed at the plaintiff, which could create an inference
that it was caused by the plaintiffs sex. Id. at 471. Judge Jones was referring to
the majority of the pornography which "had nothing to do with [the plaintiff] per-
sonally." Id. at 486 (Jones, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 477 n.3.
132. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988)).
133. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 137 (1987) (contending that
"[i] ntercourse remains a means or the means of physiologically making a woman
inferior"); id. at 127-28 (stating that it is unclear "[h]ow to separate the act of
intercourse from the social reality of male power ... especially because it is male
power that constructs both the meaning and the current practice of intercourse as
such").
134. See George, supra note 128, at 32 (contending that "[a] better solution" to the
problem of whether harassing conduct is sexually discriminatory "would be to
forego this absurd discussion of equal opportunity offensiveness and find all sexu-
ally oriented behavior actionable by recognizing its inherently differential impact
on male and female employees").
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The disparate treatment theory of discrimination is about causa-
tion: if the plaintiffs sex caused the challenged conduct to occur. More
specifically, in determining whether sexual conduct in the workplace
constitutes disparate treatment, the key is whether the conduct was
targeted at one sex in the workplace. 13 5 This targeting could occur
because the harasser is motivated by heterosexual or homosexual de-
sire for the plaintiff. Even absent any evidence of sexual desire, a
plaintiff can prove targeting-and thus disparate treatment-by
showing that the harasser directed the conduct only at women. A
plaintiff can also prove targeting by showing that the nature or
amount of sexual conduct in the workplace changed around the time
women entered the workplace.
Some workplace sexual conduct, however, is not targeted at one
sex in the workplace. Some people discuss sex and view pornography
because they find such discussions and pictures entertaining and en-
joyable, regardless of the effect of such conduct on others in the work-
place.136 The male attorneys in Fitzgerald, the supervisor in Coniglio,
and the male firefighters in O'Rourke may fall into this category.
Non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace does not constitute
disparate treatment because it is not caused by the plaintiffs sex.1 3 7
135. See Calleros, supra note 72, at 2 (stating that "Oncale points to a simple, coherent
theory of sexual harassment that rests on proving that the harasser targeted the
victim for harassment on the basis of the victim's status as male or female").
136. See Fremling & Posner, supra note 117, at 1085 (stating that "often men post
pornographic pictures, use foul language, and engage in similar activities not to
drive women out of the workplace but merely for their own enjoyment," as evi-
denced by the fact that "similar conduct is commonly found in workplaces in
which no women are present").
137. In an article published after this Article was substantially completed, David
Schwartz confronted the issue of proving the sex discrimination requirement of
actionable sexual harassment. David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex?
The Causation Element in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697
(2002). He agrees that the language of Oncale reflects a disparate treatment or
causation-based understanding of discrimination. See id. at 1710, 1736.
Schwartz contends, however, that all workplace conduct that is sexual in nature
can be understood as caused by the gender of others. See id. at 1783 (stating that
it is not "theoretically sound to assert that there is some sexual conduct that is
not 'because of sex'"). He explains his argument as follows:
Take the example of telling sexual jokes or posting pornographic pic-
tures in an all-male oil rig or fire station. This type of sexual conduct
functions as a sort of waving of a flag of heteropatriarchy, calling upon
the audience to salute. Those who do not salute can be identified as gen-
der traitors and treated accordingly. This conduct is "because of sex"
irrespective of whether anyone is offended by it, let alone severely
abused or oppressed, although the latter reaction is necessary to make a
federal case.
Id. at 1785.
Given Schwartz's broad understanding of causation, all workplace sexual con-
duct-whether targeted or not-would satisfy the sex discrimination require-
ment of actionable sexual harassment. He proposes a restoration of what he calls
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Should non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace be actionable
under Title VII? It will be actionable only if plaintiffs can prove dispa-
rate impact discrimination and if courts accept such a means of prov-
ing discrimination in a sexual harassment case. 138
IV. ANALYSIS OF NON-TARGETED WORKPLACE SEXUAL
CONDUCT UNDER A DISPARATE
IMPACT APPROACH
A. The Law of Disparate Impact Discrimination
Disparate impact discrimination occurs when a facially neutral
employment practice disproportionately harms members of a pro-
tected class and is not job-related or consistent with business neces-
sity. 139 The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact
theory of discrimination in the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 140 Black employees of Duke Power challenged the company's poli-
cies requiring a high school education and passing scores on two stan-
dardized general intelligence tests for initial assignment or transfer
into any department other than Labor, the company's lowest-paying
department.141 These policies operated to exclude a disproportionate
number of blacks from the non-Labor departments.142 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that there was no racial mo-
the "sex per se" rule, in which "sexual conduct in the workplace is always, with-
out more, 'because of sex.'" Id. at 1705. Accordingly, under Schwartz's approach,
it would never be necessary to rely on the disparate impact theory in order to find
workplace sexual conduct sexually discriminatory and thus relevant to a plain-
tiffs sexual harassment claim.
138. See John H. Marks, Title VIi's Flight Beyond First Amendment Radar: A Yin-To-
Yang Attenuation of "Speech" Incident to Discriminatory "Abuse" in the Work-
place, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 11 (1999) (stating that "[aibsent this element
of targeting, allegedly harassing activity can come within Title VII's scope, if at
all, only under a theory of disparate impact").
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
140. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
141. Id. at 427-28. Prior to the effective date of Title VII, the company openly discrim-
inated based on race in its hiring and job assignment decisions, employing black
employees only in the Labor Department. Id. at 426-27. The highest paying jobs
in the Labor Department paid less than the lowest paying jobs in the other four
departments. Id. at 427. The policy requiring a high school diploma for initial
assignment to a department other than Labor was adopted in 1955. Id. The com-
pany adopted the other challenged policies-requiring a high school diploma for
transfer to a department other than Labor and requiring passing scores on the
standardized tests for initial assignment or transfer into any such department-
on July 2, 1965, the date when Title VII became effective. Id. at 427-28.
142. Id. at 429. The Court noted that 1960 census statistics revealed that only 12% of
black males had finished high school, compared to 34% of white males, and that
the EEOC had found in another case that the use of a group of tests-including
the two tests at issue in Griggs-resulted in only 6% of blacks passing the tests,
compared with 58% of whites. Id. at 430 n.6.
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tivation behind the company's adoption of the policies and that the
company applied the policies in a race-neutral fashion.143 In light of
that conclusion, the court of appeals held that the policies were not
racially discriminatory in violation of Title VII.'4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII prohibits "not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation," unless the challenged employment prac-
tice is related to job performance.145 The Court explained its reason-
ing as follows:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the lan-
guage of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, pro-
cedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior dis-
criminatory employment practices.
14 6
Duke Power could not prove that either its high school diploma re-
quirement or its standardized test passage requirement was related to
successful performance of non-Labor Department jobs.147 Accord-
ingly, the Court concluded that both requirements were "artificial, ar-
bitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" which operated to
discriminate invidiously on the basis of race, in violation of Title
VII.148 The Court found the company's lack of discriminatory intent
irrelevant because "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the con-
sequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."'4 9
In later cases, the Court clarified the scope of the disparate impact
theory of discrimination. For example, the disparate impact theory is
available in cases in which past societal discrimination did not cause
the disparate impact.150 Moreover, plaintiffs can use the theory to
143. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232-36 (4th Cir. 1970).
144. Id. at 1235-36.
145. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
146. Id. at 429-30.
147. Id. at 431.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 432. The Court stated that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capa-
bility." Id.
150. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). The Dothard Court used the theory
to invalidate minimum height and weight requirements for the position of correc-
tional counselor in the Alabama state penitentiary system, which disproportion-
ately excluded women. Id. at 332.
The Griggs Court had suggested that the disparate impact of the high school
diploma and test passage requirements in that case was due to past societal dis-
crimination: "Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation to manifest
itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long
received inferior education in segregated schools . O..." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
In addition, the Griggs Court's reference to "freez[ing] the status quo of prior
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challenge subjective or discretionary employment practices as well as
objective employment requirements.'51
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended Title VII and
codified the disparate impact theory of discrimination.152 To establish
a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must
prove that an employer "uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."15 3 The employer is then liable for disparate impact
discrimination unless it "demonstrate[s] that the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity."'15 4 Even if the employer can prove that the challenged
practice is job related and consistent with business necessity, the em-
discriminatory employment practices" could be read as indicating that the dispa-
rate impact theory was only applicable in cases in which the disproportionate
effect of a facially neutral employment practice could be traced to past intentional
discrimination. Id. The Court's use of the disparate theory in Dothard disproved
that reading. See also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988
(1988) ("We have not limited [the disparate impact theory] to cases in which the
challenged practice served to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act intentional
discrimination.").
151. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)-(B). Prior to this amendment, some commentators
had argued that Title VII's language did not support a disparate impact theory of
discrimination. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 182-204 (1992); George Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1297, 1344-45 (1987) (arguing that the basis of the disparate impact the-
ory "is not to be found in any provision explicitly enacting it into law or in any
passage in the legislative history"); Michael Evan Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay
on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employ-
ment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429,
497-503 (1985) (arguing that Congress intended Title VII to prohibit only inten-
tional discrimination). The codification of the disparate impact theory via the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 rendered this argument moot.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
154. Id. "Demonstrates" is defined as "meets the burdens of production and persua-
sion." Id. at § 2000e(m). In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, a plurality of the
Supreme Court stated in dicta that the employer bore only the burden of produc-
tion, not the burden of persuasion, on the issue of business necessity. 487 U.S.
977, 986 (1988). The plurality also characterized the business necessity defense
as satisfied by evidence showing that the challenged practice "serv[es] the em-
ployer's legitimate business goals." Id. at 998. The Court majority adopted these
views in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). In Wards
Cove, the Court stated that "there is no requirement that the challenged practice
be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster."
Id. In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress rejected the Wards Cove
Court's interpretation of Title VII and the disparate impact theory of discrimina-
tion. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (stating that one of the
purposes of the Act was "to codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job
related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)").
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ployer will still be liable if the plaintiff can prove the availability of an
alternative employment practice with a less discriminatory impact
that the employer refuses to adopt.155
A claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment alleges
that the conditions of the plaintiffs employment are discriminatory.
However, most disparate impact cases-and all of the disparate im-
pact cases decided by the Supreme Court-have involved challenges to
an employer's qualification standards or selection practices for hiring
or promoting employees, rather than challenges to the conditions of
employment.' 5 6 One explanation for the limited use of the disparate
impact theory in conditions of employment cases is based on an argu-
ment about the language of Title VII prior to its amendment by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. It is arguable that the original language of
Title VII allowed the use of the disparate impact theory only to chal-
lenge hiring, promotion, and discharge decisions.15 7 However, the
amendment of Title VII to include an express prohibition of "a particu-
155. 43 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
156. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982) (discussing requirement
that employees pass a written examination to be considered for promotion);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 327 (1977) (discussing requirement that ap-
plicants for employment be of a certain minimum weight and height); Griggs, 401
U.S. at 427-28 (discussing requirement that employees have a high school di-
ploma and pass two standardized tests in order to be assigned initially or trans-
ferred into certain departments).
157. Courts originally interpreted the disparate impact theory of discrimination as
arising out of section 703(a)(2) of Title VII, rather than section 703(a)(1). See
Teal, 457 U.S. at 448 (stating that disparate impact claims "reflect the language
of Sec. 703(a)(2)"); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1 (citing only to section 703(a)(2) of
Title VII, not to section 703(a)(1)). Section 703(a)(1) broadly prohibits employers
from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Section 703(a)(2) never refers to "condi-
tions of employment," instead barring employers from "limit[ing], segregat[ing],
or classify[ing] [I employees [or applicants for employment] in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee," because of a prohibited
factor.
It is arguable that section 703(a)(2)'s reference to "employment opportunities"
does not encompass challenges to conditions of employment, but rather is appli-
cable only to challenges to hiring, promotion, or discharge decisions. For exam-
ple, in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reasoned as follows: "While policies that serve as barriers to hiring or promotion
clearly deprive applicants of employment opportunities, we cannot conclude that
a burdensome term or condition of employment . . . would 'limit, segregate, or
classify' employees in a way that would 'deprive any individual of employment
opportunities' or 'otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee' in viola-
tion of section 703(a)(2)." 998 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Lynch v.
Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("I do not
agree with the court that working conditions that apply to all workers can be
viewed as a method by which an employer would 'limit, segregate, or classify'
employees, in the words of Sec. 703(a)(2)."). Accordingly, if the disparate impact
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lar employment practice that causes a disparate impact" nullifies the
argument that the disparate impact theory is unavailable to challenge
conditions of employment. There is now an express statutory basis for
disparate impact claims, and the phrase "employment practice" is cer-
tainly broad enough to include challenges to employment conditions
as well as selection practices.1 58
Lynch v. Freeman159 is one of the rare cases in which a plaintiff
used the disparate impact theory of discrimination to challenge suc-
cessfully a condition of employment. The plaintiff in Lynch worked as
a carpenter-apprentice at a construction site. 160 Her employer pro-
vided portable toilets at the construction site for the use of the work-
ers, forbidding workers from using the indoor restrooms in the main
building of the plant.161 The portable toilets were dirty, had no run-
ning water, and often had no toilet paper or toilet paper that was
soiled.162 To avoid using the portable toilets, the plaintiff began hold-
ing her urine until she left work, until that practice caused her to suf-
theory of discrimination only applies in actions brought under section 703(a)(2),
plaintiffs could not use the theory to challenge conditions of employment.
158. See Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1249 (asserting that
"egregiously disturbing or distracting expression" could constitute a particular
employment practice under the Civil Rights Act of 1991); Perry, supra note 85 at
155-57 (arguing that the language of the then not-yet-enacted Civil Rights Act of
1991 does not distinguish between selection and non-selection decisions); LEX K.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 20.05 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that "from a
policy standpoint there simply is no good reason why discriminatory conditions of
employment should not be encompassed by the Griggs rationale" and that the
disparate impact provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "contain no particular
limitation to Section 703(a)(2)").
Another possible explanation for the limited use of the disparate impact the-
ory to challenge conditions of employment is that harassment law has become the
primary means of challenging employment conditions. See Theresa M. Beiner,
Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions or Privileges of Employment
Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643, 656 (1996) (noting that, except in the har-
assment area, "courts have not been creative in their approach to what they con-
sider a term, condition, or privilege of employment for purposes of Title VII").
Some courts have suggested that even the disparate treatment theory of discrimi-
nation is limited to claims based on materially adverse employment decisions,
implying that any challenges to conditions of employment must be analyzed
under the parameters of harassment law. See, e.g., Spring v. Sheboygan Area
Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that, in order to establish a
violation of the ADEA, the plaintiff must show that her employer took a materi-
ally adverse employment action against her because of her age). This Article ex-
plores whether harassment and disparate impact are mutually exclusive, or
whether, because the Supreme Court has emphasized that actionable harass-
ment requires a finding of discrimination, courts should consider both the dispa-
rate impact and the disparate treatment theories of discrimination under Title
VII in order to determine if a plaintiff can sue for harassment.
159. 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1987).
160. Id. at 381.
161. Id. at 381-82.
162. Id. at 381.
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fer a urinary tract infection.163 Thereafter, she began using the
indoor restroom regularly, and her employer eventually fired her for
violating its rule prohibiting such use. 164 Expert testimony estab-
lished that women faced health risks from using the dirty portable
toilets that men did not face, because of "anatomical differences be-
tween the sexes."165 The court found that the plaintiff established a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, reasoning that
"[any employment practice that adversely affects the health of female
employees while leaving male employees unaffected has a signifi-
cantly discriminatory impact."166
Disparate impact theory has been used with some frequency to
challenge one particular condition of employment: English-only poli-
cies, in which an employer adopts a rule that only English can be spo-
ken on the job.167 Perhaps the most well-known case is the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co. 1 68 The majority of Spun
Steak's employees were Hispanic and Spanish-speaking, with varying
degrees of proficiency in English.169 In response to complaints that
some Spanish-speaking workers were making derogatory comments in
Spanish about their non-bilingual coworkers, the employer instituted
a policy whereby only English could be spoken in connection with
work.' 7 0 The Spanish-speaking employees sued, contending that the
policy disparately impacted Hispanic employees.171
The Spun Steak court first acknowledged that the plaintiffs' claim
was unusual in that it focused on a disparity in a condition of employ-
ment rather than on a barrier to hiring or promotion.172 However,
noting the Supreme Court's instruction in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson that Title VII should be construed broadly, the court concluded
163. Id. at 381-82.
164. Id. at 382.
165. Id. at 384, 388.
166. Id. at 388.
167. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted
and judgment vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d
264 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D.
Ill. 1999); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Va. 1995).
168. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). Spun Steak has been the subject of numerous law
review articles, most of them critical of the Ninth Circuit's holding. See, e.g.,
Cara D. Helper, Comment, Enforcing the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin: The Overexten-
sion of English-Only Rules in Garcia v. Spun Steak, 79 MINN. L. REV. 391 (1994);
Roman Amaguin, Note, Garcia v. Spun Steak Company: Has the Judicial Door
Been Shut on English-Only Plaintiffs?, 16 U. HAw. L. REV. 351 (1994).
169. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1485.
172. Id.
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that disparate impact challenges to employment conditions could be
brought under the statute.17 3 The court explained that:
Regardless whether a company's decisions about whom to hire or to promote
are infected with discrimination, policies or practices that impose significantly
harsher burdens on a protected group than on the employee population in gen-
eral may operate as barriers to equality in the workplace and, if unsupported
by a business justification, may be considered "discriminatory."1 7 4
Despite the court's recognition that the disparate impact theory
could be used to challenge a condition of employment, the Spun Steak
plaintiffs' challenge to the English-only policy failed. The court agreed
that if the English-only policy caused any adverse effects, employees
of Hispanic origin would disproportionately suffer those effects.' 7 5
The court found, however, that the policy caused no significant ad-
verse effects at all. The plaintiffs contended that they suffered an ad-
verse impact because they were denied the ability, while on the job, to
speak in the language in which they felt most comfortable.1 76 The
court rejected that argument, noting that the employees were fully bi-
lingual, such that the English-only policy merely inconvenienced
them. 177 According to the court, "Title VII is not meant to protect
against rules that merely inconvenience some employees .... Rather,
Title VII protects against only those policies that have a significant
impact."178
The plaintiffs also argued that the English-only policy created "an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation" and that this
tense environment constituted a condition of employment.1 79 As the
court recognized, the plaintiffs were making a harassment argument,
contending that the English-only policy created a hostile work envi-
ronment based on their national origin.' 8 0 The court acknowledged
that claims of harassment usually involve intentional discrimination,
but it found that actionable harassment could be based on a disparate
impact theory: "Although . . . [Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson] is a
173. Id. at 1485-86. The court reasoned that a disparate impact challenge to a condi-
tion of employment did not fall within the language of section 703(a)(2) of Title
VII, the language that was traditionally understood to give rise to the disparate
impact theory. See supra note 157. The court concluded, however, that disparate
impact challenges to employment conditions could be brought under section
703(a)(1) of the statute.
174. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485.
175. Id. at 1486. The court stated, "It is beyond dispute that, in this case, if the En-
glish-only policy causes any adverse effects, those effects will be suffered dispro-
portionately by those of Hispanic origin. The vast majority of those workers at
Spun Steak who speak a language other than English-and virtually all those
employees for whom English is not a first language-are Hispanic." Id.
176. Id. at 1487.
177. Id. at 1487-88.
178. Id. at 1488.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1488-89.
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sexual harassment case in which the individual incidents involved be-
havior that was arguably intentionally discriminatory, its rationale
applies equally to cases in which seemingly neutral policies of a com-
pany infuse the atmosphere of the workplace with discrimination."181
For conduct to constitute actionable harassment, however, it must be
severe or pervasive, and the court found insufficient evidence that the
English-only policy infected the working environment to such a degree
as to create a hostile work environment. 8 2
It is noteworthy that one of the most famous cases involving a dis-
parate impact challenge to a condition of employment involved an ar-
gument that the condition created a hostile work environment, in
effect, that the condition amounted to harassment. As discussed pre-
viously, courts generally have not thought of disparate impact and
harassment law as complementary. Instead, the courts that have
taken seriously the requirement that harassing conduct must be dis-
criminatory to be actionable have generally focused only on disparate
treatment discrimination.
To succeed in a claim that non-targeted sexual conduct in the
workplace constitutes actionable sexual harassment under Title VII,
plaintiffs must do more than satisfy the requirements of traditional
sexual harassment claims, such as the severity or pervasiveness re-
quirement. Because such plaintiffs cannot prove disparate treatment,
they also must satisfy the statutory requirements for proving dispa-
rate impact discrimination. As discussed above, a plaintiff establishes
disparate impact discrimination by showing that a facially neutral
employment practice has a disparate impact-a disproportionately
adverse effect-on persons of one sex. The defendant then has the
opportunity to defeat the claim by demonstrating that the challenged
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1489. In reaching that holding, the court rejected the position taken by the
EEOC. Id. The EEOC Guidelines provide that an employee states a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination simply by proving that an employer has
adopted an English-only policy. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2001). Such a policy, ac-
cording to the EEOC, may "create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and in-
timidation based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory
working environment." Id. Under the EEOC's position, an English-only policy is
consistent with Title VII only if the employer can prove it is justified by business
necessity. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) and (b). One judge on the Spun Steak panel dis-
sented from the majority's rejection of the EEOC Guidelines, explaining that he
would defer to the EEOC's expertise in construing Title VII. Spun Steak, 998
F.2d at 1490 (Boochever, J., dissenting). The Spun Steak majority's rejection of
the EEOC Guidelines has been much criticized. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak
Co., 13 F.3d 296, 299-300 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (contending that the panel decision's objection to the Guide-
lines' presumption of disparate impact is "incomprehensible"); Helper, supra note
168, at 411-21 (arguing that the EEOC Guidelines are a reasonable construction
of Title VII and were entitled to deference); Amaguin, supra note 168, at 382-88
(arguing that the court should have deferred to the EEOC Guidelines).
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practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity. Could
these requirements be satisfied in the context of a sexual harassment
claim based on non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace?
i8 3
B. A Facially Neutral Employment Practice...
The first step in proving discrimination via the disparate impact
theory is identifying a facially neutral employment practice. Could
non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace ever constitute a facially
neutral employment practice, suitable for disparate impact analysis?
Answering this question requires a consideration of two separate is-
sues: first, the meaning of "facially neutral," and second, what consti-
tutes an "employment practice."
When the Supreme Court refers to "facially neutral" employment
practices in the disparate impact context, the Court intends to encom-
pass any practices that are not intentionally discriminatory because
they are not caused by the sex of any persons in the workplace. The
Court first used the phrase "facially neutral" in the disparate impact
context in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 8 4
stating that disparate impact claims "involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that
in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity." The Court likely based that phrase
on the following language in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,185 the Court's
seminal disparate impact case: "Under the Act, practices, procedures,
or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, can-
not be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." This language from Griggs in-
dicates that a policy or practice is appropriate for analysis under the
disparate impact theory if it does not explicitly differentiate on the
basis of a prohibited factor and is not caused'by intentional discrimi-
nation.'8 6 In other words, conduct is facially neutral and appropriate
183. In arguing for a broader understanding of disparate treatment and causation in
sexual harassment cases, see supra note 137, David Schwartz notes the difficul-
ties of proving discrimination under the disparate impact theory:
[Dlisparate impact requires proof of the broader effects of a policy be-
yond the individual case-typically in the form of statistic-whereas in-
tentional discrimination cases typically do not require such proof. It
would be burdensome to shift sexual harassment plaintiffs into the dis-
parate impact mode of proof.
Schwartz, supra note 137, at 1774.
184. 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
185. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
186. The policies at issue in Griggs required a high school education and passing
scores on two standardized general intelligence tests for initial assignment or
transfer into any department other than the company's lowest-paying depart-
ment. Id. at 427-28. The policies did not explicitly differentiate based on race
(they did not provide, for example, that only black employees needed to pass the
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for analysis under the disparate impact theory if it does not constitute
disparate treatment.1 8 7 Non-targeted sexual conduct in the work-
place does not constitute disparate treatment because it is not caused
by the plaintiffs sex. Accordingly, non-targeted workplace sexual con-
duct satisfies the "facially neutral" requirement of disparate impact
analysis.
A more difficult task is identifying an "employment practice" on
the part of the employer. Even before the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amended Title VII, the Supreme Court stated that the disparate im-
pact theory was a basis for finding "employment practices" discrimina-
tory. 8 8 The statute now provides that a plaintiff proves disparate
impact discrimination by demonstrating that an employer "uses a par-
ticular employment practice that causes a disparate impact" based on
a trait protected by Title VII, if the employer is unable to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.18 9 Might some harassment cases involving non-
targeted workplace sexual conduct provide a basis for identifying an
employment practice that causes a disparate impact? The statute
does not define the phrase "employment practice," and the Supreme
Court has not provided much guidance on what constitutes an employ-
ment practice. 190
tests), and the court of appeals had found that the employer "had adopted the
diploma and test requirements without any 'intention to discriminate against Ne-
gro employees."' Id. at 432 (quoting 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970)); see also
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 349 (stating that "a prima facie Title VII violation may be
established by policies or practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but
that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular group"); Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (stating that "the necessary
premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices,
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be func-
tionally equivalent to intentional discrimination").
187. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating
that "the central difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims is that disparate treatment requires a showing of discriminatory intent
and disparate impact does not .... In fact, the judicial doctrine of disparate im-
pact was created in Griggs specifically to redress facially-neutral policies or prac-
tices which visited disproportionate effects on groups protected by Title VII"); see
also Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 583, 588
(D.R.I. 1996) (stating that "[tihe doctrine of 'disparate impact' recognizes that
even though an employment practice is not motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose and does not expressly make any class based distinction, the practice may be
discriminatory if it adversely affects members of a protected class to a greater
degree than non-members").
188. See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (stating that a disparate impact plaintiff "must
begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is challenged"); Team-
sters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (stating that disparate impact claims "involve employ-
ment practices that are facially neutral").
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
190. As discussed in section IV.A, supra, all of the disparate impact cases considered
by the Supreme Court have involved challenges to an employer's qualification
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One possible understanding of the meaning of "employment prac-
tice" in disparate impact analysis is simply that the plaintiff must es-
tablish a basis for holding the employer liable for the discriminatory
conduct alleged. 19 1 As a general rule, Title VII prohibits discrimina-
tion only by employers, and only employers can be held liable under
Title VII.192 Establishing a basis for employer liability has not
presented any difficulty in most disparate impact cases, because the
conduct usually challenged in such cases-the establishment and use
of criteria for hiring or promoting employees-is the type of conduct
for which employers are directly responsible.193
In fact, courts have questioned employer liability for employment
discrimination only in the harassment context. Where the alleged dis-
crimination occurred in the context of a tangible employment action,
like hiring or firing, courts have found employers automatically liable
once the plaintiff proved discrimination.194 Courts generally find em-
standards or selection procedures for hiring or promoting employees. The Court
has not held or even stated in dicta, however, that the disparate impact theory is
applicable only in such cases. Moreover, the Court's holding in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, that the disparate theory applies outside the context of
objective employment requirements, arguably suggests a somewhat broad under-
standing of what constitutes an employment practice for purposes of disparate
impact analysis. See 487 U.S. at 991.
191. Charles Calleros apparently takes this view: "[A]n unlawful disparate impact
would be established if nondirected workplace expression for which the employer
is responsible alters working conditions for members of a protected class in num-
bers disproportionate to their numbers in the total workforce that is exposed to
the expression." Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1244-45
(emphasis added); see also id. at 1249 (stating that "[s]o long as the employer is
responsible for expression under agency principles, egregiously disturbing or dis-
tracting expression could constitute 'a particular employment practice"').
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The statute defines "employer" as "a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each work-
ing day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
year, and any agent of such a person ...." Id. at § 2000e(b). The statute also
prohibits discrimination by employment agencies and labor organizations.
§ 2000e(b),(c). The federal courts of appeal that have addressed the issue are in
agreement that supervisors are not subject to individual liability under Title VII.
See, e.g., Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998); Wathen v.
Gen. Elec., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997); Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542,
552 (3d Cir. 1996).
193. When discrimination is the product of an employment policy-as is alleged in
most disparate impact cases-the employer is directly liable; "it is the actions of
the employer as an entity that have violated the statute." Rebecca Hanner
White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment Discrimination, 30 GA.
L. REV. 509, 518 (1996). Where employment decisions are "in conformance with
an overall policy or practice of the employer as a whole, policies or practices
which the employer directly authorized or ratified, or of which it clearly knew or
should have known," employers face direct rather than vicarious liability. Id. at
518 n.42.
194. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998) (asserting that
"there is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims against employers for dis-
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ployers vicariously, not directly, liable in such cases. Pursuant to
agency principles, courts have reasoned that vicarious liability is ap-
propriate when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action
against a subordinate for a discriminatory reason, because such action
is within the scope of employment and/or the supervisor is aided by
the agency relation in taking such an action. 19 5
In contrast to the well-accepted law on employer liability for dis-
crimination occurring in the context of tangible employment actions,
courts struggled for years to determine standards for employer liabil-
ity for sexual harassment. More specifically, courts struggled to deter-
mine if and when an employer could be held vicariously liable for a
hostile work environment created by a supervisor. Courts agreed that
employers were vicariously liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment
engaged in by a supervisor.196 They also agreed that employers were
not vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by a co-
worker; instead, employers were directly liable if they knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate correc-
tive action-in other words, if their negligence was a cause of the har-
assment. 19 7 Employers would also be directly liable for a hostile work
environment created by a supervisor if the employers' negligence was
criminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing, promo-
tion, compensation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer liability
once the discrimination was shown" and stating that automatic employer liability
for discriminatory tangible employment actions is an "apparently unanimous
rule"); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) (noting that "courts
have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of em-
ployees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have
known, or approved of the supervisor's actions"); id. at 75 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (stating that under general Title VII law "the act of a supervisory employee
or agent is imputed to the employer"); White, supra note 193, at 521 (noting "how
little discussion the adoption of vicarious liability has provoked"); Susan Estrich,
Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 853 (1991) (stating that employer liability is
unquestioned in non-harassment Title VII cases: "Where a supervisor discrimi-
nates in wages, hours, or working conditions, the employer must remedy that
discrimination, whether or not the employer knew about it, should have known
about it, or approved it.").
195. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791 (citing cases holding that vicarious liability is appro-
priate for these reasons); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1)
(1958) ("A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment"); id. § 219(2)(d) ("A master is not
subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their
employment unless.., the servant.., was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation."); White, supra note 193, at 530, 533 (asserting
that "much intentional discrimination may be viewed as within the traditional
view of scope of employment" and that "[elven when discrimination is outside the
scope of employment, vicarious liability is still supported by common-law agency
principles because it is the existence of the agency relationship that enables the
supervisor to commit a statutory violation").
196. White, supra note 193, at 523.
197. Id. at 534-35.
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a cause of the harassment, but courts questioned whether employers
could be held vicariously liable, even though they were without fault,
for hostile work environment harassment by supervisors.198
Courts recognized that the agency principles supporting vicarious
liability in the context of a discriminatory hiring or firing might not
support vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment. 19 9 They reasoned that employees who engage in
harassing conduct often act for personal motives, rather than out of a
purpose to serve the employer, such that their conduct is outside the
scope of employment. 20 0 Moreover, because sexual harassment claims
tend to involve conduct that could be carried out by a coworker as well
as by a supervisor-a coworker as well as a supervisor could touch a
plaintiff in a sexual manner or display pornography in his work
area-courts questioned whether harassing conduct was aided by the
agency relationship. 20 1
In 1998, the Supreme Court resolved the question of when an em-
ployer is liable for supervisory sexual harassment. The Court held
that an employer is vicariously liable for a hostile work environment
created by a supervisor.20 2 However, unless the supervisor's harass-
ment culminates in a tangible employment action, the employer can
assert an affirmative defense by proving that it exercised reasonable
care in preventing and responding to sexual harassment and that the
aggrieved employee unreasonably failed to utilize preventive or cor-
rective opportunities provided by the employer or otherwise to avoid
harm.203
198. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998) ("[Allthough a supervi-
sor's sexual harassment is outside the scope of employment because the conduct
was for personal motives, an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where its own
negligence is a cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to
sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed
to stop it. Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability under Title
VII, but [the plaintiff] seeks to invoke the more stringent standard of vicarious
liability.").
199. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-94.
200. Id. at 794.
201. White, supra note 193, at 523.
202. The Court reasoned that, to some extent, the authority given to a supervisor al-
ways aids the supervisor in his harassing conduct, giving the harassment "a par-
ticularly threatening character" and making the aggrieved employee more
reluctant to report the harassment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802-03; Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 763.
203. In light of the Court's statement in Meritor that employers will not always be
liable for harassment committed by a supervisor, the Court formulated the af-
firmative defense to liability that is available in cases not involving a tangible
employment action. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763. The
Court noted, moreover, that the availability of the affirmative defense will en-
courage both employers and aggrieved employees to take action to prevent or
remedy quickly instances of harassment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06; Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 764.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
With these principles in mind, how might a plaintiff establish em-
ployer liability in a case involving non-targeted sexual conduct in the
workplace that arguably has a disparate impact on women? As dis-
cussed above, an employer is liable for harassing conduct if the em-
ployer's negligence was a cause of the conduct-if the employer knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take reasonable
corrective action. With regard to harassment by coworkers, plaintiffs
can establish employer liability only by proving that the employer was
negligent.
How might a plaintiff prove that her employer's negligence was a
cause of the non-targeted sexual conduct she experienced? Perhaps
the easiest method would be by proving that she told her employer
about the conduct and the employer failed to take any corrective ac-
tion. An interesting question to consider is whether it would be suffi-
cient to establish employer negligence for a plaintiff to prove that she
told her employer that she experienced the type of conduct at issue in
any of the three cases described in the Introduction to this Article. If a
female plaintiff demonstrated, for example, that she informed her em-
ployer that her male coworkers regularly talked about sex and used
vulgar language, 20 4 and that her employer took no corrective action,
would she establish employer negligence and thus a basis for em-
ployer liability?20 5
At first glance, the answer to that question might seem to be yes.
The Supreme Court has stated that an employer is "negligent with
respect to sexual harassment"-and thus is liable for the harass-
ment-"if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed
to stop it."206 Oncale made clear, however, that harassing conduct
does not violate Title VII unless it is discriminatory. In many cases
involving harassing conduct that is discriminatory under the dispa-
rate treatment theory, notice to the employer describing the conduct
will also serve as notice to the employer that the conduct is sexually
discriminatory. If, for example, a female plaintiff informed her em-
ployer that a male coworker frequently propositioned her for sex or
made derogatory references to her gender, the employer would be on
notice both of the conduct and of the likelihood that the conduct was
sexually discriminatory. An employer who took no action in response
to the plaintiffs complaint arguably would be negligent, providing a
basis for employer liability.
204. See Fitzgerald v. Ford Marrin Esposito Witmeyer & Gleser, L.L.P., 153 F. Supp.
2d 219, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd, 2002 WL 313225 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2002).
205. Of course, for the conduct to constitute actionable sexual harassment in violation
of Title VII, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the harassing conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and to cre-
ate an abusive work environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993).
206. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
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In contrast, if a female plaintiff informed her employer that her
male coworkers regularly talked about sex and used vulgar language,
the employer would not automatically be put on notice that such con-
duct was sexually discriminatory. By definition, to be appropriate for
consideration under the disparate impact theory of discrimination, the
conduct must be facially neutral; accordingly, the male coworkers' con-
versations must not have been caused by the plaintiffs sex. The con-
duct is sexually discriminatory, then, only if it is disproportionately
harmful to persons of one sex. Would a reasonable employer be aware
that the conversations at issue were disproportionately harmful to wo-
men, such that the conversations were likely discriminatory and such
that the employer could be deemed negligent in failing to respond to
them?
Under the facts hypothesized, it may initially appear that the an-
swer must be no, unless one contends that any workplace conversation
about sex-indeed, any workplace sexual conduct at all-is always
disproportionately harmful to women. That contention has dangerous
implications. It suggests that all things sexual (at least in the work-
place) are bad for women and that women need to be protected from
such things. Requiring employers to assume that they must always
protect women from any sexual conduct in the workplace may be more
stigmatizing than helpful to women. 20 7
On the other hand, it seems unreasonable to expect a female
worker, who wants her employer to take action to reduce the sexual-
ized nature of her work environment, to present the employer with
statistical studies demonstrating that certain aspects of the environ-
ment disproportionately harm women. If a plaintiff needs to prove
that her employer failed to respond to that kind of specific evidence in
order to establish employer negligence and employer liability, al-
lowing plaintiffs to prove the discrimination element of sexual harass-
ment via the disparate impact theory would serve little value. It
would be so difficult for a plaintiff to identify an "employment prac-
tice" that causes a disparate impact that few sexual harassment plain-
tiffs would ever succeed at establishing discrimination through the
disparate impact theory. Accordingly, few plaintiffs would ever suc-
ceed in proving that non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace cre-
ated a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.
It may be possible, however, to develop a middle-ground approach,
in which employers are not deemed to be negligent if they fail to as-
sume that all sexual conduct in the workplace disproportionately
harms woman, and which does not impose such a heavy burden on
plaintiffs who want to spur their employers to action. A plaintiff could
be required only to complain to her employer about workplace conduct
207. See infra section V.B.
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that she believes disproportionately harms her because of her gender.
Upon receiving such a complaint, the employer would not be required
immediately to institute corrective action, such as ordering that the
conduct cease, in order to avoid being deemed negligent and responsi-
ble for the conduct at issue. Instead, such a complaint by a plaintiff
would require the employer to undertake an inquiry into whether and
to what extent persons of one sex found the conduct particularly dis-
tracting or offensive. If such an inquiry revealed or would have re-
vealed that persons of one sex were substantially more disturbed or
distracted by the conduct than were persons of the other sex, only then
would the employer be required to institute corrective action in order
to avoid being found negligent.
Of course, as discussed above, employer negligence can be found a
cause of harassing conduct even absent an employee complaint about
such conduct, if the employer should have known of the harassment.
Moreover, plaintiffs need not prove employer negligence when the al-
leged harasser is a supervisor; employers are vicariously liable for su-
pervisory harassment. 20 8 How might these concepts operate in cases
involving facially neutral conduct? It could be argued that when a
workplace is obviously highly sexualized-where conversations about
sex regularly occur out in the open or pornography is displayed openly,
for example-the employer should know of the risk that such conduct
is disproportionately harmful to women and should undertake an in-
quiry to determine whether such disproportionate harm is present in
its workplace. Because of the dangers implicit in requiring employers
to assume that workplace sexual conduct is harmful to women,
20 9
however, a better approach is to require an employee complaint to
trigger the employer duty of inquiry. 2 10 In addition, vicarious liability
for supervisory harassment appears inappropriate in the context of
the disparate impact theory, which requires that the plaintiff identify
an "employer practice" that causes the disparate impact. 2 11 It seems
a stretch to argue that an "employment practice" could exist where
there is no evidence of employer fault, and vicarious liability by defini-
tion involves imposing liability without a showing of fault.
2 12
208. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
209. See infra section V.B.
210. It is arguable, however, that courts should not require an employee complaint to
trigger the employer duty of inquiry unless the employer has a well-publicized
anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure. It may be unreasonable to
place the burden of complaint upon the employee where the employer has not
communicated its willingness to respond to such complaints.
211. See supra text accompanying note 189.
212. If vicarious liability was a possible basis for employer liability in the disparate
impact context, the employer would be liable-and an "employment practice"
would be identified-whenever a supervisor sexually harassed a subordinate.
Unless the harassment culminated in a tangible employment action, the em-
ployer would have the opportunity to establish an affirmative defense. It is un-
[Vol. 81:11521202
2003] SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT 1203
It will not be easy for sexual harassment plaintiffs to identify an
"employment practice" causing a disparate impact, even if the phrase
is interpreted as simply requiring the plaintiff to establish a basis for
employer liability. The plaintiff will need to demonstrate that she
complained to her employer about conduct in the workplace, that her
employer conducted an inquiry that revealed that the conduct had a
disparate impact on persons of one sex (or that her employer failed to
conduct an inquiry, which-if it had been conducted-would have re-
vealed such a disparity), and that her employer failed to take reasona-
ble corrective action. Despite these difficulties, however, the
"employer liability" interpretation of "employment practice" may be
preferable to plaintiffs when compared to the alternative.
It could be argued that the statutory requirement that a plaintiff
prove that an employer "uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact" mandates that a plaintiff identify some af-
firmative conduct by the employer that disproportionately harms
members of a protected class. In other words, evidence of an em-
ployer's failure to act arguably is insufficient to satisfy the statutory
language. It is thus necessary to explore the meaning of the verb
"use."
The dictionary defines the verb "use" as meaning "to put into ac-
tion or service: to have recourse to or enjoyment of' or "to carry out a
purpose or action by means of: make instrumental to an end or pur-
pose: apply to advantage: turn to account."2 13 Synonyms for "use" in-
clude "employ," "utilize," "apply," and "avail."2 14 These definitions
and synonyms suggest that, to "use a particular employment prac-
tice," an employer must do more than merely negligently allow certain
behavior to occur in its workplace. Rather, the employer must have
some affirmative connection to the behavior. When an employer
adopts a policy that applicants for employment must have a high
school diploma or must be of a certain height, it is clear that the em-
ployer is utilizing affirmatively a rule that may disproportionately
harm members of a protected class. In contrast, when an employer
likely that the facially neutral conduct appropriate for analysis under the
disparate impact theory would ever culminate in a tangible employment action;
thus the affirmative defense should be available in most cases. To satisfy the
affirmative defense, the employer must prove that it exercised reasonable care in
preventing and responding to sexual harassment and that the aggrieved em-
ployee unreasonably failed to utilize preventive or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer or otherwise to avoid harm. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804;
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763. The employer would be unable to establish the affirma-
tive defense if it failed to communicate and enforce an anti-harassment policy
that prohibited facially neutral conduct that had a disparate impact on members
of a protected group, as well as harassing conduct that was caused by the sex of
the target of the conduct.
213. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2523-24 (1993).
214. Id. at 2524.
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fails to stop employees from engaging in conversations about sex or
displaying pornography, it seems more of a stretch to say that the em-
ployer is utilizing affirmatively any employment practice at all. 2 15
215. The decision of Congress to include the "uses a particular employment practice"
language in its codification of the disparate impact theory does not suggest, how-
ever, that Congress intended to restrict the applicability of the theory to cases
involving challenges to an employer's qualification standards or selection proce-
dures. Some challenges to conditions of employment would satisfy even a narrow
interpretation of the "uses a particular employment practice" language. For ex-
ample, the employer in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993),
clearly used a particular employment practice when it adopted a rule requiring
only English to be spoken on the job.
Other language in Title VII, however, arguably does suggest that Congress
intended the disparate impact theory to apply only in cases involving challenges
to qualification standards or selection procedures. After subsection (A) of the
statute explains the plaintiffs requirement of proving a disparate impact, the
defendant's burden of proving business necessity, and the plaintiffs opportunity
to prove an alternative employment practice, subsection (B) provides as follows:
With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice
causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the com-
plaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged em-
ployment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as.one employ-
ment practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
Reference to an employer's "decisionmaking process" is sensible only in the
context of a case involving employer qualification standards or selection proce-
dures; it does not make sense to refer to an employer's "decisionmaking process"
in the context of a challenge to a condition of employment. Moreover, this "deci-
sionmaking process" language-even more so than the "uses a particular employ-
ment practice" language in subsection (A) of the statute-suggests that the
disparate impact theory applies only to challenges to affirmative conduct by an
employer, rather than to an employer's failure to act.
Nonetheless, when viewed in context, it is unlikely that Congress's use of this
"decisionmaking process" language reflects a decision by Congress to limit the
disparate impact theory to qualification standards or selection procedures cases.
Congress drafted this part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in response to the Su-
preme Court's 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989). HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW AND PRACTICE 187-88 (2001). Wards Cove was a case involving a chal-
lenge to an employer's selection procedures for hiring employees, in which the
plaintiffs alleged that a variety of the employer's selection procedures had a dis-
parate impact on nonwhites. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The Court majority
held that the plaintiffs needed to show that "each challenged practice has a sig-
nificantly disparate impact on employment opportunities for whites and non-
whites." Id. The dissent contended that such a requirement was too difficult
because it may be impossible for plaintiffs to separate the effect of a bundle of
selection procedures. Id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Congress struck some-
what of a compromise, requiring a plaintiff to prove that each employment prac-
tice causes a disparate impact unless she can demonstrate that the elements of
an employer's "decisionmaking process" are incapable of separation for analysis.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). Viewed in this light, Congress's use of the phrase
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Moreover, even before Congress codified the disparate impact the-
ory via the "uses a particular employment practice" language, at least
one court held that only affirmative acts by an employer constituted
"employment practices" appropriate for challenge under the disparate
impact theory. In EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works,216 the
defendant employer obtained new employees primarily through word
of mouth; existing employees would inform their friends about jobs
with the defendant, and those persons would complete an application
at the defendant's office. When the defendant had an opening to fill, it
went through the applications it had on file.2 17 The EEOC alleged
that this word of mouth recruiting practice had a disparate impact on
blacks in violation of Title VII.218 The court disagreed, reasoning that
the defendant's "passive[] wait[ing] for applicants who typically
learned of opportunities from current ... employees" was not an em-
ployment practice suited for disparate impact scrutiny.2 19 According
to the court, "for the purposes of disparate impact, a more affirmative
act by the employer must be shown in order to establish causation."22 0
Under the Miniature court's interpretation of what constitutes an
"employment practice" appropriate for disparate impact scrutiny, sex-
ual harassment plaintiffs would have a difficult time establishing dis-
crimination through the disparate impact theory. Only in a very
unusual workplace could it be said that an employer affirmatively uti-
lized sexual conversations or the display of pornography. 22 1 The Min-
iature court's interpretation, however, is based on an incorrect reading
216.
"decisionmaking process" appears more of an attempt to modify the Wards Cove
approach to bundled selection practices, rather than a conscious choice to pro-
hibit the use of the disparate impact theory to challenge conditions of
employment.
947 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1991).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 305.
220.
221.
Id.
Employers that affirmatively utilize sexual conversations or the display of por-
nography would likely fall into one of two categories. First, employers may en-
courage sexual conversations or the display of pornography because they know
that it makes employees of a certain sex uncomfortable. Under such circum-
stances, the conduct would not be facially neutral; it would be intentionally dis-
criminatory under the disparate treatment theory. See supra notes 116-18 and
accompanying text. Second, employers may be in a sex-related business, in which
discussions about sex and exposure to pornography is an essential element of
some employees'jobs. Such employers, however, may be able to avoid liability for
disparate impact discrimination by establishing the affirmative defense that the
challenged conduct is job-related and consistent with business necessity. See in-
fra section IV.D. In short, the disparate impact theory is likely to be unnecessary
to impose liability on some employers that affirmatively utilize sexual conversa-
tions or the display of pornography, while other such employers will likely avoid
liability under the disparate impact theory via the affirmative defense.
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of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 222 one of the Supreme Court's
disparate impact cases. 223 Contrary to the Miniature court's descrip-
tion of the case, Wards Cove never states nor even suggests that the
disparate impact theory requires an affirmative act by an em-
ployer. 224 Accordingly, the Miniature court's interpretation of "em-
ployment practice" is unpersuasive.
Moreover, it may be possible to characterize an employer's conduct
with respect to facially neutral harassment in a way that could satisfy
an understanding of "employment practice" that focuses on affirma-
tive employer conduct. A plaintiff may be able to prove that her em-
ployer has a policy or practice of allowing employees to communicate
with each other in whatever manner they choose or to display
whatever they choose in the workplace. When stated in this manner,
an employer's refusal to take action in response to a plaintiffs com-
plaint about sexual discussions or the display of pornography in the
workplace appears more like a conscious choice by the employer to
adopt a particular policy or practice than like a mere failure to act. 225
222. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
223. In support of its holding that only an affirmative act by an employer can consti-
tute an "employment practice," the Miniature court relied primarily on Wards
Cove and reasoned as follows:
"[A] Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case of disparate impact sim-
ply by showing that, 'at the bottom line,' there is a racial imbalance in
the work force." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657, 109 S. Ct. at 2124. The
EEOC here, in essence, is attacking Miniature's overall hiring procedure
by pointing to the "bottom line" results; it has not made the more focused
allegation required by Wards Cove that a specific, affirmative employ-
ment practice caused the disparity between entry-level workers at Mini-
ature and entry-level workers throughout Chicago.
947 F.2d at 305.
224. Rather than suggesting that the disparate impact theory requires an affirmative
act by an employer, Wards Cove emphasizes causation. 400 U.S. at 657. The
Wards Cove Court held that plaintiffs must show that a particular employment
practice caused a racial disparity in hiring, rather than just showing the dispar-
ity. See 400 U.S. at 657. In Miniature, the EEOC did not attempt to make the
argument rejected by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove: that, because there was
a statistical disparity between the percentage of blacks in the relevant labor mar-
ket and the percentage of blacks employed at Miniature, some recruiting or hir-
ing practice or combination thereof by Miniature must be responsible for the
disparity. Rather, the EEOC argued that a specific employment practice-the
company's reliance on word of mouth recruiting-caused the disparity. Nothing
in Wards Cove mandates the Miniature court's rejection of that argument.
225. The dirty toilets disparate impact case, Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir.
1987), discussed previously at text accompanying notes 159-66, provides an ex-
ample of how the same factual scenario can be characterized as employer omis-
sion or affirmative employer choice. The court described the plaintiffs
discrimination claims as "based principally on the employer's failure to furnish
adequate, sanitary toilet facilities at the worksite where the plaintiff was em-
ployed." Id. at 381. If the court had wanted to avoid describing the claims as
based on an employer omission, the court could have characterized the chal-
lenged employment practice as the employer's refusal to allow workers to use the
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A plaintiff may be able to identify an "employment practice" on the
part of her employer in connection with non-targeted sexual conduct
in the workplace, either by establishing a basis for employer liability
for the conduct or by proving that the employer had an affirmative
policy or practice of allowing employees to engage in such conduct.
For non-targeted workplace sexual conduct to be actionable under Ti-
tle VII, however, evidence of more than just an employment practice is
required. The conduct must cause a disparate impact on members of a
protected class.
C. ... that Causes a Disparate Impact on the Basis of
Sex ...
1. Likelihood that Workplaces Will Include Facially Neutral
Conduct that Has a Disparate Impact on Women
In order for non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace to be ac-
tionable under Title VII, plaintiffs must prove that such conduct had a
disparate impact on members of a protected class. Is it likely that
workplaces will include conduct that, while not intentionally discrimi-
natory against women, is disproportionately disadvantageous to wo-
men? More specifically, is non-targeted sexual conduct in the
workplace likely to be disproportionately disadvantageous to women?
In light of our nation's history of job segregation by sex, it is likely
that workplaces will include facially neutral conduct that dispropor-
tionately harms women. Prior to the enactment of Title VII, many
employers openly excluded women from all but a few, historically fe-
male, jobs.226 Many years later, the labor market is still character-
ized by job segregation: men work mostly with other men, and women
work mostly with other women. 2 27 Although female workers have en-
tered male-dominated professions, they remain greatly under-repre-
sented at the highest levels of such professions. 2 28 Although blue-
collar work is the most financially rewarding option for working class
persons, "women's presence in traditionally male blue-collar jobs re-
mains minuscule."2 29 This job segregation has negative consequences
indoor restrooms in the main building of the plant. See id. at 381-82; see also
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION 468 (4th ed. 1997) (questioning the Miniature holding by asking, "[D]idn't
the employer make a conscious choice to hire new employees from unsolicited
applications?").
226. Abrams, supra note 35, at 1186.
227. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 66-68, 76 (2000); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Wo-
men and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in
Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749,
1751 (1990).
228. WILLIAMS, supra note 227, at 67.
229. Id.
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for female workers, because work traditionally done by women pays
less and provides fewer advancement opportunities than does work
traditionally done by men. 230
One significant effect-and perhaps a cause 231-of this job segre-
gation by sex is that many jobs and workplaces have been structured
according to male norms. The job descriptions, job structures, and
workplace cultures of many desirable jobs have developed around the
bodies, lifestyles, and personalities of the individuals who have gener-
ally held those positions: men. 23 2 To the extent that women tend to
differ from men, these job descriptions and structures and workplace
cultures may be disproportionately exclusionary of, or otherwise
harmful to, women. As stated by Kathryn Abrams, "Women have
been disadvantaged as workers by the fact that central features of the
workplace have been constructed by men, according to norms that ex-
clude and devalue experiences and perceptions characteristic of wo-
men."23 3 There have been few successful lawsuits, however,
230. Schultz, supra note 227, at 1751.
231. The causes of job segregation by sex have been much debated. In her article,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segrega-
tion in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
Vicki Schultz analyzes court cases challenging sex segregation in which employ-
ers asserted as a defense that women lack interest in traditionally male jobs. Id.
at 1751. She concludes that the explanations courts have found for sex segrega-
tion-either women's choice or employer coercion-fail to take into account the
ways in which employers help form women's job preferences. Id. at 1839-41. One
of the ways whereby employers shape women's job preferences, according to Sch-
ultz, is through the work cultures of traditionally male jobs, which often convey
the message that women are not welcome. Id. at 1832-39; see also WILLIAMS,
supra note 227, at 66 (asserting that "[m]ost women remain in 'women's work,' in
substantial part, because masculine norms exclude them from jobs traditionally
held by men").
232. See Deborah J. Vagins, Note, Occupational Segregation and the Male-Worker-
Norm: Challenging Objective Work Requirements Under Title VII, 18 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 79, 80 (1996) (asserting that the workplace is structured around a
facially neutral norm of the "ideal worker," which actually "implicitly reflects the
lifestyles and privileges of male workers," such as not being the primary care-
taker of young children); Abrams, supra note 35, at 1189 (contending that "male
control of the workplace has permitted male norms to prevail" and that such
norms "shape intangibles such as the 'appropriate' professional demeanor: the
tone of voice, air of command, and quickness to accommodate or anger that mark
a 'successful' employee"); Maxine N. Eichner, Note, Getting Women's Work That
Isn't Women's Work: Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII,
97 YALE L.J. 1397, 1398 (1988) (asserting that "job descriptions and structures
that have been adapted to male incumbents continue to bar women from those
sectors of the labor market from which they were once historically excluded by
intentional discrimination").
233. Abrams, supra note 35, at 1191.
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challenging job descriptions and structures and workplace cultures as
having a disparate impact on women. 234
One famous case involved an airline that set a minimum height
requirement of 5' 7" for its pilots, which excluded 93 percent of women
but only 25.8 percent of men. 23 5 The court ordered the defendant to
lower its height requirement to 5' 5", but the plaintiff contended that
such a requirement still had a disparate impact on women. 2 36 The
court found that a height requirement of 5' 5" was justified by busi-
ness necessity: "The evidence showed that pilots must have free and
unfettered use of all instruments within the cockpit and still have the
ability to meet the design eye reference point. In view of the cockpit
design, over which defendant has little control, a height requirement
must be established."237 The court never questioned the fact that the
airline purchased airplanes with cockpits designed around the male
body and failed to suggest that, even prospectively, the airline attempt
to purchase planes that fit women's bodies as well as men's.2 38 The
court just accepted the status quo, despite the fact that the cockpit
was based on a male norm that disproportionately excluded women.
The Lynch v. Freeman23 9 case discussed in section IV.A of this Ar-
ticle provides another example of a workplace condition based on a
male norm that was disproportionately harmful to women. Women
constituted less than one percent of the hourly construction workers
at the construction site where the plaintiff worked. 240 Probably none
of the construction workers, male or female, relished the toilet facili-
ties at the site-dirty, ill-equipped portable toilets. 241 The construc-
tion company provided such shoddy facilities, however, because it
designed its workplace conditions around a male norm. Men might
not like dirty toilets, but their health-unlike the health of women-is
234. See Eichner, supra note 232, at 1410 (noting that courts "fail to recognize that the
employer's conceptions of necessary job qualities and job structures may them-
selves contain entrenched discriminatory biases"). Some scholars have argued
that the disparate impact theory should be used to challenge employer policies
that disfavor those who are the primary caretakers of children, as such policies
have a disproportionate effect on women. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 227, at
104-08; Vagins, supra note 232, at 87; Abrams, supra note 35, at 1226-29.
235. Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061, 1062-63 (E.D. Mo. 1976), affd,
568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977).
236. Id. at 1064. Similarly, the cabs of trucks are often designed such that they fit
most men but a much lower percentage of women. WILLIAMS, supra note 227, at
77.
237. Boyd, 419 F. Supp. at 1064.
238. See Eichner, supra note 232, at 1410 n.53 (making this criticism of the Boyd
court).
239. 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1987).
240. Lynch v. Dean, 1985 WL 56683, at *9, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 338 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1987).
241. Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d at 381.
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not threatened by using them.242 The employer argued that, because
it furnished the same facilities to all its employees, it could not be
found to have discriminated against women. 24 3 The court rejected
this argument, reasoning that "[i] f apparent equality of facilities could
shield an employer from Title VII liability the entire rationale of the
disparate impact theory-based as it is on 'consequences'-would be
undercut. In these cases 'discrimination results not from the decision
to employ a challenged practice, but from its effect."' 244
It is arguable that sexual conduct in the workplace, conduct that is
typically thought of as harassment, can be considered the rough
equivalent of dirty toilets-facially neutral but having a more harsh
effect on women. Much of the scholarship on sexual harassment con-
tends that men and women are not similarly affected by harassing
conduct and perceive such conduct differently. In fact, this recogni-
tion that men and women have different perceptions led some theo-
rists to argue for-and some courts to adopt-a "reasonable woman,"
as opposed to a "reasonable person" standard for determining when
conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work en-
vironment. 245 It is important to note, however, a fundamental dis-
tinction between the reasonable woman standard and a disparate
impact approach to the discrimination element of sexual harassment.
Under the reasonable woman standard, conduct that has already been
found to be discriminatory is examined under a gender-specific per-
spective to determine if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be ac-
tionable. 246 The disparate impact approach is relevant at an earlier
stage of the analysis-to determine whether the conduct is discrimi-
natory. If the conduct is not discriminatory, it does not constitute sex-
ual harassment under Title VII regardless of its severity or
pervasiveness, 24 7 and, in order for non-targeted workplace sexual con-
duct to constitute sexual harassment, discrimination must be proved
via the disparate impact theory. Despite this important distinction
between them, both the reasonable woman standard and the dispa-
242. See id. at 384-85 (noting that "all females were placed at a higher risk of urinary
tract infections by using unsanitary portable toilets or by avoiding the use of such
toilets and holding their urine").
243. Id. at 387.
244. Id. (quoting Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, 645 F.2d 1251, 1257 (6th Cir.
1981)).
245. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Caroline Forell, Es-
sentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769.
246. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 582 (noting that courts use the reasona-
ble woman standard to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged "harassment
sufficiently 'severe or pervasive' to be both subjectively and objectively hostile or
abusive").
247. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (stating
that Title VII does not prohibit all harassment in the workplace, but is directed
only at sex discrimination).
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rate impact approach are based on the idea that perceptions of work-
place conduct may differ based on gender. Accordingly, as discussed
later in this Article, 248 arguments for and criticisms of the reasonable
woman standard may be relevant to determining whether non-
targeted sexual conduct in the workplace should be actionable via a
disparate impact approach to sexual harassment.
Several influential law review articles have argued that men and
women differ in their perceptions of sexual conduct in the workplace.
For example, one article states, "Substantial social science research
supports the conclusion that gender has a strong effect on individuals'
perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment, with women sig-
nificantly more likely than men to label conduct as harassing and of-
fensive."2 49 Another article asserts that "[olne principal reason for the
pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the workplace is that men re-
gard conduct, ranging from sexual demands to sexual innuendo, dif-
ferently than women do."250 Both articles cite the results of Barbara
A. Gutek's research regarding the effects of "sex at work" on individu-
als and organizations. 25 1
Based on several years of research, 25 2 Gutek concluded that
"highly sexualized [work] environments affect women's job satisfac-
tion; the more sexualized the environment, the lower their job satis-
faction," and "Ii]n general, women are hurt by sex in the workplace but
men are not."25 3 Such findings appear to support the proposition that
harassing conduct that is sexual in nature has a disproportionately
harsh impact on women and thus suggest that non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct should be actionable via a disparate impact approach
to sexual harassment. However, much of the behavior that Gutek
characterizes as "sex in the workplace"-such as sexual comments
and sexual touching-probably constitutes disparate treatment on the
basis of sex.2 54 Because such conduct is targeted based on sex, this
248. See infra notes 401-15 and accompanying text.
249. Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the
Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L. REV. 151, 186 (1991).
250. Abrams, supra note 35, at 1202.
251. See Dolkart, supra note 249, at 186 n.33 (citing BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE
WORKPLACE 96-102 (1985)); Abrams, supra note 35, at 1206 n.99 (citing GUTEK,
supra).
252. Gutek explains that the book "represents the culmination of a comprehensive
program of research on sex at work and the interactions of women and men at
work. The book is based on findings from several studies, primarily from a large
random-sample survey of 1,257 working men and women in Los Angeles County."
GUTEK, supra note 251, at x.
253. Id. at xiii.
254. For example, the women's version of Gutek's main questionnaire asks the follow-
ing three questions: "Sometimes on the job, men make comments of a sexual na-
ture that are meant to be compliments. On your present job, have you ever
received sexual remarks from a man that he meant to be complimentary?" Id. at
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research does not support the proposition that non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct disproportionately harms women.
The vast majority of the research regarding gender differences in
perceptions of harassing conduct presents the same problem: the re-
searchers focused on harassment scenarios involving targeted con-
duct-sexual advances or other conduct directed at a particular
individual, that most likely would not have occurred but for the tar-
get's sex.2 55 For example, one study asked male and female subjects
to evaluate the offensiveness of a scenario in which a man pats the
rear end of a woman with whom he works and compliments her on her
body.256 The researchers found that women perceived the scenario as
more offensive and more likely to constitute sexual harassment than
did men. 257 This finding might provide some support for a gender-
specific standard for determining whether harassing conduct is suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to be actionable. However, because the sce-
nario involved targeted conduct, conduct that is most likely
discriminatory under a disparate treatment theory, this research does
not suggest that non-targeted workplace sexual conduct should be ac-
tionable via the disparate impact theory.
The social science research on perceptions of sexual harassment
has failed to consider the requirement that harassing conduct be sexu-
ally discriminatory in order to be actionable under Title VII. The
questions asked to survey respondents and the scenarios presented to
193. "Sometimes on the job, men make sexual comments that are meant to be an
insult or a 'put-down.' On your present job, have you ever received sexual com-
ments from a man that he meant to be insulting?" Id. at 194. "Sometimes on the
job, a man might touch a woman in a way that is meant to be sexual. On your
present job, have you ever been touched by a man in a sexual way?" Id. These
questions seem likely to elicit responses about comments and touching that were
targeted at a woman and that the male actor would have been unlikely to direct
at another man.
255. See, e.g., Michela A. LaRocca & Jeffrey D. Kromrey, The Perception of Sexual
Harassment in Higher Education: Impact of Gender and Attractiveness, 40 SEX
ROLES 921, 935, 938 (1999) (using a sexual harassment scenario involving a male
professor who complimented a female student's looks and put his hand on her
knee, and finding that men perceived the scenario as less harassing than did
women); Carol L. Baird et al., Gender Influence on Perceptions of Hostile Environ-
ment Sexual Harassment, 77 PSYCHOL. REP. 79, 80-82 (1995) (reporting that, in
response to scenarios involving one employee directing conduct such as nonsexual
or sexual remarks or touching at an employee of the opposite sex, women rated
the scenarios as more harassing than did men); Gary N. Powell, Effects of Sex
Role Identity and Sex on Definitions of Sexual Harassment, 14 SEX ROLES 9, 13-14
(1986) (reporting that women were more likely than men to find that sexual re-
marks and sexual looks and gestures-whether meant to be complimentary or
meant to be insulting-constituted sexual harassment in the workplace).
256. Christopher W. Williams et al., An Attributional (Causal Dimensional) Analysis
of Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1169, 1173
(1995).
257. Id. at 1174.
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research subjects have focused on conduct that is sexual in nature;
researchers have not varied the questions and scenarios based on
whether the conduct at issue was caused by the sex of the target.258
In light of the federal courts' history of ignoring the requirement that
sexual harassment be sexually discriminatory in order to be actiona-
ble-and of equating conduct that is sexual in nature with conduct
that is sexually discriminatory 2 59-it is not surprising that social
scientists have done the same thing. However, now that the Supreme
Court has emphasized that harassing conduct must be sexually dis-
criminatory in order to violate Title VII, social scientists should ex-
plore the implications of that holding on their research agendas.
Rather than simply evaluating whether men and women have differ-
ent perceptions of sexual conduct in the workplace in general, social
scientists should examine whether men and women have different
perceptions of non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace, conduct
that is not caused by the sex of the target. If such research revealed
that more women than men were offended by non-targeted sexual jok-
ing in the workplace, for example, and would find it difficult to per-
form their jobs in a work environment in which sexual jokes were
frequent, this result would suggest that non-targeted workplace sex-
ual conduct should be actionable because it has a disparate impact on
women.
Despite the lack of attention paid by social scientists to the re-
quirement that harassing conduct be discriminatory, a few studies
provide some support for the proposition that women perceive non-
targeted workplace sexual conduct differently than men. One study
asked male and female subjects, all of whom were employed, to evalu-
ate to what extent they considered various conduct by a male supervi-
sor that was sexual in nature to be sexually harassing.2 60 The
258. For example, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board surveyed over 20,000 fed-
eral employees and reported that more women than men considered uninvited
sexually suggestive looks or gestures and uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, re-
marks, or questions to be sexual harassment. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM 26-28,
app. C-5 - C-6 (1981). Such conduct would be discriminatory under a disparate
treatment theory if the person who made the gesture or told the joke did so be-
cause of the sex of someone in the workplace. The comments of some of the sur-
vey participants indicate that at least some of this conduct amounted to disparate
treatment; for example, one woman reported that she and other female employ-
ees were constantly subjected to suggestive remarks and propositions from male
employees. Id. at 37. Because of the way the survey's writers phrased the ques-
tions, however, it is unclear whether and to what extent men and women perceive
differently conduct that is not intentionally discriminatory but instead is facially
neutral.
259. See supra section II.B.
260. Gerald L. Blakely, Eleanor H. Blakely & Robert H. Moorman, The Relationship
Between Gender, Personal Experience, and Perceptions of Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace, 8 EMPLOYEE REsP. & RTS. J. 263, 267 (1995).
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researchers found that female subjects evaluated ambiguous con-
duct-conduct that the researchers considered neither severe nor in-
nocuous-as more harassing than did male subjects. 26 1 Included in
the examples of ambiguous conduct were the following: a male super-
visor telling sexually oriented jokes to or in the presence of a female
subordinate, a male supervisor making sexually suggestive remarks
or gestures in the presence of a female subordinate, and a male super-
visor displaying pin-up calendars or other sexually suggestive materi-
als.26 2 This conduct could be intentionally discriminatory under the
disparate treatment theory if the supervisor's conduct was motivated
by sexual desire for the subordinate or otherwise was caused by the
presence of women in the workplace. Because this conduct could be
non-targeted, however, the study's findings of significant gender dif-
ferences in the perception of such conduct provides some support for
the proposition that non-targeted workplace sexual conduct dispropor-
tionately harms women.
Participants in another study26 3 viewed video presentations of
simulated interviews with complainants, alleged harassers, and other
workers based on the facts in the cases of Ellison v. Brady26 4 and
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.265 Ellison involved a female em-
ployee's complaint about a male coworker who persistently asked her
out on dates and sent her notes. Rabidue involved a female em-
ployee's complaint about male employees' open display in the work-
place of pictures of nude women and a complaint about a male
coworker who made extremely vulgar comments about the complain-
ant and other women. In the Rabidue fact pattern, but not the Ellison
fact pattern, women found the conduct more severe, more pervasive,
more likely to meet the legal definition of sexual harassment, and
more likely to have affected negatively the complainant's work envi-
ronment than did men. 26 6 Some of the conduct at issue in Rabidue,
such as the extremely vulgar comments about the complainant and
other women, likely constituted disparate treatment, because it is un-
likely that the male coworker would have made such comments about
261. Id. at 270. In contrast, as the researchers had hypothesized, male and female
subjects did not differ in their ratings of the extent to which severe or innocuous
conduct constituted sexual harassment. Id.
262. Id. at 269.
263. Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, How Do People Evaluate Social Sexual Con-
duct at Work? A Psychological Model, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 75, 77 (2000). All
of the participants in the study were full-time employees. Id.
264. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
265. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
266. Wiener & Hurt, supra note 263, at 79-81. In both fact patterns, women found the
conduct more likely to have affected the complainant's psychological well-being
than did men. Id. at 81.
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men.2 67 Regarding the pornography, however, the evidence did not
indicate that any of the display was caused by the plaintiffs sex or by
the sex of other women in the workplace. This conduct could be
viewed as non-targeted, such that it is discriminatory only under a
disparate impact approach. The fact that women viewed the Rabidue
facts as more 9evere, more likely to have harmed the complainant's
work performance, and more likely to have harmed the plaintiffs psy-
chological well-being than did men suggests that non-targeted work-
place sexual conduct should be actionable because it has a disparate
impact on women.
In addition, it is reasonable to suspect that women do perceive
workplace displays of pornography 268 and discussions or joking about
sex-even when such conduct is non-targeted-differently than do
men. Male-dominated work environments are more likely to feature
discussions of sex and comparisons of sexual experiences than are fe-
male-dominated work environments. 269 That fact alone suggests that
men may be less disturbed by sexuality in the workplace than are wo-
men. If discussions of sex in the workplace interfered with the ability
of many men to get their work done, it is unlikely that such discus-
sions would be common in male-dominated workplaces. Furthermore,
the comparative newness of women to many workplaces and kinds of
work may cause more women than men to view their position in the
267. The coworker commonly referred to women as "whores," "cunt," "pussy," and
"tits." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting). There is no evidence that
he used similarly derogatory terms to refer to men. Moreover, the conduct at
issue in Ellison was clearly disparate treatment; the male coworker's actions
were motivated by sexual desire for the plaintiff, and there was no evidence that
the coworker was also sexually attracted to men.
268. Susan M. Shaw conducted useful research regarding women's perceptions of por-
nography, although her research did not involve the workplace context. Men's
Leisure and Women's Lives: The Impact of Pornography on Women, 18 LEISURE
STUD. 197-212 (1999). Shaw interviewed women regarding their individual ex-
periences with pornography and showed them a series of pictures taken from
magazines such as Playboy and Playgirl. Id. at 202. The women consistently
reacted negatively to the pictures. Id. at 203. Although the women were more
negative toward pictures of sexual violence-using words like "terrified" and "dis-
gusted" to describe their feelings when looking at the pictures-they also re-
sponded negatively to the non-violent pictures, describing feelings of
embarrassment and discomfort. Id. at 203-05. Moreover, the women stated that
such pictures made them feel inadequate and self-conscious about their own bod-
ies, and that they believed that such pictures made men look down on women. Id.
at 205-07.
269. GUTEK, supra note 251, at 137; see also id. at 167 (stating that "[a] work environ-
ment numerically dominated by men will be characterized by a sexual ambience
and the expression of male sexuality. This takes the form of comments about
women in general, pictures and posters, sexual jokes and analogies, and obscen-
ities."); id. at 169 (stating that "[tihe average working man may tell sexual jokes,
use explicit sexual terms to describe work situations, make sexual comments to
coworkers, and display sexual pictures and posters").
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workplace as precarious and threatened by workplace sexuality. 270
Women may not want a sexualized workplace-even if none of the
workplace sexuality reflects anti-women bias or is otherwise targeted
at women because of their sex-because they want to be seen as seri-
ous workers and believe that any workplace sexuality draws attention
to them as potential sex objects rather than as serious workers. 27 1
The female firefighter who was the plaintiff in O'Rourke v. City of
Providence described her reaction when seeing pictures of nude wo-
men that another firefighter kept in his locker: "I see these pictures of
these women there, and is this what they think of women? Is this how
they're viewing me? There was no respect."27 2 In contrast, men are
naturally viewed as serious workers, and a sexualized workplace
poses no threat to that view. 27 3
Moreover, women may be more disturbed than are men by pornog-
raphy or discussions of sex in the workplace because women are dis-
proportionately victims of sexual violence.2 74 As explained by
270. Abrams, supra note 35, at 1204-05.
271. See GUTEK, supra note 251, at 100. It is possible, however, that women in general
are not more disturbed by sexuality in the workplace than are men in general.
Rather, it may be that a person-whether male or female-who is in the gender
minority in the workplace is disproportionately disturbed when sexual conduct
occurs in that workplace. Charles Calleros provides the example of his brother-
in-law, who was the only male among more than a dozen employees in a library's
cataloguing department. Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at
1243. The brother-in-law discovered that the inside of a cabinet in the copy room
was lined with pictures of male nudes, which made him at least "momentarily
offended." Id.; see also Lahey v. JM Mortgage Serv., Inc., No. 99C4074, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5221 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2000) (plaintiff, the only male loan processor,
sued his employer for sexual harassment based partly on his coworkers' hiring of
a male stripper at a company Christmas party and later display of photographs of
the stripper in the workplace). However, even when men are in the gender mi-
nority in a workplace, they still may be less disturbed by workplace sexual con-
duct than are women because women are disproportionately victims of sexual
violence. See Abrams, supra note 35, at 1205. As Calleros noted, "although [his]
brother-in-law was temporarily disturbed by the pictures of nude males in his
workplace, he did not feel any threat of sexual assault from the female owner of
the pictures." Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1246.
Nonetheless, if a plaintiff, male or female, could produce evidence supporting
this workplace gender minority theory-either evidence of the reactions of per-
sons in the plaintiffs particular workplace or evidence from general statistical
studies-courts should find that the plaintiff has proved that non-targeted sexual
conduct caused a disparate impact.
272. 235 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Torrey, supra note 112, at 88.
273. See GUTEK, supra note 251, at 101; see also id. at 166 ("A man apparently can
make sexual jokes and comments, use sexual obscenities .... and still be consid-
ered a desirable worker: analytical, rational, tough, a good leader. The sexual
aspect of the male sex role does not interfere with the perception of men as seri-
ous, professional workers.").
274. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that "because wo-
men are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a
stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior").
[Vol. 81:11521216
2003] SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT 1217
Kathryn Abrams, "Because of the inequality and coercion with which
it is so frequently associated in the minds of women, the appearance of
sexuality in an unexpected context or a setting of ostensible equality
can be an anguishing experience."275 In particular, women may be
aware of evidence indicating that pornography arouses men and justi-
fies aggression against women. 2 76
Non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace, such as displays of
pornography and discussions or joking about sex, may be common in
some male-dominated environments, and such a sexualized workplace
may be disproportionately harmful to women. It may seem obvious,
then, that non-targeted workplace sexual conduct should be actiona-
ble via a disparate impact approach to sexual harassment. But does
the effect caused by such conduct constitute an "impact" appropriate
for disparate impact analysis?
2. The Meaning of "Impact" in a Sexual Harassment Case
What does "impact" mean in a sexual harassment case? All of the
disparate impact cases decided by the Supreme Court-and the vast
majority of disparate impact cases decided by the lower courts-have
involved challenges to an employer's qualification standards or selec-
tion practices for hiring or promoting employees. 277 The "impact" at
issue in all of these cases was a pass/fail barrier to some tangible job
benefit. In Connecticut v. Teal,2 78 for example, the employment re-
quirement at issue was a written test that employees needed to pass
in order to be considered for promotion; when the plaintiffs failed the
test, they were excluded from consideration for promotion.
Non-targeted workplace sexual conduct, however, generally does
not involve a pass/fail barrier to a tangible job benefit. A plaintiff
could contend that exposure to such sexual conduct caused her and
other women, in numbers disproportionate to men, to quit their
jobs.279 The plaintiff would argue that the women failed to meet their
275. Abrams, supra note 35, at 1205.
276. See Torrey, supra note 112, at 88-92 (discussing studies of men's reactions to
pornography).
277. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982) (discussing employer re-
quirement that employees pass a written examination to be considered for promo-
tion); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 327 (1977) (discussing employer
requirement that applicants for employment be of a certain minimum weight and
height); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971) (discussing em-
ployer requirement that employees have a high school diploma and pass two
standardized tests in order to be assigned initially or transferred into certain
departments).
278. 457 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1982).
279. See Willborn, supra note 50, at 688 n.45 (noting that a plaintiff could try to prove
that women were "disproportionately screened out by the neutral factor" by
presenting evidence that "women had quit in disproportionate numbers because
of the environment").
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employer's requirement that employees tolerate sexual conduct in the
workplace, and that their failure to satisfy this requirement excluded
them from a tangible job benefit-it cost them their jobs. Loss of a job
is certainly an "impact" covered by the disparate impact theory, and
characterizing the situation in this manner makes it appear as if a
pass/fail barrier is involved. The difficulty, however, would be proving
causation. The plaintiff cannot simply produce evidence that more
women than men quit their jobs with the employer and ask the court
to assume that the non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace
caused this impact, 28 0 and the plaintiff may be unable to obtain more
specific evidence of causation.
Moreover, even plaintiffs who do not quit their jobs may want to
contend that non-targeted workplace sexual conduct had a disparate
impact on them because of their sex. They may argue that such con-
duct disproportionately affects women-that it disturbs, distresses,
and distracts women and interferes with their ability to succeed at
their jobs more than it does men. Should disparate impact analysis be
available when mental distress rather than a pass/fail barrier to a
tangible job benefit is at issue?
The few disparate impact cases involving challenges to conditions
of employment establish that disparate impact analysis can be used in
cases not involving a pass/fail barrier to a tangible job benefit. In
Lynch v. Freeman,2 S1 the court found that the threat to physical
health that the dirty toilets posed to women, but not to men, was an
"impact" that could be actionable via the disparate impact theory, rea-
soning that "[a]ny employment practice that adversely affects the
health of female employees while leaving male employees unaffected
has a significantly discriminatory impact." In Garcia v. Spun Steak
Co.,282 the court reasoned that if the English-only policy created a
tense work environment, "an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and
intimidation," that effect would constitute an "impact" actionable
under the disparate impact theory.
Lynch and Spun Steak suggest that disparate impact analysis
should be available when the alleged impact makes it more difficult
for members of a protected class to perform their jobs, even though the
impact does not constitute a barrier to their obtaining the jobs in the
first place. Such a proposition is controversial, however. In his dis-
senting opinion in Lynch, Judge Danny Boggs contended that he saw
nothing "in the whole movement toward sexual equality in the work-
280. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (stating that "a
Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case of disparate impact simply by showing
that, 'at the bottom line,' there is racial imbalance in the work force").
281. 817 F.2d 380, 388 (6th Cir. 1987).
282. 998 F.2d 1480, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1993). The court found that the plaintiff failed
to prove such an impact, however. Id. at 1489.
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place embodied in Title VII, to enact a requirement that working con-
ditions for all must be upgraded to some unstated standard before
women can have full access to the workplace."283 Rather, according to
Judge Boggs, "the keynote of that movement has been the removal of
barriers that are special to women so that they may then compete on
the basis of their ability to do the actual job, given its conditions."28 4
Boggs' argument, in essence, is that while disparate impact analysis is
available to allow a woman to get a job in the first place, she must
accept the work environment as is. If such an argument were ac-
cepted, plaintiffs could not use the disparate impact theory to chal-
lenge non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace, but Boggs'
argument should be rejected.
Lynch and Spun Steak, unlike the Boggs' dissent, reflect the
breadth of the commitment to antidiscrimination contained in Su-
preme Court decisions interpreting Title VII. In Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson,28 5 the Court held that Title VII covered more than
just tangible employment actions; it also prohibited discriminatory
conduct that was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment." In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,286 the Court held that Title
VII prohibited not only intentional discrimination but also practices
"that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation," that "operate
as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups." Reading the two cases
together leads to the conclusion that work environments "that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation" and that "operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups" are prohibited by Title VII.
The Griggs Court was concerned about equality of opportunity and
reasoned that equality of opportunity required the elimination of neu-
tral practices that operated to "'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimi-
natory employment practices." 28 7  Contrary to Judge Boggs'
contention in Lynch, it is not equality of opportunity to tell a woman
that she can work on a construction site but only if she will tolerate
working conditions that developed based on a male norm and are dis-
proportionately dangerous to the health of women, regardless of
whether such conditions are necessary for the job.288 Citing Meritor,
the Spun Steak court recognized that, for true equality of opportunity
in employment, the disparate impact theory must be available to chal-
283. Lynch, 817 F.2d at 391.
284. Id.
285. 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
286. 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
287. See id. at 430.
288. See Eichner, supra note 232, at 1409 (contending that "[t]o implement the equal-
ity of opportunity guaranteed specifically by Griggs and more generally by Title
VII, jobs must be more than open to women in name only-they must be accom-
modated to women as well as men").
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lenge more than just pass/fail barriers to tangible job benefits. 28 9 The
court reasoned,
Regardless whether a company's decisions about whom to hire or to promote
are infected with discrimination, policies or practices that impose significantly
harsher burdens on a protected group than on the employee population in gen-
eral may operate as barriers to equality in the workplace and, if unsupported
by a business justification, may be considered "discriminatory."2 9 0
Accepting that disparate impact analysis should be available even
when a pass/fail barrier to a tangible job benefit is not at issue, does
not necessarily mean that such analysis should be available when the
alleged "impact" is mere mental distress. In other words, a court
might be more willing to find that the threat to physical health at
issue in Lynch is a sufficient "impact" than it would be to find that
mental disturbance, distress, or distraction caused by non-targeted
workplace sexual conduct suffices. The Supreme Court's reasoning in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ,291 however, suggests that mental dis-
tress and resulting interference with one's work should be considered
a sufficient "impact" for purposes of disparate impact analysis. In ex-
plaining the standard for when conduct creates a sexually hostile
work environment, the Harris Court made clear that one of the inju-
ries with which Title VII is concerned is mental distress. The Court
stated that its "severe or pervasive" standard "takes a middle path
between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and
requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."292
The Court also noted that one of the factors relevant to determining
whether an environment is abusive is "whether it unreasonably inter-
feres with an employee's work performance." 293
As discussed in the previous section, some male-dominated work-
places may feature a considerable amount of non-targeted sexual con-
duct, such as displays of pornography and discussions about sex. This
conduct may disproportionately disturb, distress, and distract female
employees and interfere with their ability to perform their jobs; it may
operate as a "built-in headwind" for women in the workplace. If
proven, this "impact" should be considered sufficient for application of
the disparate impact theory of discrimination. Proving disparate im-
pact discrimination is not an easy task, however. How would a plain-
289. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485.
290. Id.; see also Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1248 (contend-
ing that "(allthough an allegedly racist or sexist poster may not exclude members
of a protected class as starkly as do entrance requirements, it could prevent those
who make inroads on formerly white-male workplaces from enjoying an equal
opportunity to perform their work capably or even to survive the pressures of the
workplace").
291. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
292. Id. at 21.
293. Id. at 23.
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tiff prove that non-targeted workplace sexual conduct caused a
disparate impact on women?
3. Proving Disparate Impact
a. Proving Disparate Impact in the Typical Case
To establish discrimination under the disparate impact theory, a
plaintiff must prove that an employer "uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact" based on a factor prohibited
by Title VII.294 Before analyzing how a plaintiff might prove that
non-targeted workplace sexual conduct caused a disparate impact on
the basis of sex, it is useful to consider how plaintiffs prove disparate
impact in the typical case involving a challenge to an employer's quali-
fication standards or selection procedures.
All disparate impact cases require, of course, proof of a disparate
impact, proof that the challenged employer conduct disproportionately
disqualified, excluded, or otherwise harmed members of a protected
group. Courts have generally insisted that a plaintiff prove a dispa-
rate impact via statistical evidence showing that an employer's quali-
fication standard or selection procedure disqualified or excluded a
disproportionate number of persons in a protected group. 29 5 Proving a
disparate impact tends to turn on two issues. First, what is the com-
parison group for determining whether there is a disparate impact?
Second, what is the required magnitude of the disproportionate
impact?296
These issues can be explored by considering the example of an em-
ployer who institutes a requirement that, in order to be hired for a
particular position, all applicants must have a college degree. A plain-
tiff alleges that the requirement has a disparate impact on African-
Americans. Can the plaintiff prove that this employment practice-
the requirement of a college degree-causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race?
The court first must determine the appropriate comparison group:
the relevant applicant or labor pool it must examine in order to decide
whether the college degree requirement causes a disparate impact on
294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
295. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (stating that
the evidence in disparate impact cases "usually focuses on statistical dispari-
ties"); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 160 (2d Cir.
2001) (stating that "statistical proof almost always occupies center stage in a
prima facie showing of a disparate impact claim"); Evers v. Alliant Techsystems,
Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff must present "sta-
tistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in ques-
tion caused the plaintiff to suffer adverse employment action because of his or her
membership in a protected group").
296. See LEwis & NORMAN, supra note 215, § 3.35.
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the basis of race. Implicit in the concept of a disparate impact is the
requirement of some sort of comparison. 29 7 As explained by one court,
"to determine whether an employment practice causes a 'disparate'
impact, the court must gain some handle on the baseline racial compo-
sition that the impact is 'disparate' from; that is, what should the ra-
cial composition of the job force look like absent the offending
employment practice." 298 The appropriate comparison group will vary
based on the nature of the job and the nature of the challenged em-
ployment practice. 29 9
In our example, the appropriate comparison group may be the pool
of persons who applied for the position. 30 0 If equal numbers of whites
and African-Americans applied for the position, and substantially
more African-Americans than whites were excluded from considera-
tion by the college degree requirement, it appears that the college de-
gree requirement had a disparate impact on African-Americans-it
disqualified a disproportionate number of them from being hired for
the position. Moreover, even if the employer could demonstrate that,
at the conclusion of its hiring process, it hired the same percentage of
African-Americans who applied as it did whites, the plaintiff would
still establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. 30 1
The employer violated Title VII by using a hiring requirement with a
racially disparate impact; it is no defense that there was an appropri-
ate racial balance at the end of the entire hiring process. 3 02
What if, however, when comparing the percentages of whites and
African-Americans who applied for the position with the percentages
of those races who were hired, it turns out that approximately the
same percentages of white applicants and African-American appli-
cants were excluded from consideration by the college degree require-
ment? Under these facts, if the appropriate comparison group were
297. LARSON, supra note 158, § 21.03.
298. In re Employment Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).
299. Id. The parties, moreover, are likely to disagree on what comparison group is
appropriate. See id. (stating that "[t]he contest between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant is one in which both seek to answer the question of who is qualified, and
thus to define the qualified applicant pool on their own terms").
300. See id. at 1313 (stating that actual applicants sometimes comprise the appropri-
ate comparison group).
301. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (holding that there is no "bot-
tom line" defense to a claim of disparate impact discrimination).
302. See id. The individual African-American plaintiff who was excluded from consid-
eration for hire by the discriminatory college degree requirement suffered an in-
jury cognizable under Title VII, even if the employer compensated for that
discriminatory requirement by hiring a sufficient number of African-Americans
to reach a nondiscriminatory "bottom line." See id. at 453. As noted by the Su-
preme Court in Connecticut v. Teal, "the suggestion that disparate impact should
be measured only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees...
individual [plaintiffs] the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on
the basis of job-related criteria." Id. at 451.
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the pool of actual applicants, the plaintiff could not prove that the col-
lege degree requirement had a disparate impact on African-Ameri-
cans. The plaintiff may be able to convince the court, however, that a
different comparison group is more appropriate. For example, if the
requirement that applicants have a college degree was well-known,
the actual applicant pool may not be the appropriate comparison
group because potential applicants without a college degree may have
been "discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized inability
to meet the very standard[] challenged as being discriminatory."30 3
National or regional statistics may provide the appropriate com-
parison group where there is no reason to suspect that the characteris-
tics of the potential applicant pool-those persons who would apply
and be qualified for the job in the absence of the challenged employ-
ment requirement-differ greatly from those of the national or re-
gional population.30 4 If this were the case, the plaintiff could use
national or regional statistics regarding the percentages of whites and
African-Americans with college degrees to prove that the college de-
gree requirement had a disparate impact on African-Americans. How-
ever, if the job in question requires special qualifications that are not
challenged by the plaintiff-for example, the ability to analyze com-
plex data-the employer will contend that national or regional statis-
tics do not provide the appropriate comparison group. The employer
will assert that the appropriate comparison group consists of those
persons who can analyze complex data. If in the group of persons who
can analyze complex data, the same percentages of whites and Afri-
can-Americans have college degrees, the employer will argue that the
college degree requirement does not have a disparate impact on the
basis of race. 30 5
303. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977); see also EEOC v. Joint Appren-
ticeship Comm., 164 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that a "statistical showing
of disparate impact need not.., be premised on an analysis of the characteristics
of actual applicants" where the challenged educational requirement and age max-
imum likely had a chilling effect on black and women applicants).
304. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330 (stating that "reliance on general population demo-
graphic data was not misplaced where there was no reason to suppose that physi-
cal height and weight characteristics of Alabama men and women differ
markedly from those of the national population").
305. The In re Employment Discrimination Litigation court explained the importance
of the appropriate comparison group as follows:
[T]he concept of a "disparate impact" on one racial group over another
only makes sense if we tailor the qualified applicant pool to reflect only
those applicants or potential applicants who are "otherwise qualified,"
... (that is, qualified but for their failure to meet the challenged employ-
ment requirement) for the job or job benefit at issue. If the court fails to
define the qualified applicant pool in an appropriately specific manner,
then the challenged employment practice has not actually been shown to
be "causing" any "disparate impact." Something else, unrelated to the
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Related to the need to identify an appropriate comparison group is
the requirement that the plaintiff produce evidence of causation. The
plaintiff must prove a causal link between the challenged employment
practice and the disparity.3O6 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,30 7
the Supreme Court held that the evidence of causation must be spe-
cific. Plaintiffs must "demonstrate that the disparity they complain of
is the result of one or more of the employment practices that they are
attacking [ ], specifically showing that each challenged practice has a
significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities for whites
and nonwhites." 30 8 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codifies this require-
ment of specific causation; plaintiffs generally must demonstrate that
each particular employment practice caused a disparate impact.30 9
The statute modifies the Wards Cove approach in one respect, how-
ever, by providing that if a plaintiff can demonstrate that the ele-
ments of the employer's decisionmaking process cannot be separated
for analysis, the entire decisionmaking process may be analyzed as
one employment practice.3 10 The plaintiff in our example could not
establish a case of disparate impact simply by showing that, at the
bottom line, a disproportionately low number of African-Americans
were hired.311 Some evidence of causation is required. Moreover, the
plaintiff could not point to that bottom line racial imbalance and con-
tend that the employer's hiring process in general had a disparate im-
pact on African-Americans. Unless the elements of the employer's
hiring process were incapable of separation for analysis, the plaintiff
would need to demonstrate that a specific component of that hiring
process, like the college degree requirement, caused a disparate im-
pact on African-Americans.
Once the court has decided what is the appropriate comparison
group for determining whether there is a disparate impact and has
looked for evidence of causation, the next issue is what magnitude of
disparity is required. The Supreme Court has provided little guidance
on this issue, stating in vague terms that the challenged employment
employer's practices and procedures, may be holding back a particular
racial group.
198 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
307. 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).
308. Id.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B).
310. Id.
311. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (stating that "a Title VII plaintiff does not make
out a case of disparate impact simply by showing that, 'at the bottom line,' there
is racial imbalance in the work force"); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d
1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that "a plaintiff must do more than simply
identify a workforce imbalance to establish a prima facie disparate impact case; it
must causally connect a facially-neutral employment practice to the identified
disparity").
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practice must disqualify members of a protected class at a "substan-
tially higher rate" than persons outside that class. 3 12 Some lower
courts have relied on the four-fifths rule from the EEOC's Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures to determine when a
disparity is of sufficient size.3 13 This rule provides:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
... of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by
the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a
greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforce-
ment agencies as evidence of adverse impact.
3 1 4
Under this approach, if the plaintiff could demonstrate that the selec-
tion rate of African-Americans (the percentage of African-Americans
in the appropriate comparison group who satisfied the college degree
requirement) was less than four-fifths of the selection rate of whites
(the percentage of whites in the appropriate comparison group who
satisfied the college degree requirement), the plaintiff would have
proven a sufficient disparity. Other courts have used tests of statisti-
cal significance to evaluate evidence of disparity, requiring that the
plaintiff prove that the disparity in selection rates was unlikely to
have occurred by chance.3 15 Some courts have used both approaches,
depending on the circumstances. 3 16
b. Proving Disparate Impact in a Sexual Harassment Case
In light of the requirements for proving disparate impact estab-
lished by courts in the typical qualification standards or selection pro-
cedures case, how would a plaintiff prove that non-targeted workplace
312. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971); see also Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (stating that the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of disparate impact discrimination by showing that "the tests in ques-
tion select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly differ-
ent from [the] pool of applicants").
313. See, e.g., Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002); Waisome v. Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (2d Cir. 1991); Cox v. City of Chi-
cago, 868 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L.
Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model Through New
Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 333 n.22 (1996) ("The four-fifths rule is the dominant
approach for determining whether an employer's selection criterion has systemi-
cally damaged the plaintiffs protected class status").
314. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2002).
315. See, e.g., Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep't, 766 F.2d 650, 658 (1st Cir. 1985);
Hameed v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 637 F.2d
506 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 313, at 333 n.22
(stating that "some courts have relied on a test of statistical significance to deter-
mine whether the pass rates for the plaintiff class and the comparator group are
different").
316. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that, in
evaluating disparate impact claims, the court has looked to both the four-fifths
rule and to "whether the plaintiff can show a statistically significant disparity of
two standard deviations").
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sexual conduct caused a disparate impact on the basis of sex?317
Could a plaintiff ever prove disparate impact in such a case?
As in the typical disparate impact case, it is necessary to decide
what is the comparison group for determining whether there is a dis-
parate impact at all. The best comparison group would be the actual
employees of the particular workplace in question.3 18 The plaintiff
could have all of the employees in the workplace answer a question-
naire or submit to an interview regarding whether and to what extent
they were disturbed, distressed, and/or distracted by the non-targeted
sexual conduct occurring in that workplace and whether and to what
extent such conduct interfered with their ability to perform their jobs.
If the results of the questionnaire or interview indicated that female
employees were disproportionately harmed by the non-targeted work-
place sexual conduct, the court would simply need to determine-
based perhaps on the four-fifths rule or tests of statistical signifi-
cance-whether the disparity proved by the plaintiff was of sufficient
magnitude to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.
The advantages of this kind of workplace-specific evidence are ap-
parent. These statistics would measure directly the effect of the non-
targeted sexual conduct in the particular workplace at issue. Unlike
with national statistics regarding the effect of non-targeted sexual
conduct on workplaces in general, the employer would be unable to
argue that his workers were affected differently by such conduct than
were workers in general. 3 19 The employer would also be unable to
argue that the non-targeted sexual conduct present in its workplace
differed from the conduct involved in the national statistical study. 3 20
Despite the advantages of workplace-specific evidence, such evi-
dence will be difficult or impossible to obtain in many cases. One po-
tential problem is small sample size; as sample size decreases, the
317. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that,
when the alleged impact is on conditions of employment, "determining whether
the protected group has been adversely affected may depend on subjective factors
not easily quantified").
318. See Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1256 (stating that a
showing that non-targeted workplace sexual conduct caused a disparate impact
"should be based not on stereotypical assumptions about the sensibilities of mem-
bers of a protected group, but rather on a particularized factual showing in each
case").
319. See id. at 1257 (arguing that the plaintiff must prove disparate impact "with
highly specific evidence of reactions within the relevant population" which
'should be viewed as the group of employees who actually were exposed to the
workplace speech, obviating the need for approximations, estimates, or extrapola-
tions based on surrogate populations or on samples of a larger population, such
as a local labor pool or more general population").
320. The employer would be unable to argue, for example, that the pornography dis-
played in its workplace differed from the pornography at issue in the national
study, such that the results of the national study were inapplicable to the em-
ployer's workplace.
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results of the sample are more likely to have occurred by chance. 3 21
Where the sample size is small, even if the plaintiff satisfies the four-
fifths rule for proving a disparity, courts may find that the plaintiffs
statistical evidence fails to make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination because the disparity is not statistically signifi-
cant.3 22 Even if an employer employs a large number of employees at
a facility, the plaintiff may still face a sample size problem if only a
small number of those employees are exposed to the particular non-
targeted sexual conduct about which the plaintiff complains. For ex-
ample, the employer may argue that only the employees who work in
the same department as the plaintiff are exposed to the pornography
or sexual joking at issue and thus only those employees constitute the
appropriate comparison group. Moreover, even if a large number of
employees are exposed to the non-targeted sexual conduct, what if the
plaintiff is the only woman, or one of a very small number of women,
in that group? Such a scenario is plausible, given that non-targeted
sexual conduct is more likely to occur in male-dominated work-
places.3 23 Yet a court is unlikely to be persuaded by evidence showing
a disparity between the percentage of male employees negatively af-
fected by non-targeted sexual conduct and the percentage of female
employees negatively affected by such conduct when the number of
female employees is very small.3 24
Another potential problem with workforce-specific evidence re-
garding reactions to non-targeted workplace sexual conduct is the pos-
sibility that some male employees could be dishonest in answering the
questionnaires or participating in the interviews in order to avoid a
finding of disparate impact. In typical disparate impact cases involv-
321. LARSON, supra note 158, § 22.05; see also Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d
1506, 1509 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[tihe size of a sample is of concern
to statisticians insofar as it affects the possibility that a given statistical dispar-
ity resulted from chance").
322. See, e.g., Thomas, 814 F.2d at 1509 (stating that "a sample size of two is too small
to make even a 100% impact rate significant"); Fudge v. City of Providence Fire
Dep't, 766 F.2d 650, 658 (1st Cir. 1985) (asserting that "in cases involving a nar-
row data base, the better approach is for the courts to require a showing that the
disparity is statistically significant, or unlikely to have occurred by chance, ap-
plying basic statistical tests as the method of proof").
323. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
324. Cf. Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that plain-
tiffs failed to prove a disparate impact through evidence showing a disparity in
pass rates between black and white police officers taking an exam for promotion,
because "if two additional black candidates passed the written examination the
disparity would no longer be of statistical importance"); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo,
466 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (finding that plaintiffs failed to prove a
disparate impact through evidence showing that all the firefighters who passed a
test for promotion were white, because the number of blacks taking the test "was
too small to permit a determination by the Court that the results were not simply
due to chance").
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ing qualification standards for some job benefit, there is little reason
to be concerned about members of the majority group conspiring to fail
the qualification standard in order to avoid a disparate impact find-
ing. The members of the majority group presumably want to qualify
to receive the job benefit. In contrast, where a workplace condition
arguably causes a disparate impact on women because the workplace
culture developed according to male norms, some male employees
might want to avoid a disparate impact finding so that the workplace
culture can remain unaltered. Some male employees might realize
that the non-targeted workplace sexual conduct must cease-no more
pornography, no more sexual discussions-only if there is evidence
that such conduct has a disparate impact on female employees. If
such conduct has the same impact on male employees as on female
employees, the conduct would not be discriminatory and would not vi-
olate Title VII. Accordingly, to avoid a disparate impact finding, some
male employees might indicate on the questionnaires or during the
interviews that they are seriously distressed and distracted by the
non-targeted workplace sexual conduct, even when they are not.
In light of these potential problems with workplace-specific evi-
dence, could plaintiffs ever use a broader comparison group? Could
plaintiffs ever prove a disparate impact using national statistics re-
garding gender differences in perceptions of non-targeted sexual con-
duct in the workplace? As discussed above, social scientists have not
examined whether men and women perceive differently non-targeted
sexual conduct in the workplace, as opposed to sexual conduct in the
workplace in general.325 Yet even though social scientists have not
yet conducted the necessary studies, it is reasonable to suspect that
they will do so 3 26 and that such studies will reveal that women per-
ceive non-targeted workplace sexual conduct more negatively than do
men.3 2 7 Compared to workplace-specific evidence, this kind of general
evidence is likely to involve samples of sufficient size, such that there
will be less of a problem with disparities being statistically significant.
In addition, there is less concern that persons participating in the
325. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
326. Social scientists have conducted numerous studies of gender differences in per-
ceptions of workplace sexual conduct in general. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hurt, Jil-
lian A. Maver & David Hoffman, Situational and Individual Influences on
Judgments of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 29 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCH. 1395 (1999); Jeanne Henry & Julian Meltzoff, Perceptions of Sexual Har-
assment as a Function of Target's Response Type and Observer's Sex, 39 SEX
ROLES 253 (1998); Gary N. Powell, Effects of Sex Role Identity and Sex on Defini-
tions of Sexual Harassment, 14 SEX ROLES 9 (1986). Now that the Supreme Court
has emphasized that harassing conduct must be sexually discriminatory in order
to violate Title VII, it is reasonable to suspect that social scientists will explore
the ramifications of the discrimination requirement by studying whether there
are gender differences in perceptions of non-targeted workplace sexual conduct.
327. See supra notes 260-76 and accompanying text.
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study will give dishonest responses in order to avoid a disparate im-
pact finding.
Use of general, non-workplace-specific evidence regarding gender
differences in perceptions of non-targeted sexual conduct in the work-
place presents two serious problems, however. The first problem is
whether the persons in the studies are an appropriate comparison
group to the employees in the plaintiffs workplace. The second prob-
lem is whether the non-targeted sexual conduct at issue in the studies
is an appropriate comparison to the conduct at issue in the plaintiffs
workplace.
Regarding the first problem, employers are likely to argue that
their employees differ significantly from the persons in the studies,
such that even if women in general are more harmed by non-targeted
sexual conduct in the workplace than are men, such evidence does not
prove that a disparity exists in the employers' workplaces. An em-
ployer may point to the age, level of education, socioeconomic status,
or place of residence (whether rural or urban) of its employees as a
basis for arguing that persons in the general, non-workplace-specific
studies are not an appropriate comparison group. Or an employer
may contend that women who choose to become firefighters, for exam-
ple, are less disturbed by non-targeted sexual conduct in the work-
place than are women in general. 32 s
Regarding the second problem, employers are likely to argue that
all non-targeted sexual conduct is not the same and will not cause the
same gender disparity in perception. An employer may contend that
while there might be a gender disparity regarding perceptions of the
pornography that researchers showed or described to participants in a
particular study, there is no gender disparity regarding perceptions of
the specific pornography displayed in the plaintiffs workplace. An
employer may make a similar argument regarding sexual jokes or dis-
cussions, contending that unlike the jokes or discussions described in
the research study, the jokes or discussions in the plaintiffs workplace
are either less offensive to women or offend both men and women
equally. If the research study inquires about perceptions of "pornog-
raphy," "sexual jokes," or "sexual discussions" in general, rather than
328. In his dissenting opinion in Dothard v. Rawlinson, Justice White made a similar
argument. 433 U.S. 321, 348 (1977). He stated that he "was unwilling to believe
that the percentage of women applying or interested in applying for jobs as prison
guards in Alabama approximates the percentage of women either in the national
or state population." Id. In other words, Justice White believed that taller and
heavier women were more likely to want to be prison guards than were shorter
and lighter women, such that the use of a national comparison group was inap-
propriate. The Court majority did not address specifically this argument, stating
only that "there was no reason to believe that physical height and weight charac-
teristics of Alabama men and women differ markedly from those of the national
population." Id. at 330.
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describing particular instances of non-targeted sexual conduct more
specifically, an employer may contend that the terms involved are too
vague for the research study to provide sufficient evidence that the
conduct in the plaintiffs workplace caused a disparate impact on wo-
men. The term "pornography," for example, means different things to
different people, and the fact that more women than men respond to a
research study by saying that they would be distressed by non-
targeted pornography in the workplace does not mean that more wo-
men than men would be distressed by the particular non-targeted por-
nography displayed in the plaintiffs workplace.
Both of these problems present significant obstacles to the use of
general, non-workplace-specific evidence to prove that non-targeted
sexual conduct in the workplace caused a disparate impact on women.
Although the Supreme Court has held that in some cases impact can
be proved using national statistics,329 employers have a strong argu-
ment that perceptions of non-targeted workplace sexual conduct de-
pend so much on the varying characteristics of both the employees and
the conduct itself that a national comparison group is never appropri-
ate. If courts require workplace-specific evidence of impact, however,
few plaintiffs would be able to prove disparate impact.
This proof issue poses the fundamental question explored by this
Article, whether non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace should
be actionable under Title VII. Such conduct will be actionable, if at
all, only under the disparate impact theory of discrimination, which
requires the plaintiff to prove that the conduct had a disparate impact
on women. If one believes that, as a policy matter, non-targeted work-
place sexual conduct should be actionable, it is necessary to accept a
method of proving disparate impact other than work-specific evidence,
because so few plaintiffs will be able to provide such evidence. If one
believes, on the other hand, that such conduct should not be actiona-
ble, enforcing a strict requirement that the plaintiff prove disparate
impact by using the most appropriate comparison group will ensure
that few harassment claims based on non-targeted workplace sexual
conduct will succeed.
If courts are willing to be flexible about a method of proving that
non-targeted workplace sexual conduct caused a disparate impact, two
possible approaches to the proof issue seem the most reasonable.
First, courts could allow a plaintiff who provided workplace-specific
evidence, albeit with a small sample size, to supplement that evidence
with general, non-workplace-specific evidence of gender disparities in
perception of non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace. Courts
have held that a small statistical sample plus additional evidence,
such as expert testimony, can support a finding of disparate im-
329. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330.
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pact.33 0 Second, courts could allow plaintiffs to prove disparate im-
pact by using general, non-workplace-specific evidence of gender
disparities but allow employers to rebut the disparate impact showing
by introducing evidence demonstrating that the general evidence was
inapplicable to the plaintiffs' particular workplaces.331 Employers
would not be able to defeat the plaintiffs' disparate impact showing
simply by arguing that general, non-workplace-specific evidence can
never establish a disparate impact. Rather, an employer would need
to produce evidence demonstrating, for example, that in its workplace
there is no gender disparity regarding perceptions of non-targeted
workplace sexual conduct, or that women who choose to be firefighters
are less disturbed by non-targeted workplace sexual conduct than are
women in general.3 32
4. Another Approach to Proving Disparate Impact in a Sexual
Harassment Case: Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. and Jenson v. Eveleth
Taconite Co.
This Article has examined how plaintiffs might assert that non-
targeted sexual conduct in the workplace constitutes actionable sexual
330. See, e.g., Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 180 F.3d 468, 475 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that, although a sample size of seven women was too small for statistical evi-
dence alone to prove that a fire department's physical agility test had a disparate
impact on women, such evidence coupled with the expert testimony of an exercise
physiologist sufficed to prove disparate impact).
331. Cf Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93 (1973) (rejecting plaintiffs claim
that defendant's policy of refusing to hire aliens had a disparate impact on per-
sons of Mexican national origin, in violation of Title VII, because the evidence
indicated that "persons of Mexican ancestry make up more than 96% of the em-
ployees at the company's San Antonio division, and 97% of those doing the work
for which [the plaintiff] applied").
332. A plaintiff may be able to counter the employer's rebuttal evidence. If the em-
ployer's rebuttal evidence consists of responses to questionnaires indicating that
male employees are just as disturbed by non-targeted sexual conduct in the work-
place as are female employees, the plaintiff may be able to show that-because
male employees knew the purpose of the questionnaire-the questionnaire re-
sults are unreliable.
Additionally, a plaintiff may argue that even if the evidence indicates that
there is no gender disparity regarding perceptions of non-targeted sexual conduct
in her workplace, persons in her workplace are not the appropriate comparison
group. The argument, which seems counterintuitive, is based on the Supreme
Court's recognition in Dothard that actual applicants for jobs as Alabama prison
guards might not be the appropriate comparison group because "otherwise quali-
fied people might be discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized in-
ability to meet the very standard[ ] challenged as being discriminatory." 433 U.S.
at 330. Similarly, a plaintiff may argue that women may have been discouraged
from working in a particular workplace, such as a fire department, because of
their knowledge that the workplace conditions-including non-targeted sexual
conduct-were based on male norms.
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harassment under Title VII, focusing on how plaintiffs might prove
that such conduct had a disparate impact on women. As discussed
above, many courts have ignored the requirement that sexually
harassing conduct be discriminatory in order to be actionable, and
other courts have interpreted the discrimination requirement as satis-
fied only by evidence of disparate treatment. A few courts, however,
have indicated that they might be receptive to a disparate impact ar-
gument in cases involving non-targeted workplace sexual conduct.3 33
The most famous sexual harassment case involving non-targeted
sexual conduct in the workplace is Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc.3 34 The plaintiff in Robinson was one of a small number of
female skilled craftworkers at Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. ("JSI").
She complained about some conduct by her male coworkers that was
directed at her because of her sex, such as a coworker asking her to sit
on his lap, a coworker remarking that "there's nothing worse than
having to work around women," and abusive language written on the
333. For example, in Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc., the female plaintiff claimed
that she experienced a sexually hostile work environment partly because of a
homosexual male coworker's display of a set of postcards depicting males in vari-
ous states of undress. No. 95CIV2926(MBM), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5562
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1998). The district court rejected the plaintiffs claim because
she failed to prove that the conduct was sexually discriminatory: "Insofar as pic-
tures of undressed or partially dressed men are offensive or demeaning, it is un-
reasonable to assume that they are offensive or demeaning only to women.
Indeed, it is most reasonable to conclude that the sexual objectification of one
sex-in this case, males-would be most offensive to members of that sex." Id. at
*41.
On appeal, the court majority did not reach the issue of whether the display of
the sexually provocative pictures of men was sexually discriminatory. 192 F.3d
310 (2d Cir. 1999). However, in a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman reasoned
that the display could be found sexually discriminatory against women under a
disparate impact theory:
IA] jury could reasonably find that a reasonable "person," regardless of
gender, would consider the displayed photos more offensive to women
than to men. The District Court expressed the view that "it is most rea-
sonable to conclude that the sexual objectification of one sex-in this
case, male-would be most offensive to members of that sex." Whether
or not such a conclusion is the "most reasonable" one to be reached
(which I very much doubt), it surely is not the only reasonable conclusion
that could be reached. If probative evidence persuaded a fact-finder that
women are more offended than men by continuous displays of male
nudity, tinged with sexual overtones, that conclusion would be immune
from rejection on summary judgment.
Id. at 321-22; see also Stair v. LeHigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600,
No. 91-1507, 1993 WL 235491 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1993) (holding that the display
at the female plaintiffs work sites of calendars containing photographs of nude
women was discriminatory because it had "a disproportionately demeaning im-
pact on women" and noting that the presence of the calendars made the plaintiff
feel "embarrassed, humiliated, and degraded"), affd without published op., 43
F.3d 1463 (3d Cir. 1994) (table).
334. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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walls in her working areas.3 35 Most of the plaintiffs harassment alle-
gations, however, involved non-targeted workplace sexual conduct,
specifically "the extensive, pervasive posting of pictures depicting
nude women, partially nude women, or sexual conduct."336 The court
noted that this display of pornography was not targeted at women in
the workplace "because no women worked in the jobs when the behav-
ior began."3 37
The Robinson court acknowledged that, because the pornography
was not targeted on the basis of sex, the display of the pornography
could be discriminatory only under a disparate impact theory.338 The
court explained that non-targeted harassing conduct is actionable if it
"is disproportionately more offensive or demeaning to one sex."33 9
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that the
pornography was discriminatory because it had "a disproportionately
demeaning impact on the women now working at JSI."340
The plaintiff in Robinson presented the expert testimony of Dr. Su-
san Fiske on the subject of sexual stereotyping. 3 4 1 Dr. Fiske testified
that both the preconditions for and the effects of sexual stereotyping
existed at JSI, particularly the sex role spillover effect, in which co-
workers and supervisors evaluate women employees as sex objects
rather than based on their merit as workers.342 According to Dr.
Fiske, workplace pornography implicates two of the preconditions for
sexual stereotyping and sex role spillover: priming and a nonprofes-
sional workplace ambience.343 Priming occurs "when specific stimuli
in the work environment prime certain categories for the application
of stereotypical thinking."344 Pornography, along with other non-
targeted workplace sexual conduct such as sexual joking, can prime
men in the workplace to view their female coworkers as sex objects
and to interact with them in that way.3 45 Dr. Fiske testified that,
335. Id. at 1498-99. The graffiti appeared to be targeted at the plaintiff because of her
sex, and included such phrases as "lick me you whore dog bitch," "eat me," and
"pussy." Id. at 1499.
336. Id. at 1494.
337. Id. at 1523.
338. Some courts, however, have failed to recognize that the disparate treatment the-
ory does not encompass conduct that is not targeted on the basis of sex. See, e.g.,
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating
that the "intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving ... porno-
graphic materials . . . is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of
course").
339. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-23.
340. Id. at 1523.
341. Id. at 1502.
342. Id. at 1503.
343. Id. at 1503-05.
344. Id. at 1503.
345. Id.
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similarly, a nonprofessional workplace ambience, in which pornogra-
phy and sexual joking are common, leads men to treat their female
coworkers as sex objects.3 46 Based on Dr. Fiske's testimony, the court
concluded that the pornography displayed at JSI had a disparate im-
pact on women because it "sexualize[d] the work environment to the
detriment of all female employees."3 47
Another case, Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.,348 involved sexual
harassment allegations similar to those in Robinson, including allega-
tions of non-targeted workplace sexual conduct. Male employees ex-
hibited sexually-focused graffiti, photos, and cartoons throughout the
workplace. 34 9 As in Robinson, the plaintiffs in Jenson presented the
testimony of an expert witness on the subject of sexual stereotyping
and its sex role spillover effect.3 50 The expert in Jenson, Dr. Eugene
Borgida, testified that a sexualized work environment-in which sex-
ual photographs, cartoons, and jokes are common-primes men to
think of, evaluate, and act toward their female coworkers in sexual
terms.35 1 Based on Dr. Borgida's testimony regarding sexual stere-
otyping, the court concluded that "the presence of sexual graffiti,
photos, language, and conduct, some of which may have existed at
Eveleth Mines for years prior to women entering the work force" had a
disparate impact on women.3 5 2 According to the court, this non-
targeted workplace sexual conduct "was disproportionately offensive
or demeaning to women" and "told women that the sex stereotypes
reflected in and reinforced by such behavior were part and parcel of
the working environment at Eveleth Mines."3 53
In light of the discussion in the previous subsection, one might
have expected that the evidence of disparate impact at the Robinson
and Jenson trials would focus on whether the women at JSI or Eveleth
Mines were disproportionately disturbed, distressed, or distracted by
the non-targeted sexual conduct, or whether the conduct dispropor-
tionately interfered with their ability to perform their jobs. Instead,
through the expert testimony regarding sexual stereotyping, the
Robinson and Jenson evidence focused primarily on the effect of non-
346. Id. at 1504.
347. Id. at 1523.
348. 824 F. Supp. 847, 879-80 (D. Minn. 1993). The plaintiffs in Jenson also alleged
that the employer discriminated against women in hiring and in conditions of
employment including job assignment, promotion, compensation, discipline, and
training. Id. at 856. In addition, the plaintiffs complained about some harassing
conduct that was directed at them because of their sex, such as a male employee
pretending to perform oral sex on a sleeping female coworker and a woman being
presented with various dildos. Id. at 880.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 880-81.
351. Id. at 881-82.
352. Id. at 884.
353. Id.
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targeted workplace sexual conduct on men. According to the Robinson
and Jenson courts, non-targeted workplace sexual conduct has a dis-
parate impact on women because such conduct causes men to treat
their female coworkers as sex objects. The method of proving dispa-
rate impact discussed in the previous subsection centered on the di-
rect effect of non-targeted pornography or sexual joking on women.
The method used by the Robinson and Jenson courts, in contrast, re-
lied on evidence that such conduct causes men to engage in the dispa-
rate treatment of women, thus indirectly harming women.
The approach to proving disparate impact used by the Robinson
and Jenson courts is certainly different from the approach discussed
in the previous section. Is the Robinson/Jenson "indirect effect" ap-
proach a valid one, and, if so, is it preferable to the "direct effect" ap-
proach? Employers might argue that the indirect effect approach used
by the Robinson and Jenson courts inappropriately combines dispa-
rate treatment discrimination with disparate impact discrimination.
According to the indirect effect approach, the harm that non-targeted
workplace conduct inflicts upon women-the disproportionate impact
of such conduct-is that it causes men to treat women as sex objects.
Employers might contend that plaintiffs should simply prove those in-
stances of disparate treatment, rather than claiming that non-
targeted pornography or sexual joking should be actionable in itself
under the disparate impact theory.
Although the argument against the indirect approach has some
merit, this kind of evidence of disparate impact may be useful in pro-
viding the factfinder with a clearer view of the plaintiffs work envi-
ronment and how that environment harms women. The evidence
provided through the indirect approach-that non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct harms women by causing men to treat them as sex
objects rather than competent workers-may assist the factfinder in
understanding that particular conduct by a male coworker may have
been caused by the plaintiffs sex. For example, such a factfinder, in
light of evidence that pornography pervaded the plaintiffs workplace,
may be more likely to find that a male coworker's sabotage of the
plaintiffs work was caused by her sex. In addition, one could argue
that regardless of whether the harm comes directly or indirectly from
the challenged conduct-here, non-targeted sexual activity in the
workplace-if the conduct causes disproportionate harm to women,
plaintiffs should be able to challenge it under the disparate impact
theory. The reasoning of the court in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co. ,354
moreover, provides additional support for the validity of the indirect
approach to proving disparate impact. According to the Garcia court,
the plaintiffs could prove that the employer's English-only policy dis-
354. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
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proportionately harmed employees of Hispanic origin if they had evi-
dence that the policy caused the workplace atmosphere to be infused
with ethnic tensions or hostility toward Hispanic workers. 3 55 In other
words, the plaintiffs could prove that the policy disproportionately in-
jured Hispanic employees through a showing of indirect effect, by
showing that the policy caused other employees to treat them with
hostility.
Despite the arguments in favor of the indirect effect approach to
proving a disparate impact, the direct effect approach described in the
previous subsection may be preferable. The vast majority of disparate
impact cases involve proving a disparate impact via statistics based on
appropriate comparison groups, and the indirect effect approach is far
removed from this norm, more so than the direct effect approach. In
addition, when compared to the direct effect approach, it is more diffi-
cult to determine how employers could rebut a plaintiffs proof of dis-
parate impact through the indirect effect approach. Could an
employer contend that even if non-targeted sexual conduct in the
workplace generally causes men to treat their female coworkers as sex
objects rather than as competent workers, such conduct did not have
that effect in this employer's workplace? To support that contention,
would the employer need to prove that none of its male employees
treated any female coworker as a sex object?
Both the direct effect approach and the Robinson/Jenson indirect
effect approach should be considered permissible means for proving
that non-targeted workplace sexual conduct had a disparate impact on
women. However, even if a plaintiff proves that her employer uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on wo-
men, the employer will not be liable for disparate impact discrimina-
tion if it can prove that the challenged practice is job-related and
consistent with business necessity. How might this affirmative de-
fense operate in a case involving non-targeted sexual conduct in the
workplace?
D. ... and Is Not Job-Related or Consistent with Business
Necessity
The precise scope of the affirmative defense of business necessity
and job-relatedness is unclear. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,356 its
first disparate impact case, the Supreme Court stated that the "touch-
stone" of the affirmative defense is "business necessity," and that the
employer must prove that the challenged employment practice has "a
manifest relationship to the employment in question." In Dothard v.
355. Id. at 1488-89.
356. 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
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Rawlinson,357 the Court continued to interpret the affirmative de-
fense in a rigorous manner, stating that, to establish the affirmative
defense, the employer must prove that its employment practice is
"necessary to safe and efficient job performance."
In contrast to the Griggs and Dothard strict necessity interpreta-
tions of the affirmative defense, in New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer,358 the Court stated in dicta that the affirmative defense is met
if the employer's "legitimate employment goals of safety and effi-
ciency" are "significantly served by, even if they do not require" the
employment practice at issue. Similarly, in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust,359 a plurality of the Court stated that to satisfy the
defense, the employer must merely "produc[e] evidence that its em-
ployment practices are based on legitimate business reasons." Fi-
nally, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,36 0 a majority of the
Supreme Court adopted the broad business necessity standard stated
in dicta in Beazer and articulated by the plurality in Watson. The
Court stated that the challenged practice need not be "essential" or
"indispensable" to the employer's business; rather, the practice need
only serve, in a significant manner, the employer's legitimate employ-
ment goals.3 6 1 The Court also stated that the employer bears only the
burden of producing evidence that its challenged practice was justi-
fied; the ultimate burden of proof remains with the plaintiff.362
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 did little to clarify the scope of the
defense of business necessity and job-relatedness. The legislation pro-
vides unequivocally that, contrary to the Supreme Court's statement
in Wards Cove, the employer's justification is an affirmative defense to
a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination on which the
employer bears the burdens of production and persuasion.3 63 The
statute is much less straightforward, however, regarding what an em-
ployer must prove to establish the defense. Although the Act provides
that the affirmative defense requires a showing of both job-related-
ness and business necessity, it "offers only a calculatedly ambiguous
understanding of what business necessity means."36 4 The Act ex-
pressly provides that only one specified interpretive memorandum
shall be considered as legislative history relevant to the meaning of
the affirmative defense, and that memorandum states simply that
"[t]he terms 'business necessity' and 'job-related' are intended to re-
flect the concepts enunciated" in Griggs and other pre-Wards Cove de-
357. 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977).
358. 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979).
359. 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988).
360. 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 659-60.
363. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), 2000e(m).
364. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 215, § 3.35.
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cisions.3 65 As discussed above, the Supreme Court cases prior to
Wards Cove did not articulate a single understanding of the affirma-
tive defense; Griggs and Dothard support a strict business necessity
standard, while Beazer and Watson support a relaxed standard. Ac-
cordingly, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not relieve the confusion
concerning which standard to apply, and this confusion has led lower
courts to adopt varying formulations of what an employer must prove
to satisfy the affirmative defense. 36 6
Despite the lack of clarity regarding the meaning of the affirmative
defense, applying the defense to cases involving non-targeted sexual
conduct in the workplace presents no difficult issues. Whether busi-
ness necessity and job-relatedness are interpreted strictly or broadly,
it is unlikely that non-targeted sexual conduct would be job-related or
consistent with business necessity in the vast majority of work-
places.367 In most workplaces, non-targeted sexual conduct, such as
displays of pornography or discussions of sex, could not be considered
manifestly related to the employment in question or necessary to safe
and efficient performance. Moreover, even if the broad interpretation
of the defense is used, it is unlikely that non-targeted sexual conduct
could be viewed as reasonably related to the employer's legitimate
business goals. Sexual pictures, jokes, and discussions are completely
365. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(b); 137 CONG. REc. 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
366. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that employer must prove that the challenged practice is demonstrably neces-
sary to meet an important business goal); Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for
Higher Ed., 929 F. Supp. 583 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding that employer must prove
that "the challenged practice is reasonably necessary to achieve an important
business objective"), affd on other grounds, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997); Stender v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 322 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that employer
must prove that the challenged practice "significantly serves legitimate employ-
ment goals").
367. Steven Willborn contends that the disparate impact model is inapplicable in sex-
ual harassment cases, in part because "the business necessity stage of a disparate
impact case simply does not compute as applied to harassment situations."
Willborn, supra note 50, at 688. He finds it difficult to envision harassing con-
duct that is job-related and consistent with business necessity.
As discussed above, non-targeted workplace sexual conduct will be actionable
under Title VII only if courts allow the discrimination element of sexual harass-
ment to be proved using the disparate impact theory. The fact that employers
would be unable to establish the business necessity defense in most cases involv-
ing non-targeted workplace sexual conduct is not a reason to refuse to find such
conduct actionable or to refuse to apply the disparate impact theory in sexual
harassment cases. If it is difficult to envision harassing conduct that is job-re-
lated and consistent with business necessity, but it is possible to envision facially
neutral harassing conduct that disproportionately injures women, such a scena-
rio supports-rather than undermines-the use of the disparate impact theory in
sexual harassment cases. Moreover, as discussed below, harassing conduct in the
form of non-targeted workplace sexual activity will be job-related and consistent
with business necessity in some cases.
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unrelated to the nature of the work performed at most businesses. In
the cases described at the beginning of this Article, for example, it is
unlikely that it was reasonably related to the legitimate business
goals of the law firm for the male attorneys to discuss their sex lives
and to tell jokes about sex. It is unlikely that it was reasonably re-
lated to the legitimate business goals of the city's computer depart-
ment for one of its employees to view pornography on the Internet
during work hours. It is unlikely that it was reasonably related to the
legitimate business goals of the fire department for the male firefight-
ers to view pornographic magazines and movies in the engine com-
pany's common living areas.
Whether business necessity and job-relatedness are interpreted
strictly or broadly, some non-targeted workplace sexual conduct will
satisfy the affirmative defense in cases in which the employer's busi-
ness and the plaintiffs job are sex-related. For example, if the plain-
tiff works for Playboy magazine, depending upon the nature of the
plaintiffs job, it may be necessary for the efficient performance of her
job that she be exposed to pornographic pictures that are candidates
for publication in the magazine. The plaintiff might be able to argue,
however, that despite the sex-related nature of the business and of her
job, her male coworkers' constant and graphic discussions of their own
sex lives would not be job-related nor consistent with business neces-
sity. A less obvious example of a scenario in which the employer
might satisfy the affirmative defense is where the plaintiff is an attor-
ney in a law firm that defends employers in sexual harassment cases.
It may be necessary for the efficient performance of the plaintiffs job
that she be exposed to detailed information about the sexually harass-
ing conduct alleged in the cases on which she works. Such a plaintiff
could argue, however, that non-case-related jokes about sex told by
other attorneys would not be job-related nor consistent with business
necessity.
In his dissenting opinion in Lynch, Judge Boggs contended that
plaintiffs should not be able to challenge conditions of employment via
the disparate impact theory, partly because he believed that the busi-
ness necessity defense would not be workable in such cases.3 68 Judge
Boggs reasoned that it could rarely be said that any conditions of em-
ployment are "necessary" because almost any condition can be im-
proved at a certain cost. 36 9 Judge Boggs' concern-that allowing
conditions of employment to be challenged via the disparate impact
theory would force employers to make expensive changes to their
workplaces-may be a valid one. This concern, however, does not ap-
ply where the challenged condition of employment is non-targeted sex-
368. 817 F.2d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 1987).
369. According to Judge Boggs, Title VII does not empower courts to determine how
much a condition can be improved without threatening the business. Id.
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ual conduct in the workplace. Employers could change this condition
by eliminating the pornography displays or the discussions of sex,
with little to no out of pocket cost. Although employers may incur
costs associated with enforcing a prohibition of non-targeted work-
place sexual conduct-the costs of training employees on the policy
and responding to complaints that the policy was violated, for exam-
ple-these costs are arguably different from the cost of physically
modifying the workplace that concerned Judge Boggs.
Some employers in non-sex-related businesses may focus on a dif-
ferent "cost" of eliminating non-targeted workplace sexual conduct, ar-
guing that this cost means that the conduct is job-related and
consistent with business necessity. Returning to the cases described
at the beginning of this Article, the fire department may contend that
allowing its firefighters to view pornography in the engine company's
common living areas helps them relax and bond with each other. This
relaxation and bonding is very important in a job that is both stressful
and tedious, in which teamwork is essential. Thus, the fire depart-
ment may argue, allowing its firefighters to relax and bond in the
manner of their choice-including viewing pornography-is reasona-
bly related to its legitimate business goal of having employees men-
tally prepared to fight fires. Similarly, the law firm may contend that
its attorneys spend a great deal of time at the office in a stressful at-
mosphere, and that allowing its associates to relax and bond in the
manner of their choice-including talking about sex-is reasonably
related to its legitimate business goal of having attorneys with suffi-
cient morale to serve the firm's clients well.
This "male bonding as business necessity" argument should be re-
jected. In effect, the employers are arguing that what is good for the
majority of employees should be controlling, because if most employ-
ees are happy, the business will be more successful. Such an argu-
ment is inconsistent with the disparate impact theory. Under the
disparate impact theory, if a neutral practice disproportionately
harms a minority of employees, it is unlawful unless it is justified by
business necessity-despite the fact that eliminating the practice
could be viewed as harming the employees in the majority.3 70 In
Griggs, for example, the Supreme Court held that the employer must
eliminate its test passage and high school diploma requirements be-
cause those requirements disproportionately injured African-Ameri-
370. The authors of one of the leading employment discrimination casebooks explain
this tension within the disparate impact theory as follows:
Imagine a new employer who is considering what employee selection
procedure to adopt. Using a test will result in 90 percent white employ-
ees and 10 percent black employees. In contrast, a structured interview
will result in 70 percent whites and 30 percent blacks. Isn't it clear that
whatever the employer does will have a disparate impact on some group?
ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 225, at 573-74.
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can job applicants. Adopting other requirements that did not have a
disparate impact on African-Americans would, at least when com-
pared with the old requirements, have a disparate impact on white
applicants. That result did not cause the Griggs Court concern. Simi-
larly, courts should reject the argument that non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct is justified by business necessity, despite its negative
impact on female employees, because it makes male employees happy.
The affirmative defense of job-relatedness and business necessity
would not pose an obstacle to disparate impact liability in most cases
involving non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace. In fact, al-
though it is necessary to interpret "employment practice" broadly and
to accept a nontraditional method of proving a disparate impact, it is
plausible that plaintiffs could satisfy all of the statutory requirements
for establishing disparate impact discrimination in sexual harassment
claims based on non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace. Deter-
mining whether non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace should
be actionable, however, requires more than just doctrinal analysis. It
is necessary to explore the public policy implications of finding such
conduct actionable via the disparate impact theory.
V. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH FINDING NON-TARGETED
WORKPLACE SEXUAL CONDUCT ACTIONABLE
A. Conflict with the First Amendment
Finding non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace to be action-
able sexual harassment poses a great potential for conflict with the
First Amendment. A full discussion of the interaction between the
First Amendment and sexual harassment doctrine-a subject which
the Supreme Court has never addressed directly but about which
many scholars have written-is outside the scope of this Article. It is
useful to consider briefly, however, why finding non-targeted work-
place sexual conduct actionable might pose a potential First Amend-
ment problem and whether there is any way to reconcile such a
finding with First Amendment principles.
Numerous commentators have criticized the sexual harassment
doctrine as inconsistent with the First Amendment. 3 7' Much harass-
ing conduct takes the form of speech; in particular, non-targeted work-
place sexual conduct often takes the form of verbal expression, such as
sexual discussions or joking, or graphic expression, such as displays of
371. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Har-
assment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Jules B. Gerard,
The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and
Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1003 (1993).
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pornography. 372 Moreover, Title VII's prohibition of sexually hostile
work environments constitutes state action restricting speech. 3 73 Em-
ployers are compelled to restrict the speech of their employees by the
threat of civil liability if they fail to do so. 37 4
The Supreme Court has stressed that it will scrutinize closely any
restriction of speech based on its content, stating that "above all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content."37 5 This prohibition of content-based restrictions of speech
372. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem
of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 697 (1997) (noting that
harassing conduct can include a wide range of speech, such as sexual proposi-
tions; sexual jokes, cartoons, and innuendo; and pornography); Eugene Volokh,
Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1791, 1800-01 (1992) (stating that alleged harassment may consist, entirely or in
part, of speech, such as sexually explicit comments and pornography displayed in
the workplace).
373. See Browne, supra note 371, at 510-11 (stating that "[a]lthough the primary
method of enforcement of the harassment prohibition is through civil actions be-
tween private parties, imposition of liability by the courts under federal and state
statutes easily falls within the definition of 'state action"'); Charles R. Calleros,
Title VII and Free Speech: The First Amendment is Not Hostile to a Content-Neu-
tral Hostile Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 227, 237 [hereinafter Title
VII and Free Speech] (stating that "[e]fforts by courts or government agencies to
enforce statutes such as Title VII in public or private workplaces .. .constitute
state action and are subject to First Amendment limitations").
374. Private employers may restrict the speech of their employees without raising any
First Amendment concerns because private employers are not state actors. See
Estlund, supra note 372, at 689 (noting that the First Amendment does not pro-
hibit private employers from censoring and punishing their employees' speech);
Volokh, supra note 372, at 1816 (noting that no First Amendment difficulties
arise if a private employer creates an anti-harassment policy on its own). When,
however, "the law condemns employee speech and effectively compels employers
to regulate it," such state action poses the potential for conflict with the First
Amendment. Estlund, supra note 372, at 689. As explained by one scholar, "The
government cannot escape First Amendment scrutiny for its speech restriction by
forcing someone else, on pain of liability, to implement that restriction." Volokh,
supra note 372, at 1817.
375. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable").
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court struck down a city ordinance which
prohibited the display of symbols that amounted to "fighting words"-a category
of speech that the Court had previously held to be appropriate for regulation-
known to "arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others" on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender. 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). The Court explained
that the government cannot selectively regulate speech, even speech falling into
the fighting words category, based on government's disapproval of the speech's
content. Id. at 383-84. Certain categories of expression, such as fighting words,
obscenity, or libel, "can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated be-
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arguably conflicts with many courts' pre-Oncale interpretation of sex-
ual harassment doctrine. Before Oncale, many courts interpreted Ti-
tle VII's prohibition of sexual harassment as encompassing conduct,
including speech, that was sexual in nature, regardless of whether it
was sexually discriminatory. 3 76 Such an interpretation restricted
speech on the basis of its content-whether that content was sexual or
not-and thus arguably was inconsistent with the First Amendment.
As discussed above, since Oncale, courts have focused on the re-
quirement that harassing conduct be discriminatory in order to be ac-
tionable.3 7 7 Most sexual harassment cases involve conduct that
amounts to disparate treatment, conduct that is targeted based on
sex.3 78 A prohibition of targeted conduct is arguably content-neutral,
basing liability not on the content of harassing speech, but rather on
the harasser's selectively targeting speech at one sex in the work-
place.379 Restricting such speech poses little risk to First Amendment
cause of their constitutionally proscribable content," but they are not "categories
of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the
vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable
content." Id. In other words, 'the government may not regulate [speech] based
on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed." Id. at
386.
376. See supra section II.B.
377. See supra section III.B.
378. See supra section III.C.
379. Charles Calleros contends that basing harassment doctrine on selective targeting
of victims due to their membership in a protected class, rather than on whether
allegedly harassing speech is sexual in nature, poses a minimal threat to First
Amendment values. See Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 373, at 262-63. He
points to some dicta from R.A.V. in support of his contention. Id. at 246. In the
first dictum, the Court stated that "'sexually derogatory fighting words,' among
other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against
sexual discrimination in employment practices," implying that the Court would
consider this regulation of speech incidental to Title VII's prohibition of discrimi-
natory conduct. Id. (discussing KA.V., 505 U.S. at 389-90). In the second dic-
tum, the Court stated that "[a] prohibition of fighting words that are directed at
certain persons or groups ... would be facially valid if it met the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. (discussing R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 392). Reading
the dicta together, Calleros reasons that the government can regulate speech,
consistent with the First Amendment, "on the basis of the defendant's targeting
of victims but not on the basis of the political or social content of the speech." Id.
at 248.
Steven Willborn has made a similar argument, relying on the Supreme
Court's statement in Wisconsin v. Mitchell that "'the First Amendment ... does
not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or
to prove motive or intent.'" Willborn, supra note 50, at 720 (quoting 508 U.S. 476,
489 (1993)). According to Willborn, if a plaintiff can prove that her harasser
targeted harassing speech at her because of her sex, finding that such speech
contributed to a hostile work environment would not threaten the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 720-21. Under such circumstances, Willborn reasons, the speech "is
not being regulated directly," but rather 'is merely evidence of illegal discrimina-
tion." Id. at 720-21.
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values. 3so This Article, however, focuses on non-targeted sexual con-
duct in the workplace, which is actionable, if at all, only under a dispa-
rate impact theory of discrimination. This type of restriction of speech
is content-based, not just because of its focus on conduct that is sexual
in nature, but also because it restricts speech based on its differing
impact on male and female listeners. Any use of the disparate impact
theory to prove the discrimination element of sexual harassment
means that regulation of speech will be related to the content of the
expression.3 8 ' Accordingly, finding non-targeted workplace sexual
conduct actionable under the disparate impact theory presents serious
First Amendment concerns. 38 2 As noted by one commentator, "[t]he
Court has never held that generally applicable restrictions are exempt
from First Amendment scrutiny . . . when they operate to restrict
speech because of its communicative impact."383
Even though sexual harassment claims based on non-targeted
workplace sexual conduct would involve content-based restriction of
speech, it may be possible to allow such claims without violating the
First Amendment.384 Charles Calleros reasons that the government
380. According to Charles Calleros, "[slo long as regulation under Title VII is content-
neutral and is not justified on the basis of a desire to suppress speech, First
Amendment values should be satisfied if Title VII's restrictions are reasonably
narrowly tailored to serve a significant or a substantial government interest."
Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1222. He reasons that the
government's interest in eradicating discrimination in the workplace is substan-
tial and discusses several factors relevant to determining whether restrictions on
discriminatory harassing speech are "reasonably narrowly tailored" toward serv-
ing that interest. Id. at 1222-23, 1225-36.
381. See id. at 1250 (stating that when "the discriminatory nature of undirected ex-
pression spring[s] from its impact on viewers rather than on selective reception of
the expression, the content of the expression necessarily plays a greater role in
the regulation, placing the content-neutrality of the regulation in doubt"). Cal-
leros notes, moreover, that RA.V. does not support the argument that restricting
speech based on its disproportionate effect on minorities somehow makes the re-
striction content-neutral: "In R.A.V., selective regulation of bigoted fighting
words presumably would not have been saved by the argument that fighting
words of such content had a disparate impact on minorities .... " Id. at 1254
n.139.
382. The Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. court, which found non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct to be actionable sexual harassment, would disagree with this pro-
position. 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993). The court reasoned that
"acts of expression which may not be proscribed if they occur outside of the work
place may be prohibited if they occur at work," and concluded that, more specifi-
cally, "expression in the workplace that is offensive to and has a psychological
impact on a member of a protected group may be prohibited." Id.
383. Volokh, supra note 372, at 1830 (emphasis removed).
384. Some commentators would reject, on First Amendment grounds, any sexual har-
assment claims based on non-targeted workplace sexual conduct. Eugene
Volokh, for example, contends that the line between permitted speech and pro-
hibited harassment should be drawn "between directed speech-offensive speech
that is targeted at a particular employee because of the employee's race, sex, re-
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has greater authority to regulate speech in the workplace context than
it has in a public forum, because of "government interests in equal
employment opportunities, and in protecting the autonomy and dig-
nity of unwilling listeners who cannot retreat into their homes during
working hours."38 5 Thus, although a content-based restriction of
speech in a public forum would ordinarily require "the most exacting
scrutiny,"38 6 Calleros concludes that liability for the disparate impact
of speech in the workplace can be based on a more lenient standard.38 7
The appropriate standard, according to Calleros, would limit liability
for the disparate impact of workplace speech
to cases in which discrimination through disparate impact is clearly shown, a
substantial adverse effect of the speech on working conditions is established
[through] a properly formulated objective standard, implied consent is clearly
absent, and recipients of the speech are captive in the sense that they have no
feasible way to "avert their eyes."3 8 8
Calleros asserts that perhaps the most important factor in deter-
mining whether Title VII can prohibit workplace speech based on its
disparate impact in light of the First Amendment is the extent to
which an employee is unable to avoid the speech.38 9 Accordingly, to
ligion, or national origin-and undirected speech, such as overheard conversa-
tions between willing employees, or printed matter posted in the workplace."
Volokh, supra note 372, at 1871.
385. Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1255; see also Nadine
Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First
Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 706 (1995) (stating that, due
to "the captive situation of many employees," some "expression that might be pro-
tected in other contexts should not necessarily be protected at work").
386. Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1255 (quoting Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
387. Id.
388. Id. Cynthia L. Estlund has proposed another means of reconciling Title VII's
prohibition of discriminatory harassment with the First Amendment, under
which some non-targeted workplace sexual conduct might be considered unpro-
tected speech. See Estlund, supra note 372, at 695 (explaining that she "pro-
pose[s] a compromise in the form of certain constraints on the manner of
expression in the workplace forum"). According to Estlund, "even speech that is
not directed at a particular individual should forfeit protection if it is made in a
manner that is manifestly and grossly offensive to coworkers on the basis of their
race, sex, religion, or other protected trait and that is not reasonably avoidable by
listeners who are thus offended." Id. at 750. She explains that the widespread
pornography at issue in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991)-the most famous case involving non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct-arguably would be unprotected under her standard: "most of
[the material] could fairly be described as grossly offensive on the basis of sex and
was displayed in areas the plaintiffs could not reasonably avoid during their
workday." Id. at 756.
389. Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 373, at 246-47. This "captive audience"
rationale is an important one. The Robinson court rejected the employer's con-
tention that an order of injunctive relief against future non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct would violate the First Amendment, in part by reasoning that
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avoid a potential conflict with the First Amendment, courts may want
to find non-targeted workplace sexual conduct actionable only where
the plaintiff proves that she was unable to avoid the speech without
limiting her ability to function in the workplace. For example, if the
plaintiff in Coniglio v. City of Berwyn3 90 could have communicated
easily with her boss without viewing the pornography on his com-
puter, the court may not want to allow the plaintiff to rely on the por-
nography in her sexual harassment claim because of First
Amendment concerns. If, on the other hand, the Coniglio plaintiff
could only avoid viewing the pornography by never entering her boss's
office, and if she needed to enter his office on occasion to perform her
job effectively, the court should be more willing to find the non-
targeted sexual conduct actionable. 3 9 1 The female firefighter in
O'Rourke v. City of Providence,392 who complained about stacks of por-
nographic magazines in her engine company's common living areas
and pornographic movies being shown in the company's common sit-
ting area, would be able to prove that she could not avoid the speech;
she would not be required to refrain from entering the engine com-
pany's common living areas in order to satisfy First Amendment con-
cerns. If, however, the male firefighters kept pornography in their
private bedrooms in the company living quarters, 393 finding such con-
duct actionable would be much more likely to violate the First
Amendment.
B. Overprotecting and Stigmatizing Women
Another potential problem with finding non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct actionable is the risk of overprotecting and stigma-
tizing women. Non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace satisfies
the discrimination element of actionable sexual harassment only if it
is disproportionately more harmful to women than it is to men. Find-
"female workers at JSI are a captive audience in relation to the speech that com-
prises the hostile work environment." 760 F. Supp. at 1535.
390. No. 99C4475, 2000 WL 967989, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2000).
391. Of course, a plaintiff establishes a sexually hostile work environment that is ac-
tionable under Title VII only if she can prove that she experienced discriminatory
conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her
employment and to create an abusive working environment. It is unlikely that a
plaintiff could satisfy the severity or pervasiveness requirement just by proving
that she observed her supervisor viewing pornography on the Internet. If, how-
ever, a plaintiff proves that she observed her supervisor viewing pornography on
the Internet under circumstances such that she had no feasible way to avert her
eyes, the court should be willing to consider that non-targeted sexual conduct as a
relevant part of the plaintiffs harassment claims despite any First Amendment
concerns.
392. 235 F.3d 713, 718-19, 722 (1st Cir. 2001).
393. See id. at 719 (stating that each firefighter in the plaintiffs initial engine com-
pany had a private bedroom).
1246 [Vol. 81:1152
2003] SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT 1247
ing such conduct actionable means that courts and employers must
focus generally on the differences between men and women and more
specifically on the possibility that sexual conduct in the workplace
harms women more than it does men.
This issue raises a fundamental dilemma, which Martha Minow
has termed "the dilemma of difference," about the best route to achiev-
ing gender equality in the workplace: "The stigma of difference may be
recreated both by ignoring and by focusing on it .... The problems of
inequality can be exacerbated both by treating members of minority
groups the same as members of the majority and by treating the two
groups differently."39 4 Emphasizing the ways in which men and wo-
men differ-here, the difference in their perception of non-targeted
sexual conduct in the workplace-poses a risk of characterizing wo-
men as needing protection and special treatment. In our nation's his-
tory, gender-conscious laws aimed at protecting women have been
detrimental rather than helpful to gender equality in the work-
place;3 95 such legislation operated to "put women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage."3 96 For example, in 1872, the Supreme Court held that
the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois refusing to grant a wo-
man a license to practice law in the state did not violate the U.S. Con-
stitution,3 9 7 with one Justice declaring that "[tihe natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits
it for many of the occupations of civil life."398 Finding non-targeted
workplace sexual conduct actionable because it disproportionately
harms women may reinforce this detrimental image of women as
timid and delicate.
Ignoring the ways in which men and women differ, however, may
also be harmful to gender equality in the workplace. Workplace condi-
tions, such as non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace, may be
neutral in that the conditions developed without any intent to discrim-
inate against women and both men and women are exposed to the
same conditions. Yet because of our nation's history of job segregation
394. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND THE
AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990); see also Dolkhart, supra note 249, at 169-71 (noting
that, although the equal treatment model of equality "fails to take into account
the real differences of women and minorities," many feminists prefer it because
"any kind of special treatment is a double-edged sword permitting unfavorable as
well as favorable treatment against an historic background of separate spheres
ideology").
395. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a Michigan law
barring women from serving as bartenders in taverns unless they were the wife
or daughter of the male owner); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (up-
holding an Oregon law limiting the hours that women could work in factories or
laundries).
396. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
397. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138-39 (1872).
398. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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by sex, some workplace conditions developed according to male
norms,3 99 and some of those norms disproportionately disadvantage
women. Eliminating the male tilt from seemingly neutral workplace
conditions requires a focus on the different effect such conditions have
on men and women. 400 Absent a focus on the differences between men
and women, workplace conditions that disproportionately and unnec-
essarily harm women will continue to exist.
This same "dilemma of difference" underlies a longstanding debate
over another aspect of sexual harassment doctrine: whether, when de-
termining if harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working en-
vironment, the factfinder should apply the standard of the "reasonable
person" or that of the "reasonable woman." Courts initially applied
the gender-neutral reasonable person standard common in traditional
tort theory.401 In the 1991 case of Ellison v. Brady,40 2 however, the
Ninth Circuit held that severity or pervasiveness should be deter-
mined based on the standard of the reasonable woman.40 3 The court
noted that men and women have different perspectives, such that con-
duct that may not bother most men may offend most women. 40 4 Con-
cerned that the gender-neutral reasonable person standard may be
male-biased and ignorant of women's experiences, the court reasoned
that "a gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables
women to participate in the workplace on an equal footing with
men."405 This rationale is remarkably similar to the argument for
finding non-targeted workplace sexual conduct actionable because of
its disparate impact on women: if a seemingly neutral standard devel-
399. See supra notes 226-44 and accompanying text.
400. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment!
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. SoC. CHANGE 325 (1984-85), re-
printed in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY FoUNDATIONS 128, 131 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed.,
1993) (describing the disparate impact theory as "provid[ing] a doctrinal tool with
which to begin to squeeze the male tilt out of a purportedly neutral legal struc-
ture and thus substitute genuine for merely formal gender neutrality").
401. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1986).
402. 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
403. The court held that "a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman
would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment." Id.
404. Id. at 878. Although the Ellison court focused on gender differences in percep-
tions of workplace sexual conduct, it is important to note that the harassing con-
duct at issue in Ellison was targeted based on the plaintiffs sex. The plaintiff
alleged that one of her male coworkers wrote her passionate letters indicating his
devotion to her and desire to have a relationship with her. Id. at 874. Because a
factfinder could reasonably infer that the coworker would not have sent such let-
ters to another man, the conduct was discriminatory under the disparate treat-
ment theory.
405. Id. at 879.
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oped based on male norms, and that standard favors men, the law
may need to be gender-conscious in order to achieve true gender
equality in the workplace.40 6
Many commentators have rejected the reasonable woman standard
as paternalistic and patronizing to women. They have reasoned that
the reasonable woman standard makes women appear hypersensitive,
overly emotional, and prudish. 40 7 In addition, the reasonable woman
standard may essentialize women by suggesting that there is a single
"women's perspective" possessed by all women, regardless of race,
class, or sexual orientation.4 0 8 Another potential problem involves
how factfinders-some of whom will be male-can apply the reasona-
ble woman standard. They are likely to rely on stereotypes of women
as weak and vulnerable.409 Instituting a gender-specific standard for
406. Commentators' arguments in favor of the reasonable woman standard also paral-
lel the arguments for finding non-targeted workplace sexual conduct actionable
under the disparate impact theory. For example, Caroline Forell contends that
courts should adopt the reasonable woman standard because "[taking women's
perspectives into account helps assure that workplaces are hospitable to both
male and female workers." Forell, supra note 245, at 805; see also Leslie M.
Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the Reasonable Wo-
man Standard Another Chance, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER L. 195, 228 (2001) (arguing
that the reasonable woman standard "liberates [women] from a male-biased legal
tradition"); Abrams, supra note 35, at 1206 (arguing that "[i]fjudges continue to
strive for the ostensibly objective perspective in assessing sexual harassment
claims, then they will succeed primarily in entrenching the male-centered views
of harassment that prevail in many workplaces").
407. See Dolkart, supra note 249, at 204 (arguing that the reasonable woman stan-
dard makes women "appear more vulnerable, more subject to emotion (hypersen-
sitive compared to the male norm), and more prudish"); see also Anita Bernstein,
Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARv. L. REV. 445, 475 (1997)
(contending that the reasonable woman standard "seems to contemplate a fragile,
ultrasensitive victim").
408. Anita Bernstein has argued that those who envision the "reasonable woman" ac-
tually have a particular woman in mind: "white, heterosexual, upper-income,
something of a moderate or liberal feminist, untroubled by intense religious feel-
ing, and a little prissier than the reasonable person in reacting to office shenani-
gans." Bernstein, supra note 407, at 473; see also Kathryn Abrams, The
Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, 1995 Dis-
SENT 48, 50 [hereinafter Reasonable Woman] (noting that some feminists chal-
lenged the reasonable woman standard by arguing that the standard's "unitary
depictions of women replicated the false and exclusory universalism of the gen-
der-neutral approach"); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1398, 1434 (1992) (noting that while "the actions of a reasonable woman may
differ depending on whether she is black or white, rich or poor, a professional or
unemployed,... [tihe reasonable woman standard does not include these multi-
ple perspectives, generating instead a cookie-mold stereotype").
409. See Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Pro-
gress or Illusion?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 654 (1993) (noting that "if the
reasonable woman theory is correct in its core assumption that male triers of fact
cannot understand the reasonable woman's perspective, male judges and jurors
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determining reasonableness, moreover, builds into the law the as-
sumption that men and women think and feel very differently about
sexual conduct in the workplace, which seems likely to entrench such
differences. 410 One state supreme court rejected the reasonable wo-
man standard because of these concerns:
[A] gender-conscious standard could reintrench the very sexist attitudes it is
attempting to counter. The belief that women are entitled to a separate legal
standard merely reinforces, and perhaps originates from, the stereotypic no-
tion that first justified subordinating women in the workplace. Courts utiliz-
ing the reasonable woman standard pour into the standard stereotypic
assumptions of women which infer women are sensitive, fragile, and in need
of a more protective standard. Such paternalism degrades women and is re-
pugnant to the very ideals of equality that the act is intended to protect.4 1 1
In addition, largely because of these concerns, Kathryn Abrams, an
early proponent of the reasonable woman standard, has rejected it,412
as has Barbara Gutek, 413 whose research on gender differences in per-
ceptions of workplace sexual conduct has been cited frequently in sup-
port of the standard.
will be forced either to ignore the standard or to resort to stereotypes of female
behavior").
410. See Franke, supra note 48, at 750 (contending that "[t]he reasonable woman stan-
dard in sexual harassment cases resolves some of the sex-based bias in the law at
the price of potentially normalizing and enforcing certain gender stereotypes or
commonly accepted social norms about women as a group and men as a group");
Cahn, supra note 408, at 1402-03 (asserting that "the use of separate standards
operates to entrench differences between men and women, rather than to estab-
lish a standard that transcends issues of sameness and difference"); Johnson,
supra note 409, at 635 (arguing that codifying the differences between men and
women in a legal standard "cannot help but interfere with genuine legal and so-
cial equality").
411. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Mich. 1993) (interpreting the Michigan
Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. §§ 37.2101-37.2804 (2003)).
Two years after the Ninth Circuit's Ellison decision, the United States Su-
preme Court held in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., that to be actionable harass-
ing conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that "a
reasonable person" would find hostile or abusive. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Al-
though the Court used the reasonable person standard, it did not expressly reject
the reasonable woman standard. Since Harris, the lower courts are divided on
whether to use the reasonable person or the reasonable woman standard. See
Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 582 n.138 (collecting cases).
412. See New Jurisprudence, supra note 117, at 1224 (advocating the gender-neutral
standard of the reasonable person "with a solid base of political knowledge re-
garding sexual harassment"); Reasonable Woman, supra note 408, at 51-52 (as-
serting that a gender-neutral standard of the reasonable person who is
"enlightened concerning the barriers to women's equality in the workplace" is
preferable to the reasonable woman standard).
413. See Barbara A. Gutek & Maureen O'Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reason-
able Woman Standard, J. Soc. IssuEs, Spring 1995, at 151, 161 (concluding that
"it would be more useful to explore the reasons why men and women differ;
rather than to infer that men and women are so different on the issue of sexual
harassment as to require different standards of reasonableness").
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Finding non-targeted workplace sexual conduct actionable under
the disparate impact theory initially appears to avoid many of the
problems presented by the reasonable woman standard. Rather than
simply instructing a factfinder, who may be male, to determine how a
reasonable woman would perceive certain conduct, the disparate im-
pact approach set out in this Article requires the plaintiff to prove that
non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace had a disparate impact
on women. Finding a disparate impact would require proof based on
objective facts rather than overgeneralizations based on assumptions
and stereotypes about women. 4 14 The disparate impact approach
would not entrench in the law the assumption that men and women
are different; the plaintiff must prove such differences.
Viewing the method of proving a disparate impact with a more crit-
ical eye, however, reveals that it has more in common with the reason-
able woman standard than initially might be apparent. If a plaintiff
proved that non-targeted sexual conduct had a disparate impact on
women in her workplace by using workplace-specific evidence, the
factfinder would be required to engage in few assumptions and gener-
alizations about women. As discussed above, however, many plaintiffs
will be unable to produce such evidence. Instead, they will need to
rely on non-workplace-specific evidence demonstrating how women in
general react to non-targeted workplace sexual conduct.4 15 The fur-
ther removed the evidence of disparate impact is from evidence of the
situation in the plaintiffs own workplace, the more the factfinder
must base his or her decision on generalized views of what women
think and how women react, thus essentializing women.
One response to the argument that finding non-targeted workplace
sexual conduct actionable risks overprotecting and stigmatizing wo-
men is that such a danger is inherent in the disparate impact ap-
proach. All disparate impact claims, unlike disparate treatment
claims, require the plaintiff to prove that persons differ from each
other based on their membership in a protected class. Thus all dispa-
rate impact claims could raise the specter of inferiority, of stigma-
tizing a particular group by sending the message that persons of that
group cannot compete if treated the same as others. Nonetheless,
Congress made the policy judgment to allow such claims when it
amended Title VII to codify the disparate impact theory of discrimina-
tion. That policy judgment by Congress, one could argue, means that
414. See Title VII and the First Amendment, supra note 120, at 1256 (asserting that
proving a disparate impact "should be based not on stereotyped assumptions
about the sensibilities of members of a protected group, but rather on a particu-
larized factual showing in each case").
415. If a plaintiff uses the Robinson/Jenson indirect effect approach to proving a dispa-
rate impact, the plaintiff will rely on how this non-targeted workplace sexual con-
duct makes men in general react, and how that reaction affects women in
general.
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non-targeted workplace sexual conduct should be actionable despite
the risk of stigmatizing women.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that finding non-
targeted workplace sexual conduct actionable may present a greater
risk of stigmatizing women than does the typical disparate impact
case involving a challenge to an employer's qualification standards or
selection procedures. In the typical disparate impact case, the plain-
tiff is arguing that the employer's system for hiring employees, such
as a test passage requirement, disproportionately excludes persons in
the plaintiffs protected class. Implicit in the plaintiffs claim is the
argument that if this unnecessary obstacle to entry is removed, the
plaintiff and other persons of that protected class can succeed on the
job under its existing conditions, just like persons outside the pro-
tected class.
In contrast, a claim that non-targeted sexual conduct in the work-
place has a disparate impact on women involves asking an employer
to do much more than merely remove an obstacle to entering a job.
Asserting that an employer needs to alter the conditions of a job in
order to allow women to function well in the workplace seems more
likely to create the stigmatizing impression that women cannot be as
successful in the workplace as men unless they receive special treat-
ment. Such an assertion will have effects outside the courtroom; it
will influence employers. Telling employers-and causing employers
to tell their employees-that they must eliminate sexual conduct from
the workplace, despite the lack of any discriminatory intent, because
such conduct hurts women 4 16 may reinforce the views of some employ-
ers and employees that women differ so much from men that they do
not belong in certain workplaces. 4 17
416. One response to this argument may be that employers do not face Title VII liabil-
ity for any and every instance of harassing conduct; rather, conduct becomes ac-
tionable sexual harassment only when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment.
See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. Thus employers need not eliminate all sexual conduct
from their workplaces but only sexual conduct that crosses the severity or perva-
siveness threshold. As Eugene Volokh has noted, however, employers are likely
to find little comfort in the notion that they will be liable for harassing conduct
only if it crosses the severity or pervasiveness threshold, because the location of
that threshold is unclear. Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Envi-
ronment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 635-36 (1997). "Severe,"
"pervasive," and "abusive" are vague terms which provide employers with little
guidance about what conduct they should prohibit. Id. Accordingly, the message
that employers are likely to hear-and to repeat to their employees-is, "We have
to get rid of everything sexual because it upsets women."
417. Moreover, the effect of allowing non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace to
be actionable via the disparate impact theory may not be that all such conduct
vanishes from the workplace. Rather, the effect may be that male employees en-
gage in certain kinds of non-targeted workplace sexual conduct-like discussions
or joking about sex-when female employees are not around. Such sex segrega-
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In addition, a disparate impact challenge to non-targeted sexual
conduct in the workplace may be more likely to stigmatize women
than would a disparate impact challenge to other conditions of em-
ployment. In Lynch, for example, the court's finding that, because of
the different anatomy of men and women, women are more likely to
become physically ill after using dirty toilets seems unlikely to rein-
force stereotypes that historically have disadvantaged women. Argu-
ing that non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace has a disparate
impact on women, however, reinforces the stereotype that sex and sex-
ual expression are bad for women, which has disadvantaged women in
the past. For example, the desire to protect women from sexual lan-
guage led the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1949 to uphold a statute
allowing women to serve on juries only if they specifically volun-
teered.418 The court reasoned that "[ciriminal court trials often in-
volve testimony of the foulest kind, and . . . the use of filthy and
loathsome words, references to intimate sex relationships, and other
elements that would prove ... degrading to a lady."4 19
C. Reemphasizing the "Sexual" in Sexual Harassment
Yet another potential problem with finding non-targeted work-
place sexual conduct actionable is the risk that doing so will encourage
courts and employers to focus their anti-harassment efforts primarily
on eliminating sexual conduct from the workplace. As discussed in
Part II of this Article, for many years courts understood sexual har-
assment law to prohibit only workplace conduct that was sexual in
nature, ignoring instances of gender-based abuse that did not involve
sexual conduct. Not surprisingly, employers understood sexual har-
assment law the same way, and many employers' anti-harassment
policies still describe the prohibited conduct as sexual in nature.42 0
Since Oncale, however, courts have started recognizing that sexual
tion in workplace socializing seems likely to hurt, rather than help, the ability of
women to achieve workplace equality.
418. See Strossen, supra note 385, at 726 (citing Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424 (Ark.
1949)).
419. Bailey, 219 S.W.2d at 428.
420. As part of a panel discussion on workplace harassment, Vicki Schultz noted that
she had looked at employers' sexual harassment policies and discovered the
following:
Almost all of them defined sex harassment primarily, if not exclusively,
in terms of sexual misconduct. They had adopted isolated policies and
procedures for dealing with sex harassment, rather than dealing with it
as an aspect of a broader anti-discrimination program. Unfortunately,
they did not see eradicating harassment as part of a larger, more affirm-
ative project of creating a company culture that is gender-integrated and
welcoming to both sexes.
Vicki Schultz, Panel VI: Fighting Gender and Sexual Orientation Harassment, 9
J.L. & POL'Y 417, 424 (2001).
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harassment is not just about sexual conduct. They have started recog-
nizing that Title VII prohibits sex discrimination and that sexual con-
duct is neither necessary nor sufficient to satisfy the discrimination
element of a sexual harassment claim.
Finding non-targeted workplace sexual conduct actionable, how-
ever, will reemphasize the "sexual" component of sexual harassment
law, creating a risk that courts and employers will return to their ear-
lier limited understanding of what conduct constitutes sexual harass-
ment. Such regression would hurt many sexual harassment plaintiffs,
even some whose complaints of harassment include allegations of non-
targeted workplace sexual conduct. The female firefighter in
O'Rourke v. City of Providence,421 for example, complained about por-
nographic magazines and movies in her engine company's common liv-
ing areas and about the male firefighters' frequent discussions of their
sex lives. The plaintiff also alleged other, nonsexual conduct that was
targeted at her because of her sex and was discriminatory under the
disparate treatment theory.422 She alleged that, following a major
fire at which several firefighters had made mistakes, her supervisors
yelled only at her and had only her involuntarily transferred to an-
other engine company.423 She alleged that the male firefighters at
her new engine company ostracized her; forced her to take details
when it was not her turn to do so; refused to give her directions when
she was driving, even though they commonly helped each other with
directions; refused to provide her with feedback on her performance;
and glued her locker shut.4 24
These instances of nonsexual conduct were arguably more severe
than the non-targeted sexual conduct that the plaintiff experienced.
It seems likely that, if given a choice between her employer putting a
stop to the disparate treatment she received from her supervisors and
coworkers and her employer putting a stop to the non-targeted sexual
conduct in her workplace, the plaintiff would choose the former. One
could argue, of course, that the plaintiff should not have to make such
a choice: Title VII prohibits both disparate treatment and disparate
impact, and the plaintiff has the right to a work environment free
from harassment that is discriminatory under either theory. In light
of courts' and employers' histories of understanding sexual harass-
ment as involving only sexual conduct, however, it is possible that
finding non-targeted sexual conduct actionable will renew the belief
421. 235 F.3d 713, 718-19, 722 (lst Cir. 2001).
422. In addition to the non-targeted sexual conduct and the targeted nonsexual con-
duct that the plaintiff experienced, she also alleged several instances of targeted
sexual conduct. For example, male firefighters commented on her breasts and
her scent, blew in her ear, snapped her bra, propositioned her for sex, and said
that she had "nothing but big tits." Id. at 718, 723.
423. Id. at 720-21.
424. Id. at 722-23.
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that the way to stop sexual harassment is simply to eliminate all sex-
ual conduct from the workplace. Courts and employers will continue
"to focus obsessively on sexual conduct," rather than attempting to
eradicate the "arguably more common, non-sexual forms of gender-
based hostility that women . . .endure every day in workplaces all
over the country."4 2 5
D. A Practical Problem: No Jury Trials for Disparate
Impact Claims
Along with the public policy issues raised by finding non-targeted
workplace sexual conduct actionable, there is also a practical problem
with allowing plaintiffs to allege that such conduct constituted dis-
criminatory harassment under the disparate impact theory. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 authorized jury trials and compensatory and puni-
tive damages for plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination under
Title VII.426 The statute provides, however, that plaintiffs alleging
disparate impact discrimination cannot receive a jury trial and cannot
recover compensatory or punitive damages. 4 27
This distinction between the rights and remedies for disparate
treatment and disparate impact discrimination presents no significant
difficulty in sexual harassment claims the plaintiff concedes are based
completely on non-targeted workplace sexual conduct. In such cases,
the judge would simply determine whether the plaintiff has proven
disparate impact discrimination along with the other requirements for
a sexual harassment claim.4 28 If the judge finds that the plaintiff has
proven her case, the judge could award prospective relief, requiring
the employer to eliminate the disproportionately harmful non-
targeted sexual conduct. 42 9
In many cases, however, the plaintiff will not concede that all of
the harassing conduct she experienced was non-targeted. 4 30 Rather,
the plaintiff will allege some conduct that might be discriminatory
425. Schultz, supra note 420, at 421.
426. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) and (c) (2000).
427. Id.
428. The other requirements of a sexual harassment claim include the severity or per-
vasiveness of the harassing conduct and a basis for employer liability. Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 72 (1986).
429. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 215, § 4.26 (stating that "Title VII plaintiffs
who prevail only by demonstrating the disproportionate adverse impact of neu-
tral practices ... are still limited to the traditional, equitable Title VII remedies
of prospective relief and back pay").
430. Plaintiffs, of course, have an incentive to argue that they experienced harassing
conduct that was targeted based on their sex, rather than non-targeted sexual
conduct, because they can recover compensatory and punitive damages only for
the former. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) and (c).
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under the disparate treatment theory and some non-targeted sexual
conduct that could only be discriminatory under the disparate impact
theory.431 Under such circumstances, it appears that the appropriate
procedure would be as follows. First, the jury would determine what
conduct was targeted based on sex and could award compensatory
and/or punitive damages based on that conduct. Second, the judge
would determine what conduct was discriminatory under the dispa-
rate impact theory4 32 and could award prospective relief based on that
conduct.
The problem with separating the consideration of harassing con-
duct in this manner is that harassment must cross a threshold of se-
verity or pervasiveness in order to be actionable under Title VII at all.
All discriminatory conduct in the workplace does not violate Title VII.
Rather, unless there is a tangible employment action, discriminatory
conduct violates Title VII only if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment and to create an abusive work en-
vironment. 4 33 Dividing harassing conduct into two groups-the con-
duct that is disparate treatment and the conduct that has a disparate
impact-means that it is less likely that the conduct in either group
will be sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. 4 34 Given that
this problem is caused by the express language of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, no judicially-created solutions to it are apparent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Should non-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace be actionable
under Title VII? Plaintiffs may be able to meet all the doctrinal re-
quirements necessary to prove that such conduct has a disparate im-
pact on women, thus satisfying the discrimination element of
actionable sexual harassment. Finding such conduct actionable via
the disparate impact theory, however, presents several public policy
concerns: concerns about the First Amendment implications of the
431. This was the situation facing the female firefighter in O'Rourke v. City of Provi-
dence. See supra text accompanying notes 421-24.
432. This may include conduct that the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued to the jury was
targeted based on her sex. For example, the plaintiff may have argued that cer-
tain pornography displayed in the workplace was intended to make her uncom-
fortable and thus was targeted based on her sex. If the jury rejects that
argument, the judge could still find the pornography display discriminatory
under the disparate impact theory.
433. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998); Harris, 510
U.S. at 21.
434. A similar problem existed prior to Oncale, when many courts considered only con-
duct that was sexual in nature in determining whether the plaintiff alleged ac-
tionable sexual harassment. By considering only some of the harassing conduct
alleged by the plaintiff, courts were less likely to find that the harassment
crossed the severity or pervasiveness threshold. See supra notes 61-64 and ac-
companying text.
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government restricting speech based on its effect on listeners; con-
cerns that emphasizing the differences between men and women will
stigmatize women; and concerns that courts and employers will con-
centrate their anti-harassment efforts on eliminating sexual conduct
from the workplace, ignoring non-sexual forms of gender-based abuse.
What is the best way to balance these concerns against the value
served by allowing such conduct to be actionable: eliminating a work-
place condition that developed according to male norms and is dispro-
portionately, and unnecessarily, harmful to women?
Perhaps the best method of striking a balance is for courts to find
non-targeted workplace sexual conduct actionable via the disparate
impact theory only if the conduct's disproportionate impact on women
is great. Currently, because research has not been done specifically on
the extent to which men and women perceive differently non-targeted
sexual conduct in the workplace, the size of the disparity is unclear.
Only if there is a great disparity between the effect of such conduct on
women and on men is it worth running the risk to free speech, the risk
of overprotecting and stigmatizing women, and the risk of reem-
phasizing the sexual aspect of sexual harassment law.
